

JPRS-UPA-91-019
9 APRIL 1991

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ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

19991028 094

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NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Law, Decree on Soviet Militia Published

91UN1119A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 16 Mar 91 pp 2, 4

["Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Soviet Militia"]

[Text] Section I: General Provisions

Article 1. The Militia in the USSR

The Soviet militia is an armed state law enforcement organization which protects the citizens, their rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests, and the Soviet society and state from criminal and other illegal encroachments.

Article 2. Main Tasks of the Militia

The main tasks of the militia are:

- to ensure the personal safety of the citizens and preserve law and order;
- to prevent crimes and other legal violations;
- to detect crimes rapidly and completely;
- to protect property from illegal encroachment;
- to participate in rendering social and legal aid to the population;
- to carry out criminal punishments and administrative penalties.

It is prohibited to call in the militia to perform tasks not assigned to them by legislation. Nobody except organs and officials directly authorized by law has the right to intervene in the activity of the militia.

Article 3. Principles of the Activity of the Militia

The activity of the militia is arranged in keeping with the principles of law and order, respect for the individual, social justice, democratism, internationalism, humanism, interaction with labor collectives and the population, and constant awareness of public opinion.

Article 4. Glásnost in Militia Activity

Militia activity is public and open to the citizens, the public, and the mass media.

The militia informs state organs, public associations, labor collectives, the population, and the mass media about the conditions of law and order and means of reinforcing it.

Information comprising state, job, or commercial secrets and also information affecting the personal life, honor, and dignity of citizens obtained during the process of performance of duty must not be divulged except in cases stipulated by the law.

Article 5. The Legal Basis of Militia Activity

The legal basis of militia activity is comprised of: the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the republics; the present law and other legislative acts of the USSR and republics; ukases of the USSR president; normative acts of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and normative acts of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ministries of internal affairs of the republics.

Article 6. Militia Service and Its Peculiarities

USSR citizens who, in terms of their personal, moral, and business qualities, education, and health, are capable of performing the duties assigned to them are accepted into the militia on a voluntary basis.

Militia workers take an oath.

Militia workers are assigned special ranks in keeping with existing legislation and are issued documents and uniforms according to the established model.

The commission of crimes or actions that are cruel or that degrade the honor and dignity of citizens is incompatible with service in the militia.

The appointment to a position, job transfers, or firing of a worker must not be related to his participation or failure to participate in the activity of public associations or to his religion.

Militia workers are forbidden: to engage in any kind of entrepreneurial activity; to organize strikes or participate in them; to moonlight in enterprises, institutions, or organizations, with the exception of scientific, creative, or teaching activity.

The conditions and procedure for serving in the militia are established by legislation of the USSR and the republics.

Article 7. Organization of the Militia

The militia is subdivided into Union and republic.

The militia is a part of the system of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The organizational structure, staff, and location of the Union militia are determined according to the procedure established by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, and the republic militia—according to the procedure established by the Republic Government.

Republic legislation may envision the creation of a local militia by the soviets of people's deputies.

The soviets of people's deputies monitor the work of the militia with the exception of the militia's criminal-procedural, administrative-jurisdictional, and operational-search activities.

Article 8. Participation of State Organs, Public Associations, Labor Collectives, and Citizens in the Performance of Militia Tasks

The militia performs the tasks assigned to it in interaction with state organs, public associations, labor collectives, and also community formations created for assisting the militia in maintaining public order.

State organs, labor collectives, officials, and public associations must assist the militia in maintaining order and fighting crime.

It is the duty of the USSR citizen to aid the militia in all ways to maintain public order.

USSR citizens may work as supernumerary militia workers on a voluntary basis. The rights and responsibilities of supernumerary militia workers are determined by legislation.

Article 9. Enlisting Other Workers of Internal Affairs Organs and Military Servicemen To Perform Militia Tasks

Workers of internal affairs organs and students and auditors at educational institutions of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and republic internal affairs ministries who are not militia workers, in the event that they are enlisted in keeping with existing legislation to maintain public order and public safety and to fight crime, are assigned the duties and granted the rights and guarantees of legal and social protection established for militia workers. These individuals bear the same responsibility as militia workers.

Military servicemen may be enlisted in cases envisioned by the law to implement measures coordinated with the republics for maintaining public order and public safety.

In cases where they are enlisted to maintain public order and public safety, military servicemen are assigned the duties envisioned by points 3, 11, 12, and 25 of Article 11, and they are granted the rights listed in points 1, 2, 17, 18, 23, 24, and 25 of Article 12 and Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the present law, and also the guarantees of legal and social protection and the provisions for responsibility established for militia workers.

Section II: Militia Jurisdiction

Article 10. Delimitation of Functions Between Union and Republic Militias

I. Within the competence of the Union militia are:

- the determination of the strategy for fighting crime; the development and leadership of the implementation of Union programs for fighting crime and maintaining public order;
- general leadership (coordination) of militia activity and implementation of measures coordinated with the republics for upholding the law and protecting the

rights and freedoms of the citizens, protecting property, maintaining public safety and public order, and fighting crime;

- leadership of the militia on the country's transportation systems;

- control of militia forces and means when conducting Unionwide and interrepublic measures for fighting crime and maintaining public order;

- the fight against the most dangerous crimes, organized crime, corruption and drug trafficking, crimes arising from ethnic or racial hostility or contempt that are of an interrepublic, Unionwide, or international nature;

- organization and implementation of a Union search for citizens in cases stipulated by legislation;

- protection of special security facilities under Union jurisdiction, the fight against crime, and the maintenance of public order at these facilities;

- provision of a unified system of monitoring and informational- analytical activity of the militia; the formation of Union reference information supplies and operational and criminal reporting;

- development of Unionwide rules for road traffic and also state safety standards;

- organization of control over the implementation of legislation on questions of the acquisition, storage, and shipment of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other objects, substances, and materials determined by USSR legislation;

- organization of the implementation of USSR legislation on the passport system and legislation of the USSR and Union republics and international agreements on citizenship and on foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship entering, visiting, transiting, and leaving the USSR, and USSR citizens leaving and entering the USSR;

- interaction with the International Organization of Criminal Police (Interpol); coordination of international cooperation of the militia of the republics in the sphere of fighting crime.

The militia may also have jurisdiction over other functions in keeping with agreements between the USSR and the republics.

II. The jurisdiction of the republic militia includes:

- preventing crime and other violations of the law, detecting, stopping, and solving crimes;
- maintaining public order and providing for public safety;

- commanding the militia on republic transportation systems;

- searching for criminals, missing persons, and other individuals in cases envisioned by legislation;
- executing criminal punishments and administrative penalties within the competence of the militia;
- implementing legislation on the passport system, on foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship entering, visiting, transiting, and leaving the USSR, and USSR citizens' entry and departure from the USSR, and also questions of citizenship;
- providing for safety of road transportation and registration of automotive transportation;
- monitoring the acquisition, storage, and shipment of firearms, ammunition, explosive substances, and other objects, substances, and materials, and providing for the opening and functioning of facilities in keeping with a list determined by USSR legislation;
- participating in the rendering of social and legal aid to the population;
- organizing and providing protection of property on the basis of agreements.

By republic legislation, other functions not envisioned by the present law and not included in the competence of the Union militia may also be placed within the competence of the republic militia.

III. The procedure for assigning forces and funds to the republic militia for carrying out tasks of maintaining law and order and fighting crime on the territories of other republics is determined by intergovernmental agreements.

Article 11. Duties of the Militia

I. The militia must:

- 1) prevent crime and other legal violations: detect the causes and conditions contributing to the commission of crimes and other legal violations; take measures for their elimination; conduct individual prevention work with law breakers; participate in the legal education of the citizens;
- 2) detect, intercept, and report crimes;
- 3) maintain public order on the streets, in the squares and parks, on the highways, in the airports, and in other public places;
- 4) in conjunction with other state organs and public associations, prevent children from being left unsupervised;
- 5) accept and register incoming information about crimes and other legal violations and also about the individuals who have committed them;
- 6) respond immediately to statements and information about crimes; when there is a legal basis, initiate criminal proceedings or refuse to initiate them; conduct inquiries; carry out pretrial preparation of materials according to protocol form;
- 7) carry out orders and instructions from the procurator or investigator concerning search and investigation activities and also render assistance to them in conducting investigations;
- 8) take measures to protect the person and property of witnesses, victims, and other individuals whose life, health, and property are in jeopardy because of the assistance they have rendered to law enforcement organs in preventing and solving crimes;
- 9) identify and locate individuals who have committed crimes and have escaped investigation, inquiries, and trial, who have failed to carry out their criminal punishment, who are missing, and also other individuals in cases envisioned by legislation;
- 10) within the limits of their authority, monitor the implementation by citizens and officials of the decisions of organs of state power and administration regarding questions of maintaining public order and fighting crime;
- 11) take immediate measures to clean up after catastrophes, fires, natural disasters, and other extraordinary events, rescue people and render them aid, and protect property that has been left unattended;
- 12) render immediate aid to victims of legal violations and accidents who are helpless and also who are intoxicated, if they are unable to move by themselves or could cause harm to themselves and others;
- 13) within the limits of their authority, provide for traffic safety; check on the observance of rules, norms, and standards in this sphere; and register and account for means of automotive transportation and the issuance of drivers' licenses;
- 14) participate in the implementation of measures envisioned by legislation for the protection of nature and ecological safety;
- 15) provide for the observance of rules for the acquisition, storage, and shipment of arms, ammunition, explosives, strong chemical, toxic, and other objects, substances, and materials, and the opening and functioning of facilities on lists determined by USSR legislation;
- 16) issue passports and also permits for entering the border zone, and register the exit and entry of citizens; check on the observance by citizens and officials of the passport system rules established by legislation;
- 17) provide for the enforcement of rules established by legislation for foreign citizens to enter, visit, transit, and exit the USSR and also enforce legislation of the USSR and republics on questions of citizenship;
- 18) guard property on the basis of agreements;

19) carry out court decisions, resolutions of procurators and investigators, resolutions of commissions for affairs of minors to bring in individuals who have failed to respond to summons, and also resolutions of procurators and resolutions of investigators, sentences, and determinations which they sanction, and court resolutions to place individuals under guard or send them to therapeutic-labor or educational-labor facilities;

20) work on cases of administrative legal violations;

21) in cases envisioned by legislation, provide for administrative supervision of individuals released from places of incarceration; monitor the behavior of individuals with suspended sentences, with mandatory employment, and also convicted persons whose prison terms have been delayed; contribute to finding jobs and housing for individuals who have served their time or completed their course of compulsory treatment in educational treatment facilities and also those who previously engaged in prostitution and panhandling;

22) provide for the storage of documents, objects, and valuables that have been found and turned in to the militia, and take measures to return them to their legal owners;

23) within the limits of their authority, execute criminal punishments and administrative penalties;

24) protect and provide for group movement of individuals who have been arrested and placed under guard;

25) protect the rights and legitimate interests of individuals delivered to the militia, detained and arrested, take measures for immediately rendering them medical and other aid if necessary, and also explain to citizens the grounds and justification for restricting their rights and freedoms.

II. Within the limits of its authority and in cases envisioned by legislation of the USSR and republics, the militia provides assistance to people's deputies, candidate people's deputies, state organs, officials, and also public associations, their organs, and their representatives in performing their official duties.

Article 12. Rights of the Militia

In order to perform the duties assigned to it, the militia is granted the right:

1) to demand from citizens and officials the observance of public order and the curtailment of legal violations and actions preventing the exercise of the authority of the militia, and if these requirements are not met, to apply coercive measures envisioned by the law;

2) when there are grounds for suspicion of the commission of a crime or the actual commission of a crime or other legal violations, to check the identity documents and also other documents necessary to verify the observance of rules for whose fulfillment the militia is responsible;

3) to compose protocols of administrative legal violations; for the purpose of preventing legal violations, when other methods of influence have been exhausted, to take individuals who have committed administrative legal violations to the militia or other official premises and detain them for a period of up to three hours, if no other period is established by the law, and conduct searches of their persons, searches of objects, and confiscation of objects and documents;

4) in cases envisioned by law, to impose administrative penalties or transfer materials on administrative legal violations for the consideration of the comrades' court, public organization, or labor collective;

5) to keep track of individuals released from prison and taken under administrative supervision, enter their residences for inspections at any time of the day or night, register individuals under surveillance, and apply to them restrictions envisioned by legislation of the USSR and republics;

6) according to the procedure established by law, to detain in specially allotted premises individuals arrested for prostitution and panhandling who have been conventionally convicted and conventionally sentenced to mandatory labor and conventionally released from the place of incarceration with mandatory labor, and those who have been arrested for leaving the administrative rayon without the permission of the administration of the special commandant's office;

7) to arrest and detain in receiving and distribution facilities for minors, in cases envisioned by the law, individuals who have not reached 18 years of age who have been left without a guardian or who have committed socially dangerous acts if they must be immediately isolated, and also minors sent to special training-educational institutions and therapeutic-educational correction facilities;

8) in cases where there are no military patrols, to arrest military servicemen who are disturbing the peace and turn them over to the military commandant's office or commander of the troop unit;

9) to arrest people suspected of committing crimes and detain them under guard, in keeping with criminal procedural legislation of the USSR and Union republics;

10) to summon people to the militia office concerning cases and materials on which they are working;

11) to deliver to medical sobering-up facilities or, when these are not available, specially equipped premises of the militia duty stations and detain in them until they are sober individuals who have been intoxicated in public places if they have offended human dignity and social morality or if they have lost their ability to walk or could cause harm to themselves and those around them;

12) to identify and keep track of individuals subject to preventive measures on the basis of and according to the procedure established by legislation;

13) in cases and according to the procedure established by law, to bring people in for questioning and also deliver them to medical facilities;

14) in cases envisioned by law, to give citizens official warnings about the inadmissibility of antisocial behavior and register these people;

15) to photograph, make sound recordings, movies and videotapes, fingerprint, and register individuals: arrested on suspicion of crimes or prostitution and panhandling; under house arrest; accused of committing premeditated crimes; subject to administrative arrest;

16) to conduct overt and covert operational search measures, including with the use of technical means, for purposes of prevention, detection, interception, and reporting of crimes; to use the information obtained in cases and according to the procedure envisioned by the law;

17) to temporarily restrict or prohibit citizens' access to individual sections of the area or facilities in order to maintain public order, protect the life and health of the citizens, and also to conduct individual investigation activities;

18) in order to intercept crimes and prosecute people suspected of committing crimes, during natural disasters and other extraordinary circumstances and events that threaten public order or the personal safety of citizens, to enter unimpeded at any time of day the residences and other premises belonging to citizens and the grounds or premises of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and inspect them;

19) when conducting measures for discovering crimes in the sphere of the economy:

—to enter unimpeded the grounds and premises of enterprises, institutions, and organizations (except for foreign diplomatic missions), production facilities used by citizens for individual and other labor activity and other kinds of enterprise; with the participation of the owner or his representative or an authorized official, to conduct inspections of production, warehouse, trade, and service premises, means of transportation, and other places for storage and use of property (if the property owner or his representative refuses to participate in the inspection or the taking of samples, these actions may be conducted in their absence with the enlistment of representatives of public organizations or executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, with the procurator being notified within 24 hours of the action that has been taken);

—to request and obtain from leaders, officials, and other workers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of their jurisdiction or the forms of ownership on which they are based, and also individuals engaged in individual or other labor activity and other kinds of entrepreneurship, the necessary information,

documents, and written clarifications pertaining to the activity being investigated;

—to verify the availability of state, cooperative, and public property against the accounting and report figures of enterprises, institutions, and organizations; to demand inspections of inventory and other inspections; according to the procedure established by law, to invite specialists to participate in the measures that are being conducted;

—to obtain in banks and other financial and credit institutions working and report information about credit and monetary operations and foreign economic transactions; to seal cash boxes and other places of storage of money, commercial and material values and documents and apply other measures providing for their storage; to make purchases for inspection and take samples of raw materials, semimanufactured products, and prepared products;

—to check on the observance of norms and rules providing for the protection of consumer rights in the production, storage, transportation, and sale of consumer goods and food products and the rendering of consumer services;

—to issue official warnings to leaders, officials, and other workers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and also people engaged in individual and other labor activity and other kinds of entrepreneurship about the impermissibility of violating legislation, with subsequent notification of the procurator;

20) if necessary, to restrict or prohibit automotive and pedestrian traffic on the streets and highways; to monitor the activity of enterprises, institutions, and organizations for providing for highway safety; prohibit the operation of means of transportation whose technical condition threatens the safety of traffic or if the content of harmful substances in their exhaust gases exceeds the permissible norms; if necessary, stop vehicles and check the operator's license and registration of the driver and the trip tickets, and make sure that the cargo corresponds to the commercial transportation documents; inspect vehicles when it is suspected that they are being used for illegal purposes; prevent vehicles from being driven by individuals who are intoxicated and also those who do not have vehicle operators' licenses; in cases envisioned by legislation, deprive drivers of the right to operate vehicles;

21) to fill out according to the law and issue documents concerning questions of citizenship, exit from the USSR and entry into the USSR by USSR citizens, foreign citizens, and individuals without citizenship, and time spent in the USSR by foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship;

22) to issue permits to enterprises, institutions, and organizations to acquire, store, and transport firearms, ammunition, explosives, strong chemicals, and toxic and other objects and substances and materials according to

lists determined by USSR legislation, and to citizens, for acquiring, bearing, and keeping firearms and ammunition, and also to revoke these permits; to confiscate from enterprises, institutions, organizations, and citizens weapons and ammunition when they are in violation of the rules for storage and use, and also in other cases envisioned by the law; to issue permits for weapon repair, pyrotechnic, and stamping and engraving enterprises and stores that trade in firearms, shooting galleries, and stands, and revoke these permits when there are violations of the established procedure for their activity;

23) to use free of charge all kinds of public urban, suburban, and local transportation (except taxis), and in rural areas, also passing transportation. Workers of militia subdivisions on transportation (within the sections they serve) have, in addition, the right to free travel in keeping with the law on trains and river and seagoing ships;

24) to freely use transportation belonging to enterprises, institutions, organizations, public associations, or citizens (except for vehicles assigned to diplomatic, consular, and other missions of foreign states and international organizations) for travel to the location of an emergency, the delivery of citizens in need of emergency treatment to medical institutions, the pursuit of individuals who have committed crimes and their delivery to the militia, and also cases that require immediate travel to the location of an incident;

25) to use unimpeded for official purposes means of communication belonging to enterprises, institutions, organizations, public associations, and, in emergencies, citizens;

26) according to the procedure established by legislation, to obtain from enterprises, institutions, organizations, and public associations information necessary for performance of the duties assigned to the militia;

27) to submit to the corresponding state organs, public associations, or officials information concerning the need to take measures to eliminate the causes and conditions contributing to the commission of crimes and other legal violations;

28) to use the mass media to prevent crimes and other legal violations, to reinforce public order, to establish the circumstances of crimes and individuals who commit them, and search for criminals in hiding and missing persons;

29) to encourage citizens who have distinguished themselves in maintaining public order and fighting crime.

The procedure and conditions for the exercise of the rights of the militia by its workers are determined in keeping with legislation of the USSR and republics.

Article 13. The Right of Militia Workers To Keep, Bear, and Use Weapons and Special Equipment and Means of Individual Protection for Militia Workers

Militia workers have the right to keep, bear, and use weapons and special equipment.

In order to ensure their personal safety, militia workers may use helmets, shields, bullet-proof vests, and other means of individual protection.

Section III: Use of Weapons and Special Equipment

Article 14. The Use of Special Equipment

Militia workers have the right to use handguns, rubber clubs, tear gas, light and sound diversionary devices, devices for detecting premises and for forcing transportation to halt, water jets, and other special devices, combat techniques, police dogs and horses, and also use armored cars and other means of transportation for the following purposes:

1) to repulse an attack on citizens, militia workers, or other individuals performing their jobs or official duties for maintaining public order and fighting crime, and also to release hostages;

2) to quell mass disturbances and group violations of public order;

3) to repulse attacks on buildings, premises, structures, and means of transportation belonging to citizens, state and public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations; to liberate buildings, premises, structures, and means of transportation that have been seized;

4) other individuals performing their jobs or official duties for maintaining public order and fighting crime may arrest law breakers and deliver them to the militia or other official location, move in groups and protect arrested individuals subject to administrative detention and under guard, if they are disobedient and resist militia workers, only if there are sufficient grounds to assume that they could escape or do harm to others and themselves and also when dealing with individuals who are deliberately hampering militia workers in the performance of the duties assigned to them by law.

Except when there is a need to repulse a sudden attack and also to arrest an individual suspected of committing premeditated crimes or a need to release hostages, the application of special equipment must be preceded by a warning of the intention to use these means and, if circumstances permit, allow sufficient time for them to stop committing the violation.

The type of special equipment and intensiveness of its application are determined taking into account the situation that has developed, the nature of the legal violation, and the personality of the law breaker. When special equipment is used, the possibility of harming the health of the citizens should be reduced to a minimum.

It is forbidden to use special equipment on women who are obviously pregnant, individuals with clear signs of disability, and children, except in cases in which they have committed an attack that threatens life, a group attack, or armed resistance.

Changes in the list of special equipment and also the rules for its application are established by USSR legislation.

Article 15. Application and Use of Weapons

As an extreme measure, militia workers have the right to use weapons in the following cases:

- 1) to protect citizens from attacks that threaten life or health and also for the release of hostages;
- 2) to repulse group or armed attacks on militia workers and other individuals performing their jobs or public duty for maintaining public order and fighting crime, and also other attacks when life or health are in danger;
- 3) to repulse a group or armed attack on residential premises of citizens, important and protected facilities, premises of state and public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations; to repulse attacks on military or work details of internal affairs organs;
- 4) to arrest an individual giving armed resistance or who has been caught committing a serious crime, or a criminal escaping arrest, and also an armed individual who refuses to obey a legal command to turn over his weapon.

The use of a weapon must be preceded by a warning of the intention to do so.

Weapons may be used without warning when there is a sudden or armed attack, an attack using combat equipment, means of transportation, aircraft, or seagoing or river ships, when an individual is escaping from guard while armed or using means of transportation, or when individuals under guard escape from means of transportation, and also for the release of hostages.

It is forbidden to use weapons on women and minors except in cases where they commit armed attacks, give armed resistance, or are involved in a group attack that threatens lives.

Militia workers have the right to use weapons in the following cases:

- 1) to halt means of transportation by damaging them if the driver is creating a real threat to the life and health of citizens and does not obey repeated demands from militia workers to stop;
- 2) to disable an animal that is threatening the life and health of citizens;
- 3) to give an alarm signal or call for help.

When using weapons the militia worker must take all possible measures to ensure the safety of nearby citizens,

to render immediate medical aid to victims, and also to notify their relatives or legal guardians.

Each time weapons are used a report is made out and the procurator is notified immediately.

The list of important and protected objects indicated in Point 3 of Part 1 of the present article is established according to the procedure determined by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

Section IV: Legal Position, Social Protection, and Responsibility of Militia Workers

Article 16. The Legal Position of Militia Workers

Militia workers are representatives of state power and are under the protection of the state.

The legal commands of militia workers must be obeyed by citizens and officials.

Failure to obey the legal commands of the militia worker, insulting the militia worker, resistance, threats, violence, or attempts on his life, health, or property and also other actions impeding the performance of the duties assigned to the militia entail the liability established by law.

Protection of the life, health, honor, dignity, and property of members of families of militia workers from criminal encroachments in connection with the performance of official duties by the latter is envisioned by legislation of the USSR and republics.

Militia workers have the right to appeal in court decisions made against them by internal affairs agency officials regarding issues and according to the procedures envisioned by the law.

Article 17. Social Protection of Militia Workers

The state guarantees social protection of militia workers.

Militia workers are eligible for mandatory state personal insurance financed from the corresponding budget and also from funds received on the basis of agreements from ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Damages to a militia worker's property caused in connection with his performance of his official duties or job are fully reimbursed from the corresponding state sources.

Harm caused to a militia worker as a result of impairment of health during the course of performance of his official duties or job is fully compensated for in the amount in excess of the sum of the assigned pension for the above with funds from the corresponding budget or funds of ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, or organizations that have concluded agreements with the militia.

Militia workers and also the families of militia workers who have died in the performance of their duties enjoy special privileges in the distribution of housing, the installation of telephones in their apartments, the assignment of places in children's preschool institutions, and the resolution of other issues having to do with social and domestic support as envisioned by republic legislation.

Militia workers who have been discharged from internal affairs organs have the right to a stipend under the conditions and according to the policy envisioned by legislation of the USSR and republics.

For working longer than the work time established by legislation and also on days off and holidays, militia workers are given compensation in keeping with legislation or else they are given time off on other days.

For protection of their professional, labor, and socioeconomic rights and interests, militia workers may unite into associations.

Article 18. Responsibility of Militia Workers

Within the limits of their authority, militia workers independently make decisions and bear responsibility for their illegal actions or inaction.

A citizen has the right to obtain from militia workers explanations regarding the restriction of his rights and freedoms.

When a militia worker violates the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, the militia is obligated to take measures to restore these rights, make reimbursement for damages, and, at the citizen's request, make a public apology.

The actions of militia workers may be appealed, in keeping with the procedure established by legislation, to internal affairs organs, state power and management organs, the procurator, and the court.

Article 19. Financing, Material-Technical, and Social-Domestic Support for the Militia

Financing and material-technical and social-domestic support for the Union and republic militias are provided with funds from the corresponding Union and republic budgets and funds received on the basis of agreements from ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, organizations, cooperatives, and citizens, according to the policy established by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the republic governments.

Section V: Supervision of the Observance of the Law in Militia Activity

Article 20. Supervision of the Observance of the Law in Militia Activity

Supervision of precise and uniform execution of the laws in militia activity is provided by the USSR Procurator

General, the procurators of the Union republics, and the procurators under their jurisdiction.

M. Gorbachev, president,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow, The Kremlin, 6 March 1991

Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Putting the USSR Law "On the Soviet Militia" Into Effect

The USSR Supreme Soviet hereby decrees:

1. To put the USSR law "On the Soviet Militia" into effect from the moment of its publication.
2. To declare invalid from the moment of the introduction of the USSR law "On the Soviet Militia":

The 8 June 1973 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "On the Basic Rights and Responsibilities of the Soviet Militia for Maintaining Public Order and Fighting Crime" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1973, No. 24, p. 309);

The 19 July 1973 USSR law "On Ratification of the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium 'On the Basic Rights and Responsibilities of the Soviet Militia for Maintaining Public Order and Fighting Crime'" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1973, No. 30, p. 398);

Article 5 of the 23 October 1973 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "On Special Titles for Rank-and-File and Management Personnel of Internal Affairs Organs" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1973, No. 43, p. 603);

Article 1 of the 5 March 1981 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "On Making Changes and Additions to Certain USSR Legislative Acts Concerning Maintenance of Public Order" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1981, No. 10, p. 232);

Section VI of the 15 October 1982 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "On Making Changes and Additions to Certain USSR Legislative Acts Concerning Maintenance of Public Order" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1982, No. 42, p. 793);

The 7 January 1988 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "On Making Certain Additions to the USSR Supreme Soviet Ukase 'On the Basic Rights and Responsibilities of the Soviet Militia for Maintaining Public Order and Fighting Crime'" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1988, No. 2, p. 20) and the 26 May 1988 USSR law "On Ratification of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukases on Making Changes and Additions to USSR Legislative Acts" referring to the ratification of the aforementioned ukase (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1988, No. 22, p. 361);

Article 4 of the 28 July 1988 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase "On Making Changes in Certain USSR

Legislative Acts" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA USSR, 1988, No. 31, p. 506).

3. Recommend to the supreme soviets of the republics to bring republic legislation in line with the USSR law "On the Soviet Militia" and provide for the development and adoption of legislative acts regulating the activity of the militia in the republics.

4. To the USSR Cabinet of Ministers before 1 July 1991:

—to abolish decrees and instructions of the USSR Government or bring them into line with the aforementioned law;

—to provide for revision and abolition by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of departmental normative acts, including instructions, that contradict the aforementioned law;

—to determine the policy for financing and material and technical support for the militia and also compensation to militia workers for working in excess of the working time established by legislation, on days off, and on holidays, and pay stipends in the event that they are discharged from internal affairs organs.

A. Lukyanov, chairman,
USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow, The Kremlin, 6 March 1991

Culture Minister on Western Aid, Lithuanian Events

91UN1069A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Nikolay Gubenko, USSR minister of culture, by V. Andreyev; place and date not given: "Let Us Not Engage in Ideological Incantations, but Let Us Say Simply: We Want to Live Well"—USSR Minister of Culture Nikolay Gubenko Proposes"]

[Text] [Andreyev] Nikolay Nikolayevich, you are very likely always being asked this very same question: How do you feel in the role of minister?

[Gubenko] I have not had time to become a bureaucrat, and every time that I am called minister, not having gotten used to it, I begin to get nervous. With my arrival in the ministry, I thought it necessary to do that which seems to me, as a professional, an actor and director, to be most important: Be useful to the fraternity, comradeship, and unity that joins artists of all orientations around a creative idea. The cultural expanse of the country, or of Europe and Asia, or what have you, has no borders and customs points. The attempt to establish them inside the country can lead to bloodshed. I very much do not want the intelligentsia to be a part of this. We also have a responsibility. We shy away from this notion, and, nonetheless, every creator who has a right to his own point of view, must understand today that at some point we must all come together and unite for life

in peace and harmony. Now, it is necessary to revive that which was ruined by the pathos of the last 10, 20, and 70 years of our life.

[Andreyev] What is happening today in the country's Ministry of Culture?

[Gubenko] First and foremost, very likely, is the demarcation of plenary powers between the Union and republic departments of culture. The center is assigned more of a coordinating function: Of course, there is no pressure, dictate, and order. But there are agreements between our ministry and the republics. The need for such cooperation and mutual understanding is felt by all interested parties, and it is only Lithuania that is not for negotiations.

I will not hide the fact that we were also bothered by the question: Why is it necessary to have a Union Ministry of Culture at all? There are 15 republics, why is a sixteenth needed? But, nonetheless, one is needed. It is needed specifically to take over the trusteeship of national property. Because it is at the USSR Ministry of Culture that the all-Union fund for the development of culture and art is established.

[Andreyev] Are there personnel changes?

[Gubenko] We became, perhaps, the only department in the country that held a competition for all positions on the staff without exception. Every official was put "on the carpet." It was not easy, ordinary, and humane. There were tears, insults, and drama. And, nevertheless, we changed 40 percent of the staff. Now every worker signs a contract with Gubenko for only one year. Why one year? Because we do not know what awaits us. For this same reason, we are signing contracts with the republics for only 12 months. It makes no sense now to plan some kind of a bright future, however it is called, to the year 2000. The state is in a transition period from that which was to that which should happen. This is a painful, sad, but in some ways a happy process.

[Andreyev] What can cultural workers expect for themselves, those whom you would not call the most well-to-do in our society?

[Gubenko] Our sphere, like health care or education, is the most underpaid, if not to say the poorest. While in the corps de ballet of the Bolshoi Theater, a person receives 120 rubles [R], then even someone who goes abroad three times a year may one day decide it is better for him to remain there. He went through excellent training in a ballet school, the school of Grigorovich and Ulanova in the theater, and he can simply run away, not receiving an adequate salary for his class and labor. The same for museum employees who have vast information and possess unique knowledge. And theater-lovers? Indeed, anybody... Therefore, when you see these amazing and tremendous devotees, these professionals of the highest sort, who are working for pennies, then you understand that they will perish under market conditions, and they will have nothing to eat. It seems to me

that the leadership of the country has an opportunity, when analyzing the question of compensation associated with the transition to a market, to raise the salary in the nonindustrial sphere—and here there is culture, and education, and medicine—to a level in industry. We talked about this with the president, and, apparently, the Federation Council will give its attention to our problems.

[Andreyev] The word "market" can be heard frequently now. But the market and culture are not only salary and taxes...

[Gubenko] You know, I am a person who is true to his life experience, which I lived almost alone. And, on the basis of my experience, I think that the market will not shine for us in the forthcoming decade. This idea was presented to us in the same way that a bright communist tomorrow was presented previously. Those who really want to go to a market interpret it as a very gradual and long process. Which is realistic. But those who say that the market can take place within two to three to four days or years are deluded in not making corrections for our statehood and the peculiarities and features of our national character. This is very reminiscent of the Chinese version of Marxism-Leninism. Incidentally, Japan, after its own upheaval, came to the market after 15 years. France has determined that the market came to the country just last year, when free prices were introduced for bakery goods.

Each country has its own path. If we say that we want to live well, and that a market is needed for this, perhaps that is what must be said: We want to live well. And let us not proclaim academic, political, and ideological concepts from the rostrums of Supreme Soviets, but warn in a normal way that we must, first of all, tighten belts for the next five years in order to live better afterwards than we did five years ago. This is what we have to say to each other.

[Andreyev] It is no secret that recently a lot of hope is being placed on assistance from abroad and on foreign capital and investments. What could our culture count on here?

[Gubenko] Everything is not simple here. I asked Armand Hammer many times "Well, invest resources in the Lenin Library, help us. If you wish, under the plaque 'Lenin Library,' I will attach a gold plaque with your name on it?" But Hammer, who all of his life, and this is no secret, made a fortune in our country (I do not understand why we are so grateful to him; specialists know what great harm he brought us), and Hammer, this symbol of kindness and goodwill with respect to us, did not give one kopek for the Lenin Library. He told me: "You give me this collection, and I will give you Lenin's letter for it." I say: "But this is a collection of the 14th-15th centuries, and this is national property, but you offer me a letter that represents an interest for sociologists. Where is the logic?"

With these people, you get off where you got on. Without exception, Western businessmen want to get two kopeks for every one they invest. Therefore, one must not labor under the delusion that the West will simply invest money in our culture, if it does not promise double or triple profits.

[Andreyev] If you will permit me, there is one more question on this subject. Now, to take works of modern art abroad, the expert analysis of the Ministry of Culture is required.

[Gubenko] This really is a problem. Now, everyone wants to engage in commercial activity, and, of course, it is more interesting to artists to sell their work for hard currency. But we have to think about the future, about what will be left in museum collections for descendants. Unfortunately, more than 90 percent of what is available is in the storeroom of any museum, and only a meager part of the artistic wealth is displayed. This is the case everywhere—in Moscow, and in Kiev, and in Tallinn, and wherever you like. This is the result of that cultural policy that has been conducted for years.

But still, it is necessary to think about how to bear testimony to the epoch. To testify through artists who captured it in their hearts and transferred it to canvas or to sculpture. And to squander this is not permissible. What is to be done? There are two solutions here: To increase the sum for art museums for purchases up to 70-80,000 each—true, even this is not a lot of money—or at least pay the artist an honorarium that is partially in hard currency.

But the artist must also understand that he is flesh of the flesh of his own people and that the talent given him by the Lord God is also from the people. Dostoyevskiy said that there is some kind of a chemical fusion between a person and the motherland. It is really impossible to suppose that Shukshin or Tarkovskiy are from some other environment and not from the one in which they lived. Part of the talent of an artist invariably belongs to his land; therefore, the current commercial fervor—everything is for sale, even if there is nothing here, it will be in France or Latin America—is incomprehensible to me. Forgive me, a reactionary...

And more. Artistic expert analysis before the export of works of art abroad must be assigned not to ministries or commissions in rayon soviets, but to the museums, where there is a possibility of receiving the most qualified and competent expert evaluation. We think that all evaluations and the entire responsibility for the export of works of art abroad must be consolidated in the art museums of the republic. Otherwise, what will happen is what is now happening—an enormous number of exhibits are being taken abroad under the aegis of artistic unions or other organizations, and they simply are not returning to the country. And for the time being, no one can control this.

[Andreyev] Nikolay Nikolayevich, you are a famous actor, director, and people's artist of the RSFSR. What is your attitude toward the now current proposal to abolish all kinds of honorary titles?

[Gubenko] As long as the tradition of this kind of encouragement has evolved, then why should it not continue? If we live to the time that every talent will be compensated according to merit, then, of course, the system of titles may become unnecessary. Let it be replaced by the international practice of prizes determined by a jury for a role, a play, a book, or a painting. Humanly, for me the title acquired at one time was, of course, a matter of extreme pride and joy, and we celebrated it as was expected. And today I would be ready to reject it, but what are you to do with people whose life is brightened by nothing more than this. There are enormous files of presentations in the Ministry of Culture and, frankly, each time I sign them with a pure heart and conscience. I realize that this is at least some kind of a reward to a person. For the time being this is it. But I would like to end up with something else.

[Andreyev] Your signature is absent from the appeal of 116 cultural figures in connection with the Lithuanian events. You do not share their position?

[Gubenko] I just received this letter: "If you are a person of honor, you should resign immediately, but it would be more noble if you put a bullet in your forehead. You dare to talk about morals, you stinking riff-raff. Would that your children damn you for centuries, would that they spit in your face!" And the signature—"Your former colleague."

Several such letters come to ministers each day, a little more to me, since there is a little more freedom here in culture...

Why is my signature not on the "Letter of the 116," where it is written that the president and the Supreme Soviet are betraying democracy? Not because at the moment of signing I was playing "Boris Godunov" in Prague on a Taganka tour. Even if I were in Moscow at that time, I would still not sign the letter. I am totally and entirely against the employment of armed force in the resolution of political questions. But I am totally and entirely on the side of the president and the Supreme Soviet, which for almost a year, since 11 March of 1990, have been saying that the actions of the legally elected Lithuanian parliament are violating constitutional norms. That is why my signature was not on this document. This is my position. Somebody else can have a different one.

'Neobolshevism' of United Workers' Front Decried

91UN1127A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by N. Kopylova: "Neobolshevism? But Very Small—"]

[Text] All my meetings with various leaders of the OFT [United Workers' Front] splendidly sooner or later came

down to a common denominator. First a blunt question: "Your political convictions?" Then a long, wary and testing look—like having someone else's hand in your pocket, trying to find out just what color party credentials you have there. I will admit that I would get upset. Who knows? You say something wrong and they will link you to the "operators in the shadow economy"; after all, we know that "whoever is not with us is against us." On account of the unfamiliarity of it, it seemed creepy, and then simply laughable. That look was quite uniformly suspicious and deliberately serious. If "Lyubov Yarovaya" [Spring Love] had been written in the genre of an operetta, that is exactly how Commissar Koshkin ought to have looked. It is hard to imagine a more banal caricature of the commissars of 1917.

Neobolshevism. That far from scientific term has become firmly established in the literary and political lexicon. By no means everyone who flaunts it has looked into the history of Bolshevism in depth and without bias. It is simply a fashionable word. It is like old village women who have not a clue that there is a country called France but nonetheless will customarily berate a bad person by calling him a "Bourbon." But to hell with it, the term. Let us try to analyze who they actually are, our present-day "Neobolsheviks."

According to the testimony of the Moscow professor Sergeyev, the most communist of all the communist organizations today is the OFT.

The USSR United Workers' Front is a public political organization that has chosen as its goal "the implementation in practice of Lenin's Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People." Its main objective is viewed as the struggle for "communist ideals of perestroika," which is to say, "the consistent establishment of social equality; the strengthening of the friendship of peoples on the basis of the division of labor within the framework of the entire country and the reduction of inequality in the socioeconomic development of the republics; and planned economic management in the interests of and under the control of the working people."

The USSR OFT's founding congress was held in Leningrad in July 1989. Officially the organization was registered in April 1990. It has branches in 36 regions of the country. The United Front's activities are financed out of dues paid by the employees of enterprises and public organizations that support the OFT, as well as citizens' personal donations.

The Third Congress of the RSFSR OFT was held in early March. Denouncing the CPSU leadership, including the general secretary, as degenerates, and threatening, as is the custom, rapid reprisals against Academicians Shatalin and Abalkin, the delegates demanded the

immediate resignation of Yeltsin and Gorbachev. At that they departed to instill revolutionary consciousness in the workers' movement.

Neither the president nor the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet have yet officially responded to the criticism.

But what sort of forces has the OFT built up during its year and a half of existence? Who has it gathered under its banner?

As strange as it might seem, it still has no organization as such. No records are kept of members, but the Front's leaders speak of hundreds of thousands.

From every indication, it has no money, either.

It has no regular periodicals (if one does not count the photocopied militant leaflet CHTO DELAT? [What Must Be Done?], which comes out occasionally). And OFT spokesmen are put out on the pages of regular periodicals only when they need to berate someone (see, for example, in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA for 29 January, "And Those Attached to Him," by M. Popov).

Evidently the support of the working class, whose fundamental interests the "Neobolsheviks" from the OFT are summoned to defend, has also been a constant problem so far.

Last April a workers' committee was established at the Lyublin Foundry and Machine Plant; it survived until autumn and then was transformed into the organization of a socialist trade union. A city workers' committee has been set up and is actively operating in Samara; granted, it is under the wing of the Marxist Workers' Party, which believes that the OFT is trying to lead the working class along a false path.

Work at the Moscow Automotive Plant imini I. A. Likhachev has been more successful. Vasilii Ivanovich Shishkarev, OFT member and worker in the Second Mechanical Assembly Building: "For nearly two years I tried to establish a primary organization in our building, but our ideas were poorly received by the workers. Last August we decided to set up a workers' committee, held a meeting, and worked out an action program: to pressure the management to make financial reports to the workers, to protect the workers against firings, and to work for pay raises. At our insistence the management made a financial report to the workers. We, of course, were led astray, but we understood the main thing: our financial managers would not try to get a pay raise for us. Then we took the route of making demands, and demanded a pay raise under the threat of a strike. We believe that we should receive no less than employees of the Moscow City Soviet Executive committee—they are smart people and know how much you need to earn to live a normal life in Moscow."

That is not the sum total of the economic slogans of the OFT (as a whole). The essence of them is "back to the socialism that existed before the 1965 reform." And even

further back, when vodka cost two rubles, 87, and peasants, who had no internal passports, would entertain themselves on holidays watching "The Kuban Cossacks" to learn about their happy life. However, while seemingly speaking about the socialist mode of production, what the "Neobolsheviks" unquestionably have in mind is the socialist means of distribution. That's their hobby horse. Their common slogans are "workers' power," and "oversight over the fair distribution of material benefits." For example, "taking immediate control of the distribution of all an enterprise's income, without entrusting it to the management, the accounting office, and the department of labor and wages." And that is not even to mention strict worker oversight over the whole trade sector.

In essence, the economic ideal of a consistent OFT member is a universal, all-encompassing rationing system. Rejecting commodity-money relations under socialism, he assigns the ruble a subsidiary role as an accounting unit. He recognizes the State Planning Committee and the working people's communist social consciousness as the leading force in the economy.

And all this claims to be called Neobolshevism? History repeats itself. The second time, as we know, as farce. However, even farce is not innocent.

"The course of events, especially in recent years, has resulted in turning legislative bodies, not just in form but in essence, into bodies of a parliamentary type that are divorced from the working people and better suited to reinforcing the bourgeois tendencies that are emerging in our country than to defending the interests of the working people. Present-day 'perestroyka' reality is characterized by the fact that, under the slogan of a transition to parliamentary democracy, the rank-in-file working people are being completely forced out of political power and, under the slogan of a movement to a market economy, out of economic power. Whereas it used to be that they were not heard in bodies of power, now they are not even seen.

"The time has come for us to take the initiative and ourselves establish the primary cells of Soviet power at places of work—in plants, on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, at research institutes and higher schools, and in military units...from the very outset, workers' associations should become not just agencies of social protection but the primary units of political and economic power. Workers' councils that are parallel to present bodies of power can, 'in the event it becomes necessary,' especially in situations of problems, conflicts or crisis, either joint with those bodies to address common questions, or decisively neutralize them, if they turn from bodies of the working people into bodies of shadow capital, cooperative-member speculators and the mafia" (from the resolution titled "On the Revival of Soviet Power," which was adopted in September 1990 at an expanded session of the RSFSR OFT Coordinating Council).

Under the banner of the revival of Soviet power, calls are being made to overthrow it. What may be meant is its revival in the following form: "The only way out of the chaos is through a dictatorship. But whose dictatorship? Powerful forces have now been formed. On the one side, the bourgeoisie, which is striving for power under the label of democracy. It cannot come to power except through a dictatorship. Their system is aimed at suppression. On the other side, the working class can no longer tolerate all these mafiosi, but without a dictatorship, it cannot even carry out monetary reform" (Vladimir Yakushev, member of the Coordinating Council of the RSFSR OFT).

The OFT offers a big choice. Whoever does not care for dictatorship can try anarchy. Here is Vladimir Stradymov, member of the Coordinating Council of the Moscow OFT. He believes that the law is theoretically expressed will of the ruling class. Therefore it is necessary to call on people to liberate themselves, show initiative, and act as they deem necessary—that will be the will of the people, i.e., the law.

Councils, committees—from anarchy to dictatorship. What is this, the lack of any position? Or maybe that is a position—"whatever you please." The lack of membership, structure, or a clear-cut program—all that leads one to think the OFT is an organization "for any emergency that arises." An organization that does not exist but is rumored to exist; an organization that is prepared, on behalf of hundreds of thousands, at the necessary moment to "appeal," "present the demand," or "deliver the ultimatum" to summon the troops, as was done in Lithuania. If another "emergency" happens somewhere, who will try to figure out who is represented by the organization that speaks out on behalf of the simple working people?

As for criticism of the CPSU leadership, it is more readily nothing but a maneuver, political hypocrisy aimed at gaining the sympathy of the masses. The OFT is indisputably a part of the ruling party that is in opposition to the party itself (!). Both of them express the "fundamental interests of the working people"—would anyone guess? In any event, on the eve of the Pavlov price increase, the Front's stand on distribution is proving extremely timely.

Vladimir Yakushev: "By striking, from an economic standpoint we are acting against ourselves. But when privatization arose, we started to say: fellows, now this is not your property, so oppose it."

Among the "fellows," there will always be a stubborn one who will ask: "Yeah, you are no traitor, so just make sense: are you yourself for the Bolsheviks or for the Communists?"

'Communist Initiative' Youth Movement's Goals Viewed

91UN1177A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 91
Second Edition p 3

[Interview with S. Chernyakhovskiy, member of the Russian committee of "Communist Initiative," by N. Lyaporov; place and date not given: "The Predictions Have Not Come True"]

[Text] The Youth and Perestroika: The Attraction of "Communist Initiative"

At the end of last year the press reported on the constituent congress in Moscow of the "Communist Initiative" Russian youth movement. There is hardly anyone surprised today by news of the emergence of a new party, organization, or movement—they are legion. Nonetheless, the new youth organization cannot fail to attract attention if only by the fact that in the present atmosphere of the highly skeptical attitude of part of society toward the ideas of communism, it openly calls itself communist. Also unusual for those just starting out are the numbers: The press reports speak of 700,000-800,000 persons. There is much that is of interest in the program documents. Together with traditional Marxist propositions, say, one also encounters here the terminology of modern sociological concepts, which is unusual for Communists.

In a word, it is not fortuitous that our readers are requesting a more detailed account of the incipient youth movement. Fulfilling this request, we publish an interview with an organizer of the movement, S. Chernyakhovskiy, member of the republic committee of "Communist Initiative." Sergey Feliksovich is 34 years old and a graduate student of the Philosophy Faculty of the Moscow State University and prior to this worked for nine years as a plant mechanic and simultaneously studied in an institute. He is a people's deputy of Moscow's Sverdlovskiy Rayon Soviet and a member of the CPSU.

The readers ask first of all: What is this movement—a new Komsomol or one further—"youth"—current in the CPSU?

[Chernyakhovskiy] No, our movement is not a "new Komsomol" for it is, after all, organizationally within the framework of the Russian Komsomol Federation. If we are talking about its social composition, I would distinguish three main groups: students, the majority of whom have already worked at enterprises, young workers, and officers. Their age is from 22 to 28, in the main, although there are younger and older people. People with energy and fervor and not without experience and with sound intellectual and physical training.

[Lyaporov] You said: within the framework of the Komsomol. What, then, was the reason for the emergence of the new movement?

[Chernyakhovskiy] Let us begin with the fact that the present crisis has, in my view, struck particularly hard precisely at the youth as the least socialized stratum of

society lacking, as a rule, savings, connections, and privileges. And under these conditions it has essentially been without its own political organization—after all, the former Komsomol can no longer, alas, be called either communist or Leninist. Censuring it for this is difficult also, I believe. An organization that for many years automatically registered virtually everyone who came of age could not have continued as a political communist organization when the crisis set in. It will be good if it survives if only as a socially protective youth structure. We, however, are aiming precisely at uniting within the framework of the Komsomol those who see it as a political organization of young Communists. Understandably, the movement is not disregarding questions of economics and the social protection of the youth either. We are for the ideological and organizational unification of the communist youth and for us becoming in practice a mass public movement and real political force capable of influencing life and affairs in society.

[Lyaporov] And what is the attitude of the youth itself toward this? There were in the press "predictions" that the young people, disenchanted with everything, "will not read" the speeches and resolutions of "Initiative"....

[Chernyakhovskiy] These are the forecasts of those who dislike the very word communism and the aspiration of working youth to political unification. They add that if there is indeed support for the movement, it will most likely be from the top—from the "old comrades".... We do not expect, of course, that the young people will surge toward us overnight "in orderly ranks," to quote our program. Who needs this today? But as far as the support is concerned, judge for yourself. Action groups and organizations among us are operating at enterprises and in educational institutions of Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Chelyabinsk and many other industrial centers and in the Army and Navy. Some Komsomol organizations—and not small ones at that—support the "Initiative" entirely. The Kursk City Komsomol organization, for instance (this was stated at a plenum of the Komsomol city committee).

As far as support "from the top" is concerned, we by no means conceal the fact that the movement cooperates with the Communist Party. In addition, we support the movement being given the status of youth organization of a renewed Communist Party.

[Lyaporov] Forgive me interrupting you, Sergey Feliksovich, but the CPSU is nowadays heterogeneous, and there are several currents in it, as you know. Besides the program statement of the 28th party congress, I could cite at least the Marxist Platform, the reform Communists.... Toward which of them is the movement oriented? Or is account not taken of the differences in this case?

[Chernyakhovskiy] When the movement emerged, young Communists from different currents came to us. But the point is this. We cannot today unconditionally

accept (for this reason or the other) any one platform in the CPSU. And we are working independently on a draft party program.

[Lyaporov] It seems that in this sense your movement is also a kind of current in the party?

[Chernyakhovskiy] It appears so. Incidentally, a document, which we called "Theses for a Draft CPSU Program," was prepared back last October and was handed to the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee and the Moscow Gorkom and also to the editorial offices of PRAVDA and KOMMUNIST. The main thing, to put it briefly, is to ensure a transition from a socialism based on the industrial type of production to a socialism whose basis is a postindustrial (information, heuristic) type of production. Whereas, given the first type, the majority of people perform the role of machinery appendage, the second leaves man merely intricate, heuristic labor and the production of new knowledge. These phases are not, naturally, separated from one another by a thick wall but are organically connected. I would like to emphasize that here, in our view, is a most important point in the explanation of the present crisis. It is by no means a question of "socialism having been built wrongly" or of "socialism having failed." We believe that socialism has reached a stage where all its intrinsic contradictions have ripened—it is these that are the source of movement, and through their solution society will reach a new phase of its development.

[Lyaporov] Quite a complex and somewhat abstract proposition for a political document (program). Do you not think so?

[Chernyakhovskiy] But we have no intention of oversimplifying matters. Nor does all this seem such an abstraction of "theory" is supplemented by, for example, the following fact. According to our calculations, in our country at the frontier of the 1970's-1980's approximately 17 percent were employed in complex labor in industry, that is, requiring creativity; in the countryside, less than one percent. And even then the bulk of workmen had secondary education. Even in the scientific sphere, to judge by the data, only one worker out of every three was engaged in really creative labor. Is this not a contradiction, the basis of which is the lagging of the productive forces? It seems to some people that the solution lies in the conversion of formal public into private property. But this is movement backward! Movement forward lies elsewhere—in the conversion of formal public property into real public property. It is for this that a fundamental restructuring and a change in the mode of production in order to really liberate labor and involve people in the sphere of the creation of information and technology are needed.

Does anyone have to be convinced that all these "abstractions" are very important primarily for us young people, for those who will be living in the 21st century and will have to extricate the country from the crisis?

[Lyapovrov] Fundamental restructuring is easily said. But, first, from where to obtain the resources for it and, second, how to interest people in the results of labor? As KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes (12 February of this year), incidentally, are you not disregarding material incentive altogether, virtually?

[Chernyakhovskiy] Concerning resources. We already have in our country sectors capable of operating at the level of world requirements. We need to take these as a basis in the revolutionary restructuring of all of production. As far as the workmen's interest is concerned, we do, indeed, have our own view in this connection, but it is by no means that simplistic view about which the authors in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA wrote. Economic interest is not "superfluous" but it is, we believe, for all that, a form of compulsion, albeit the most flexible. The true engine of progress, on the other hand, was and remains profound interest in creative labor and man's aspiration to self-realization. It is not fortuitous that Herzberger's labor theory geared to the stimulation of the workman by more interesting, creatively infused labor has become prevalent in the West.

[Lyapovrov] In my opinion, we have become somewhat carried away by discussion of the "theoretical equipment" of the movement. This is understandable: It is only just starting out. Nonetheless, what steps have already been taken on the practical level?

[Chernyakhovskiy] It depends what is meant by practical steps.... We are opposed to a mass preoccupation with commerce, say. Our main concern is the spread of our ideas and the organization and cohesion of communist youth. It was the abandonment of this task, in my opinion, that ruined our Komsomol. For us the main thing is, I repeat, the formulation of a rationally substantiated and intellectually attractive doctrine capable of interesting the youth.

Thus in the plane of such practical work we conducted an intercity theoretical seminar on the topic "Socialism and the 21st Century." A theoretical club of the same name has emerged as a result—it works on Thursdays in the social and political center on Tsvetnyy Boulevard. A digest of analytical material has been prepared for publication.

Our activists meet regularly with their peers at enterprises of Moscow and other major cities of the country. I have to say that interesting meetings and a discussion at them by no means amount to "stinging" speeches about shadow economy operators and party bureaucrats, as that same KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA maintains. Of course, some people dislike the fact that in analyzing the present situation we do not emphasize the "burden of past mistakes" and the "inconsistency of the present leadership of the country." The young people have many acute problems of their own. We took part in the meeting of representatives of various student currents in Sochi. At the Auto Works in Togliatti our activists are in conjunction with the work force council defending the

most just, in our view, "anticapitalizing" version of the denationalization of property. In Nizhniy Novgorod participants in the movement are assisting in the publication of the newspaper NASH VYBOR, which champions socialist positions. The meeting with representatives of Komsomol organizations of Leningrad, which discussed questions and exchanged experience pertaining to the social protection of working youth, was useful, I believe.

At the same time I emphasize once again that we consider the preparation of our version of the CPSU Program an important undertaking. We will unfailingly offer it and will try to persuade communists of its rightness. In order that it be really effective, promising and, if you will, attractive for the youth a breakthrough into the circle of new theoretical ideas is absolutely essential for the party. The present state of our society needs to be explained on the basis of an analysis of the intrinsic contradictions of its development, not of the "ill will of a company of 'two's'" active in history. A thorough concept of socialism of the 21st century is needed. And people need not a "repentant" but a creative and active Communist Party.

Dzasokhov Commentary on 'Lenin' Roundtable

91P50141A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 28 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by Mikhail Botyan: "Lenin and the 20th Century"]

[Text] The international roundtable on 'Lenin and the 20th Century,' organized by the Novosti Information Agency, ended in Moscow yesterday. Our correspondent asked Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary A. Dzasokhov to comment on the results of the roundtable.

"On the one hand, the discussions were very pointed. But they were not conducted on a very high professional and scientific level. The common denominator was the acknowledgement of Lenin as one of the greatest thinkers of the elapsing 20th century.

"It was interesting to become acquainted with the views of well-known Sovietologists, for example, Doctor R. Pipes from the U.S., who continues to interpret Lenin critically as both a revolutionary and a philosopher, and another researcher also from America—R. Tucker, who makes a more objective analysis and sheds light on many things, including the reference points and principles which we profess, directing the course to perestroika and the founding of a democratic, humane society.

"It seems just to me that the majority of the orators singled out the following circumstance under the symbol of Lenin's heritage: Lenin's teachings must not be perceived as statics which can provide answers to all our questions today, but must be used as a flexible Leninist methodology for analysis of the processes of social development. Secondly, it was very indicative that the

October Revolution is not exclusively a Russian, Soviet phenomenon: it is inscribed in the general laws of peoples' aspiration and social progress. And thirdly, and very important: the acknowledgement—in varying degrees, of course, but by everyone—that Lenin's teachings about the global interdependence of civilization are very relevant today."

Transfer of Appeals to Republic Level Discussed

91UN1198A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by Professor T. Shamba, doctor of judicial science and USSR people's deputy, and G. Kolbaya, candidate of judicial science and member of the USSR Supreme Court: "Does the Union Need a Supreme Court?"]

[Text] Lately, as a result of the republics declaring their statehood sovereignty, the issue of separation of powers between the Union and the subjects of the federation has become acute. It is beyond any doubt that it should be a true federation—not a pretended one—and that a substantial redistribution of powers between the Union and the republics is necessary. Sometimes, however, one gets the impression that the localities are so bent on limiting the rights of the center that nothing is left of a federation or even a confederation.

In this particular case we want to speak about the proposals to narrow the Union powers in legal matters so much that it no longer makes sense. For instance, one of the proposed ideas is to fully restrict criminal proceedings to the republics and strip the USSR Supreme Court of its right to review such cases on a supervisory basis.

The point is, however, that this issue should be discussed not in the context of the relationship between the center and the federation subjects, but in the context of human rights guarantees. After all, this is the highest task for the law.

One should not forget that with all the horrors of the totalitarian regime that has ruled the country for decades, a Soviet citizen—no matter in which republic he lived—had a right to "go to Moscow to pursue justice." Even during some very dark years in our life, the USSR Supreme Court, responding to complaints and protests, has been changing or rescinding many unlawful or unjust sentences handed down by the supreme legal institutions of the Union republics. In such cases, quite often the USSR Supreme Court decided not only to rescind all prior court decisions in the case, but also to dismiss the case with full exoneration of the convicted person. By the way, among those sentences that have been changed or rescinded were some that involved capital punishment.

Here are some statistics on the current supervisory activities of the USSR Supreme Court. During the period from 1980 to 1989, the court looked into 35,173 complaints and 9,077 cases. In response actions, it filed

1,828 protests: to the Supreme Courts of the republics—375; to the Judicial Panel on Criminal Cases of the USSR Supreme Court—956; and to the USSR Supreme Court Plenum—497. As a result, sentences for more than 7,000 people have been rescinded, among them were some capital punishment sentences. If actions in response to protests filed by the Procuracy are taken into account, the Supreme Court during the same period rescinded or changed the sentences for 7,479 people and dismissed the cases of 4,309 people (the overwhelming majority of them on exonerating grounds), and returned for additional investigation or for a new trial over 400 cases.

We would like to emphasize that behind all these corrective actions are human lives, regardless of where they live or where the trial has taken place.

The demand to redistribute the powers between the center and the subjects of future federation in favor of the latter is based on the need to move from bureaucratic centralization to democratic decentralization. In essence, this is a justifiable move. What does democratization have in common with a right of a citizen to bring to the Supreme Court an appeal of an unjust—from his point of view—sentence handed down by a Union republic court? Do not the data listed above show that the USSR Supreme Court's supervisory powers in regard to a republic Supreme Court decision is a clear guarantee of a citizen's right to have a fair resolution of his case in court?

One should also keep in mind that the USSR Supreme Court's role is not limited to correcting mistakes. An even greater number of mistakes and violations are prevented by the mere possession by the USSR Supreme Court of those supervisory powers over the republic Supreme Courts.

The USSR Supreme Court's supervisory powers are becoming even more important now, because the number of criminal cases initiated in connection with interethnic conflicts are growing. There is evidence that in some of the republics the courts that try such cases are subjected to such pressure from the opposing forces that is not easy—and sometimes simply impossible—to withstand. The procedural and organizational powers of the USSR Supreme Court are simply a salvation in such cases; these powers involve taking over such cases, transfer of cases to other courts, or revision of an already passed sentence. If these powers of the USSR Supreme Court are annulled, many people who are tried in connection with interethnic conflicts will face a Calvary instead of justice.

We realize that if the Union disintegrates the issue will become moot. However, if the Union is going to be preserved in whatever form—and we have no doubt that it will—its citizens should not be deprived of the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the country.

And last. In defining the extent of the USSR Supreme Court supervisory and organizational powers in regard to federation subjects, the last word should belong not to

the parliaments, but to the sovereign peoples. For, believe us, the issue of a right to justice is no less important for a person than the issue of preservation of the Union, private possession of land, or any other. Therefore, even if the republic parliaments display a

negative attitude in regard to the USSR Supreme Court's right to revise the sentences and other decisions handed down by their own Supreme Courts, this question should be put up for a referendum. The right of which the people may be deprived is just too precious.

Baltics

Abortive 'Provocation' at Riga OMON Base Reported

PM0703165591A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 26 Feb 91 p 4

[Article by A. Vladimirov: "Provocation Did Not Spoil the Holiday"]

[Text] During the recent days off the Special-Purpose Militia Detachment [OMON] base in Vecmilgravis was under veritable siege. By Friday, the events unfolding here had forced the OMON command to interrupt a training course, as those who usually greeted the guests were on this occasion clearly unable to cope with welcoming the people who had come to congratulate the guys on Soviet Army and Navy Day.

"There were several hundred people at the base during those three days," a detachment officer recounted. "From morning through evening there was a continuous flow of veterans and young people, representatives from labor collectives and academic institutes. A quick enumeration of the cities and inhabited localities speaks for itself. Riga and Jelgava, Ventspils and Kuldiga, Cesis and Liepaja... To be honest, we only just managed to register them all."

"The list of well wishers is long—the Riga Electrical Machinery Plant, the Riga State Electrical Engineering Factory, the Riga Autobus Plant, the republic Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, around 20 secondary schools, labor and armed forces veterans, dozens of postcards, telegrams, declarations of support. Especially touching were the unpretentious drawings and posters from children.

"Of course, everybody is interested in the detachment's current living conditions and future prospects. Therefore, practically every fighter who was not otherwise engaged became an unofficial guide for a few hours."

Indeed, this unexpectedly powerful support for the OMON showed once again that certain circles' plans to create a vacuum around the detachment and impart an enemy image to it have come to nothing. They have failed to fool the people. That is why Letts and Russians, Jews and Ukrainians, and representatives of other nationalities also came here during these days. It is also comforting to note that there were many rural inhabitants among the guests.

Unfortunately, it is this which probably displeased the extremist forces. On one of the days, shots rang out in the vicinity of the base: automatic gunfire, a single volley which in an instant compelled the detachment fighters to institute a perimeter defense, having first instructed the people—among whom were women and children—to take cover. But the troublemakers did not risk going any further. Although the OMON suggest that the shooting

sought primarily to provoke the detachment into retaliating. But once again the OMON showed restraint.

The militia were called: They searched the adjacent areas but could not find the extremists...

However, this irresponsible sortie by the militants did not spoil the holiday mood. Furthermore, there is one essential postscript: On the very eve of the holiday, the Vilnius OMON leaders were here. Henceforth, both detachments will coordinate their actions.

I would like to conclude these notes with the words of Detachment Commander Ch. Mlynnik, who asked that I convey his warmest, most sincere thanks to all who found time to congratulate the OMON on this holiday for all Soviet people.

Latvia's Deputy Supreme Council Chairman on RSFSR-Latvia Treaty

91UN1029A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
14 Feb 91 p 2

[Report on speech given by A. Krastins, Latvian Supreme Council deputy chairman, at 2nd Movement for the National Independence of Latvia Conference on 27 January 1991, originally published in NEAT-KARIBA: "Secrets Become Public: The Treaty Between Russia and Latvia"]

[Text] The treaty between Latvia and Russia was not a peace treaty, as it was termed by Mr. Mikos. It was a political treaty. I would like to characterize somewhat more precisely the political aspect of that treaty, not its legal aspect, because from the standpoint of judicial and legal aspects the treaty is no longer functional today in its present form.

In essence the treaty is so contradictory that in order for it to function additional documents would be needed: treaties on individual sectors, individual accords and other legal acts adopted separately by the Latvian Republic and the Russian Federation and expressing our official viewpoint on these matters.

When A. Gorbunovs went to Tallinn to meet with B. Yeltsin and A. Ruutel he took with him a text of the treaty which had been transformed from our draft treaty prepared on 11 August. We deleted from it all the points which were the source of contradictions. It contained no reference to citizenship and no economic section, just the section in which the Russian Federation recognizes the state independence of Latvia and its right to the status of subject of international law. All the rest merely consisted of insignificant clarifying articles.

In Tallinn it was proposed to A. Gorbunovs that he sign either the treaty as it now stands with virtually no changes or none at all. He decided to sign this treaty. One should bear in mind the situation on that day, what was happening in Lithuania, what was imminent in Latvia, and also the fact that at that time there were no real state

formations within the territory of the USSR empire which would have supported us. All our hopes were pinned on Russia and on B. Yeltsin.

In part this was justified, in part of course it was not. It was only in order to give Russia a chance to express its stance on the Baltic republics, on their policy and on what had happened that this treaty was signed and later ratified by the Latvian Republic Supreme Council.

The signing of treaties with Latvia and Estonia gave B. Yeltsin an opportunity to convene an emergency session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and there raise the Baltic question. Otherwise he would not have been able to put that question on the agenda. We are strongly opposed by our enemies from within Latvia, who travel to Russia and actively promote their views there.

Now a word about the disputed issues and charges against the treaty levelled by the Latvian Committee. Fundamentally and in essence they are justified, as the section regarding citizenship is not in accordance with international treaties. Nonetheless, if one analyzes closely points 3 and 4 of the treaty it becomes quite clear that they cannot function until such time as each of the parties to the treaty—the Latvian Republic and the Russian Federation—adopts their own legislative acts regarding citizenship.

As you are well aware, the Latvian Republic Supreme Council has resolved that the citizenship issue will be raised following election of a legal Sejm and de facto restoration of the Latvian Republic. Therefore there is no reason to say that this treaty will be applied in regard to citizenship prior to the reestablishment of the Latvian Republic.

The Russian Federation has no law on citizenship, nor can they draft such a law in the near future. At the present time they have other tasks, i.e. the struggle for real political power. Therefore, even though declarations have been made in regard to these matters they are impossible to implement. And the most important thing for us is to hold out through this week, through next month, perhaps until spring, perhaps until November.

At the present time the Soviet Union is in effect heading for the introduction of martial law throughout its entire territory, at least de facto martial law. Therefore we need concrete political contacts with that portion of the Russian Federation's government which wants to change the government of the USSR. As you are aware, B. Yeltsin has demanded M. Gorbachev's resignation. He is concluding his own treaties with the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, thereby forming another large political bloc in opposition to the Kremlin. We must take advantage of this situation.

By breaking up the empire we have a chance to leave it with the fewest losses, taking into consideration as well international opinion and political sanctions against the Soviet Union.

Thus this was a political treaty. As we analyze it we must not exaggerate its legal standards. The very basis for it bespeaks the fact that from the standpoint of international law this treaty is invalid, since our independence is being recognized by a state which is not itself independent. It is a political document which has been put in the form of a treaty in order to give it added significance. It should be interpreted exactly that way, without exaggerating the significance of individual points, definitions, etc.

I think that we could conclude treaties of this nature with anyone who wishes to and with whom we wish to do so.

If one carefully analyzes the section regarding citizenship one will see that application of Article 3 precludes application of Article 4, while application of Article 4 precludes application of Article 3, because everything pertains to the legislation of both parties regarding citizenship. Only after these issues have been resolved will it be possible to speak of application of these articles.

Therefore I feel that in this political situation the Latvian Committee was wrong to take the position it did. Especially sending its decision to Moscow, to Yeltsin, was a big mistake, as it absolutely corresponded to the notions of the Black Hundreds-like Colonel Alksnis as expressed by him at a session in Russia. Now both Latvian patriots and defenders of the Union are opposed to the treaty.

Every issue should be politically evaluated on the basis of a specific political situation, not just from a purely legal or principled standpoint. We must remember who is our ally at a specific point in time.

Remember that in 1918 Latvia also fought alongside the German Landswehr; remember how that was exploited and the results it achieved.

We do not know what will happen now. A major political struggle is underway in Russia. Thus far there is no counterweight to Yeltsin. He has always lacked just a few votes needed to get his decisions passed. Yet following the signing of this treaty Yeltsin did issue an appeal to the soldiers of the Russian Federation serving here and to progressive officers. After that the situation changed markedly, for instance in Moscow intellectual circles and also in the major industrial centers. If there was a hostile attitude toward the Baltic republics in those areas we could not count on a favorable outcome in Moscow. Yet we are still dependent on the policy carved out there.

Recently I have met on many occasions with army representatives who have come to Latvia as part of various commissions. Their thoughts vary, but even high-ranking officers have expressed solidarity on matters of Baltic independence and have quite plainly stated that their military units will not under any circumstances participate, even if ordered to do so. Some have even expressed the idea that their gun barrels might be turned in the opposite direction.

From a legal standpoint I agree: this treaty is absurd. Yet in a political sense it is something of an achievement. How valuable it is will be demonstrated by the further course of events, if we can continue to hold out.

Demolition of 35 Lenin Monuments in Latvia Protested

91UN1029B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
16 Feb 91 p 1

[Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau statement: "Statement in Protest Against the Demolition of Memorials to V. I. Lenin on Latvian Territory"]

[Text] The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau categorically protests the latest act by the republic government aimed at erasing from the memory of the people of Latvia the name and image of V. I. Lenin, the leader of the proletarian revolution and for Communists and many working people around the world the embodiment of social justice, the thing toward humanity has been striving throughout the entire course of its existence.

At the suggestion of the republic Ministry of Culture the Latvian Council of Ministers has decided to drop from the list of cultural monuments of republic significance 35 monuments to V. I. Lenin, including ones standing in Aluksne, Tsisis, Gulbene, Yurmala, Liyepaya, Madona, Riga, Sigulda, Valka and Ventspils, as well as the memorial plaque on the Riga Central Train Station. This is yet another violation of the 13 October 1990 USSR Presidential Ukase "On Prevention of Desecration of Monuments Connected With the History of the State and Its Symbols," which clearly demands that compliance with decisions by republic and local organs ordering the demolition of memorials be suspended and that those organs refrain from such decisions in the future.

We appeal to the Communists, working people and citizens of Riga and the republic to prevent this act of vandalism against the memory of the image of a leader and a man who is dear to us as Communists, to defend our Lenin; we are firmly convinced that there are very many people who are supporters of various social and political organizations and non-party members who feel the same way yet are not speaking up.

We appeal to you because just recently as a result of similar silence there emerged and existed a system in which any creative thought which did not coincide with the "guiding" thought was suppressed. Today, if you remain silent and do not take action, the same system will continue to thrive, though with other forces behind it now.

We appeal to those workers who will be forced to commit this blasphemy. Think! Today you will be paid generously by the champions of this newfound democracy, because betrayal is always well paid, but only so long as you continue to commit it. What will happen to you afterward? Painful shame and the fear of looking people in the eye or looking at what your hands have wrought?

The Latvian CP Central Committee Bureau demands that the Latvian Government stop making illegal decisions and, playing on people's moods and emotions, attempting to satisfy the political ambitions of those who strive to establish a bourgeois-nationalist government in our republic.

Latvia's Nationalities Department Chief Interviewed

91UN1182A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
23 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with V.P. Steshenko, director of the Department for Nationalities Issues of Latvia, by T. Bavykina in Vilnius; date not given: "To Feel the Pulse..."]

[Text] Vladimir Petrovich Steshenko, director of the Department for Nationality Issues of Latvia, visited Vilnius. We met with him at the Department for Nationalities Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania government. He kindly agreed to answer our questions, the tight "schedule" of his one-day visit notwithstanding.

[Bavykina] Vladimir Petrovich, you have been department director for a very short period of time. It has been less than a month since you were appointed. Please tell the readers of our newspaper about yourself.

[Steshenko] Usually, everybody is interested to know the ethnic background of the person heading the Department for Nationality Issues. Well, I am Ukrainian. My father, a military physician, served for a quite long time in Latvia, though not continuously, and "settled" in Riga after he retired. I am a journalist by profession. I worked for a long time for the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, and subsequently for an information agency and the scientific publication POISK. When political life in the republic came to a boil, I took part in creating the People's Front of Latvia. I was even a member of the Duma until such time as Russian intellectuals, myself included, left it quietly, feeling that we were, so to say, unneeded there. Subsequently, I was elected chairman of the Socialist Party of Labor. Hopefully, I am right in my belief that my position is consistently centrist; at any rate, I try to use common sense in everything.

[Bavykina] What is the goal of your visit?

[Steshenko] Our department is being established at present, and I am in Vilnius to see what our Lithuanian colleagues have succeeded in doing, what the structure of your department is, and what avenues of action are priorities. For example, I am very much interested in how our Lithuanian colleagues managed to create a sociological service and form a group of lawyers within a relatively short period of time. We have yet to do it. This means that we need to gain experience.

[Bavykina] As far as I know, the issue of creating a Department for Nationality Issues was under consideration in Latvia for almost a year. Did the January events

prompt the Council of Ministers of the republic not to postpone making this decision any longer?

[Steshenko] This was indeed the case. The sociopolitical situation which emerged in January in Latvia and other Baltic republics exacerbated differences between various ethnic and social groups considerably. Of course, these differences had existed before because relations between various ethnic and social groups need to be harmonized on a continuous basis. Interethnic differences become more acute whenever the social equilibrium is disturbed. At present, there is no escaping this, because radicalism still continues to mount in our society, which is being renewed. Unfortunately, ultra-radicals of every description and extremists score political points by virtue of this. Of course, as a journalist I care about the honor of the profession, but I must note the fact that the opinions of ultra-radicals are frequently perceived by the people as state policy, including on the issue of ethnic minorities, largely "thanks to" precisely the press and television.

Extreme radicalism—regardless of whether it is that of the left or the right—which does not shy away from not only political speculation but also provocations, drives the people into dead-end situations and draws them into acute social or political conflicts which are merely "painted" in ethnic colors on the surface, once again through the efforts of the same ultra-radicals. The Riga OMON [Special-Missions Militia Detachment], which was put in the position of a hunted animal by the "joint" efforts of the two parties, is a case in point. It is no accident that the International Human Rights Commission and its Latvian chapter came to the defense of the OMON personnel.

The uncertain sociopolitical situation has a powerful effect on interethnic relations: The people do not know what tomorrow has in store for them; they are run down by constant worries, and are not sure that they have legal protection. Unfortunately, unlike in Lithuania, which has the Law on Ethnic Minorities, the status of ethnic and social groups in Latvia has not yet been determined because we still do not have the Law on Citizenship.

[Bavykina] Given this situation, what are the tasks of the department and its role?

[Steshenko] At present, the Department for Nationality Issues has more often than not to play the role of "fire brigade." In general, the department should become a unique institution for the prevention of ethnic and social conflicts. To this end it is necessary to strictly uphold the principle of equilibrium, a balance of interests.

This is how I would outline the extent of our tasks at present: to analyze, to predict, and to provide feedback. Here is an example of predicting the situation: We are already preparing for greater tensions in our society on account of the Law on the State Language taking effect on 1 January of next year. It is more radical than the one you have and, apparently, it does not sufficiently take into account the fact that non-Latvians account for 48

percent of the population of Latvia, that in the eastern areas of Latvia (Latgale) the residents of the nonindigenous nationalities account for two-thirds, and that in our large cities Russian speakers account for more than one-half. This is why we understand that we are about to run into a difficult problem.

[Bavykina] However, initially interethnic differences were also exacerbated in Lithuania after the introduction of the Law on the State Language: Apparently, a reasonable balance of the interests of various ethnic and social groups in the language sphere was not maintained to a sufficient degree, as is the case in your republic. However, a compromise has been successfully achieved due to the efforts of the department and the struggle of the ethnic minorities themselves for their rights...

[Steshenko] Yes, I know that you have secured an extension of the deadline for switching over to the state language in the keeping of business records, and parallel use of the languages in locations where ethnic groups reside in clusters. Your experience is all the more valuable because we also share troubles which we will have to encounter in the course of implementing the Law on the Language. Thus, instruction in the state language for the adult "Russian-speaking" population virtually was not provided. The issue of instructor cadres is acute; there is a shortage of them even in secondary schools. However, a great many cooperatives have sprung up which charge horrendous amounts for instruction by the so-called accelerated method. However, the effectiveness of their operation is negligible. This is why we will try, first, to analyze how the funds allocated by the state in conjunction with the adoption of the Law on the Language have been used, and subsequently propose some of our revisions, including those based on your experience.

[Bavykina] In Lithuania they also follow events in Latvia closely; after all, sociopolitical processes in the Baltic republics are quite similar...

[Steshenko] Undoubtedly. This is why our departments cannot but work together closely. Galina Kobeckaite has already visited Latvia many times. Knowing the situation in the adjacent republics makes it possible to better predict the situation at home. A new process has now begun in our republic which will certainly attract the attention of both Lithuania and Estonia—the creation of the Russian community of Latvia (following the example of similar organizations abroad). As conceived by its founders, this is going to be a socioeconomic rather than a political organization, with its own Russian Bank, an insurance company, and joint-stock companies. It is hard to say at present what the practical result of this is going to be. One thing is clear: We need to feel "the pulse" all the time and share both experience and information in a timely manner.

Latvia Passes Law on Free Development of Ethnic Groups

91UN1182B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 20 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by Alla Petropavlovskaya: "We Select Our Nationality Ourselves"]

[Text] Yesterday the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia adopted the Law on the Free Development of National and Ethnic Groups of Latvia and their right to cultural autonomy. They first began to discuss cultural autonomy seriously in December 1988, after the Forum of the Peoples of Latvia passed a relevant resolution. A legal concept was developed by the ANKOL [Association of the National-Cultural Societies of Latvia] as early as August 1989. It became the basis for the recently adopted law. Therefore we may acknowledge, with some reservations, that this law was developed by the "grass roots."

The law guarantees equal human rights in compliance with international norms to the permanent residents of the Republic of Latvia regardless of nationality, a free choice of ethnic affiliation to be entered on documents in keeping with ethnic self-identification, the right to freely maintain contacts with fellow countrymen in their historical motherland and other states, the right to freely leave the Republic of Latvia and return to it, and so on. The law codifies the duties of the state organs of the Republic of Latvia, in particular the duty to create material conditions for the development of the education, languages, and cultures of the national and ethnic groups, to which end it is deemed necessary to allocate certain funds in the state budget. Article 11 codifies the provision under which the Republic of Latvia provides an opportunity for its permanent residents to receive a higher education in their native language outside Latvia.

Here are several instant evaluations of the law made immediately after it was adopted. Deputy L. Kurdyumov ("Equal Rights") thinks that "this is a declarative, populist law adopted for the sole purpose of demonstrating that in Latvia they also care about the rights and freedoms of ethnic groups." "The law sets forth basic legal principles only. In the future, the Supreme Soviet will detail them in quite a number of laws providing for specific implementation. This is a realistic instrument for the operation of the Department for Nationality Issues as a structure of our executive power." This is the opinion of A. Panteleyev, chairman of the Commission for Human Rights and Ethnic Relations.

Lithuania's Kuzmickas Comments on USSR Talks

91UN1180A EKHO LITVY in Russian 13 Mar 91 p 3

[From the "Digest: The Lithuanian Press" column compiled by Tadas Savarskis: "From TIESA"]

[Text] Two interviews are published in this issue of TIESA: with Bronius Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, and Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of the DPTL [Democratic Workers' Party of Lithuania]. "Northern Neighbors Are Watching and Are Amazed" is the title of the first interview, several excerpts from which we offer digest readers:

"The worst thing of all is that the motives for the USSR's actions are not clear: Does it really want to conduct negotiations or to just give the appearance of negotiations in order to create a favorable impression and opinion in the world," Bronius Kuzmickas said to TIESA correspondent Teresa Kezene. "Last autumn I myself took part in consultations regarding negotiations; they were not successful and were broken off. I became convinced that both the USSR leadership and its delegation were not in a frame of mind for serious negotiations. It seems that this attitude has still not changed."

[Kezene] Does the world see M. Gorbachev's duplicity?

[Kuzmickas] I met with many diplomats from various countries at the session of the Northern Council. Some of them are placing great hopes on the negotiations. But there is also no lack of those who see the true reality—that the USSR has not been inclined toward sincere negotiations so far. And what is also interesting is that, in its relations with the Soviet Union, the West is beginning to take the situation in the Baltic republics into account. It appears that assistance to the Soviet Union will depend on how it conducts negotiations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and whether it suppresses democracy there. I would say that Western diplomats grew a little more sensible toward the end of the war in the Persian Gulf when Gorbachev proposed his version for ending the war. They do not understand how an ally can be so insidious. The prestige of the Soviet Union fell. Now the Baltic situation should begin to resound loudly.

(...)

[Kezene] The first year of negotiations was not easy, and blood was spilled. What are your predictions for the next, second year?

[Kuzmickas] I admit, I thought about a lot of things, but I did not expect tanks, and I truly did not hope for this. It was asked more than once abroad whether it was possible for something like what happened in the Transcaucasus to happen in Lithuania. I always said that this would not happen, and that some other kind of pressure could be expected. The Kremlin proved that it is not too scrupulous in its means. So one can hardly expect light from that side. The forthcoming year very likely will be difficult. I think that there will be many attempts from the outside to destabilize the situation, to incite disputes, and to provoke us. The outburst in Vilnius is the first indication that the scenario is beginning to be implemented.

[Kezene] How can we oppose brute force?

[Kuzmickas] Our fortress is political consciousness and the ability to respond to provocation with restraint. No less important is the consolidation of political forces. We must find a common language on the most important questions of strategy. This kind of a joint position will be extremely necessary. It is possible this very spring, and not only once.

Lithuanian Defense Chief Views 13 Jan Events As Planned

91UN1180B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
13 Mar 91 p 3

[From the "Digest: Lithuanian Press" column compiled by Tadas Zavarskis: "From LIETUVOS AIDAS"]

[Text] The echoes of the bloody events of 13 January are not abating on the pages of the press of Lithuania, which is celebrating its first anniversary of independence. We are still tormented and, very likely, we will continue to be tormented for a long time by the question: "Who is responsible for what happened?" In this sense, the article "The March of 11 March" by Audrius Butkevicius, general director of the Department for National Defense, which was published in the state newspaper on 9 March, is interesting.

(...)

"Plans prepared last year for the seizure of Lithuania were refined in the summer, in autumn they were supplemented with military intelligence information, and a time study of operations was coordinated. It was not possible to conceal this preparatory work at the time. Atshalov's operations officers were again deployed to Vilnius in January, and a date for conducting presidential rule was set—13 January. The main senior brass group was deployed in Vilnius, and other units in Kaunas and other cities of the republic. A regiment of 920 soldiers of the Pskov Division, which was deployed to Vilnius, also did not promise anything good, and later it delivered a spetsnaz detachment of soldiers directly subordinate to Atshalov. We were saved from a repeat occupation by the people of Lithuania, who shielded the Supreme Council with their bare breasts. Even Atshalov did not dare break through the crowd of thousands to suppress the people with tanks, and the operation became bogged down.

"It is clear to anyone who is familiar with the activity of military structures: All committees operating at their request are a Uskhopchik farce, a fig leaf. If Uskhopchik becomes another Rodionov, it is his business. The operation to seize Lithuania was led by the aforementioned Atshalov, Generals Varennikov and Ovcharov; Demidov, an official of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]; and others who were directly responsible for the actions of their subunits. Most of the people were killed by subordinates from Atshalov's spetsnaz subunit. We

presently know about plans for an assault on the Lithuanian Supreme Council and other secrets of the occupiers, and we have made provisions for how we might oppose aggression.

"Under the pretext of conducting daily driving exercises, 300 soldiers of a KGB motorized rifle division were deployed to Vilnius. Their profession is the organization of various provocations. Their work involved outbursts in Vilnius and Riga, conducted professionally, without casualties, and very noisily. Showing himself once again, General Varennikov declared cynically: 'The situation in the Baltics has to be prepared for presidential rule.' There are enough executors—we remind you of the KGB cadets who were brought in (1,500 persons), the airborne assault brigade deployed in Taurage, and other subunits that are ready for action. This is masked by political games: the special attention of the president to reviving negotiations and deceiving representatives of foreign states regarding constitutional secession from the USSR," asserts the author of the article.

Lithuania's Short-Lived Premier Simenas Interviewed

91P50137A Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian
18 Jan 91 p 1

[Interview with former prime minister Albertas Simenas at the Santariskiai Hospital Neurology Department by RESPUBLIKA correspondent Dalia Jazukeviciute: "Ward No 3"]

[Text] [Correspondent] There are several versions of your unexpected disappearance. Perhaps you would be willing to explain it yourself?

[Simenas] Each differing version satisfies the interests of certain groupings. I think people should think more about the end results and not about the interim processes. I can only say that I did not do any harm to Lithuania. Right now I am seriously ill. I hope to get well as soon as possible and return to my work in the parliament.

[Correspondent] Do you have any comments on the current situation or on the future of Lithuania?

[Simenas] Much will be determined by the majority political forces in Moscow and the war in the Persian Gulf. If there is a military coup, it would be a misfortune for Russia as well as for Lithuania. However, it would only be short term. The most important thing right now is not to give in. If the parliament or government is occupied by military force, it is useful to us all the same, since it would be a self-evident occupation, an open form of aggression and Moscow could never say that we joined the Union voluntarily or anything like it. In the eyes of the world Lithuania would be a colony. This would be a victory all the same.

[Correspondent] Thank you for agreeing to speak with me.

[Simenas] I agreed to be interviewed by RESPUBLIKA only because it has changed so much since the events of Bloody Sunday. RESPUBLIKA was always the most professional newspaper in Lithuania, but was not always justified in its attacks on the parliament and government, that is why it was unacceptable to me. I now believe that RESPUBLIKA very clearly stands in the ranks of the defenders of Lithuania's independence and is helping to unite, not split, the nation.

Lithuanian Paper Publishes Details of Simenas Disappearance

91UN1180C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
13 Mar 91 p 3

[From the "Digest: The Lithuanian Press" column compiled by Tadas Zavariskis: "From GIMTASIS KRAS-TAS"]

[Text] "RESPUBLICA has been conducting an investigation for almost a whole week" in the disappearance of A. Simenas. When there is no official information, such articles attract particular attention... However, in the home stretch, RESPUBLICA was overtaken by GIMTASIS KRAS-TAS, which published the long article version of Algis Petrulis' article, "The Truth Dies in Silence." It is rather difficult to select the most important excerpt from this long article in which the author's step-by-step logic is presented. But, nonetheless, we took it on:

"On the night of 13 January, at about 0200 hours, shots rang out at the Vilnius television tower and the groans of the first victims could be heard. At 0230 hours, the telephone rang in the dispatcher's office of the government garage. Dispatcher Stase recognized the voice of Borute, secretary of the head of the government. Instructions were given to dispatch a vehicle to A. Simenas immediately. However, the vehicle was first supposed to pick up guards.

"After several minutes, a black Volga GAZ-31 drove up to the government building. Two young men were already waiting at the door. One went back into the building, and the other sat next to the driver. He said: 'To Turniskiu, 25.' He did not utter another word. After 10-15 minutes the Volga slowly drove up to the villa in Turniskes. A light was burning on the second floor. The guard knocked on the door. The light went out suddenly. After some time the door opened and a conversation lasted for several minutes. After another several minutes A. Simenas and the guard came out—both with suitcases. Right after them came the wife of the prime minister and three small children. It was only after the vehicle started to move that the driver asked A. Simenas where to go. A. Simenas answered that it absolutely did not matter to him, but that it was necessary to make a call (there was a telephone in the vehicle). They stopped at the militia station. A yellow Zhiguli were already waiting there. A. Simenas shook the hand of the driver of the Zhiguli and went inside the station for a while. Soon,

all of the baggage was taken out of the Volga and put into the Zhiguli, and the yellow vehicle disappeared in the darkness. The Volga was released from Turniskes only after a half hour. The driver of the Volga was able to recall the color of the Zhiguli and the license number. Later, not one militiaman was able to recall this.

"On the eve of the bloody events V. Landsbergis, together with A. Simenas, arrived at a government meeting. K. Prunskiene, although she had retired, was able to sit in the prime minister's chair. A. Simenas had to sit alongside. V. Landsbergis introduced the new chairman of the Council of Ministers. The strange situation was resolved only after V. Landsbergis and K. Prunskiene left. A. Simenas took his proper chair. It was at the first meeting that A. Simenas asked the ministers: 'Who categorically refuses to work in the new government?' Six ministers raised their hands. After several weeks, P. Kuris, recalling this meeting, said: 'I sensed that this was only a temporary chairman.'

"A. Simenas asked M. Misiukonis and A. Brazauskas to help him and not to leave the government.

"They bought a new suit for A. Simenas on the eve of the tragic events: The premier was being readied for a meeting with M. Gorbachev. Today, many ministers cannot say exactly why A. Simenas did not go. It is known that in those days Gorbachev was keeping to himself under various pretexts.

"One thing is clear: The Council of Ministers tried to take the initiative into their own hands. Possibly, even to act independently. Was this not an undesirable signal for some of the deputies? This supposition may be reinforced by the fact that on the eve of the tragic events Prunskiene tried to persuade the ministers that it was necessary to operate independently, without coordinating actions with parliament. Could not the independence of the government be interpreted by some influential deputies as treason?

"On the evening of 12 January in the building of the Council of Ministers, A. Simenas convened a meeting of the government. The chairman gave a note to A. Saudargas. With gestures he pointed to the ceiling and the walls, saying: Understand, I cannot say this out loud. The Minister of Foreign Affairs read the note and left quickly. At about midnight A. Saudargas was in Poland. Almost all of the ministers knew about this. As it became clear later, only A. Simenas himself did not know about this. At the farewell, A. Simenas said that it was not necessary to convene the next day, inasmuch as everyone was tired. It was necessary to rest. A. Simenas mentioned that he had not slept for six days. Later in the evening, A. Simenas met with representatives of various parties and organizations. The last group to call on Simenas was a delegation of Tautininkai [Lithuanian Nationalist Party]. At about 2400 hours, A. Simenas was driven to Turniskes. A day earlier, his wife and three children had settled in here. The chairman of the Council of Ministers was no longer being guarded (not counting the guard in

Turniskes). Before moving into the new apartment, the men from his family's bodyguard told the premier's wife: 'The chairman has decided not to guard you.' This was embedded in his memory. At a closed meeting of the Supreme Council, in an incoherent stream of words, he mentioned this fact as one of the reasons for leaving Vilnius."

Russian Cultural Center Opens in Tallinn, Launches Paper

PM1803151791

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 March 1991 Second Edition carries on page 4 under the headline "Russian Gallery" a 550-word report by IAN's Aleksandr Veretennikov. The report says that "The 'Russkaya Entsiklopedia' Cultural Center has opened in Tallinn." Asked by Veretennikov how the center perceives its activity, poet Sergey Boytsev, general director of the Russian center, replies: "Our minimum aim is to compile a catalogue of the names of Russians who have contributed something to Estonia's culture. Clearly this will require us to have a large number of assistants and good liaison with the public, to hold exhibitions, meetings with cultural workers, and so forth. Cultural and educational tasks will be tackled at the same time. We assign a considerable role here to the art gallery and the cultural newspaper RUSSKAYA POCHTA."

"Are you hoping to find readers? There are so many newspapers in Estonia now."

"The circulation of RUSSKAYA POCHTA is 5,000, it is profitable, and is run on full economic accountability. I can say that the newspaper is helping to revive the spiritual culture of the Russian community on Estonian soil."

RSFSR

Isakov on RSFSR Special Congress Session

91UN1163A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 12, 23 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Republic, by G. Vladimirova; place and date not given: "There Can Be No Victory in Conflict"]

[Text] [Vladimirova] The RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies opens on 28 March. We all realize that the situation in the republic and the country is extraordinarily complex. What are your thoughts about this?

[Isakov] Yes, the congress will be assembling under exceptional conditions. There is an atmosphere of a crisis of authority developing into the death throes of authority.

[Vladimirova] What, in your view, are the reasons for this situation?

[Isakov] Thinking about this, you involuntarily attempt to select among the important and less important events those which are, for all that, the most appreciable, which brought on the crisis. From my viewpoint, the main reason is the fact that a new party is actively taking shape before our eyes from a bloc of political forces differing in terms of their ideology. This was said clearly enough by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin in his speech on 9 March in Cinema House.

The formation of such a party bloc is in principle a positive phenomenon. Indeed, it is time to have done with the monopolism of one party and the monochromaticity of the political spectrum, but at the same time it has to be considered that this is happening in a country which is only just laying the primary foundations of political culture. The shortage thereof is, among all the others, the most painful, virtually. It is perceived in everything—the statements of political leaders, the way in which their speeches are covered in the press (misinterpreted at times) and the actions of their political supporters or opponents.

In my view, from the monopolism and diktat of one party a sharp tilt has begun toward the diktat of another—young, aggressive, and only just taking shape, but unwilling to tolerate any restrictions in its political activity.

I spotted the disturbing symptoms of such a dictatorship long ago. They were manifested in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet at the early stages of its activity. I would put in this category disregard for the law and lawful procedures and attempts to rely on a small group of confidants and retainers of the leader and adopt most important decisions in an atmosphere of secrecy and then pass them off as the will of everyone. We have seen all this, we have been through all this. And when I noticed the first signs of this illness in the activity of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, I had to speak about this at the congress. Profound conclusions were not drawn, unfortunately.

[Vladimirova] We should speak about your political sympathies also, I believe, particularly if it is considered that proposals concerning your recall and no confidence in you were heard both at the third session and at meetings with the electorate.

[Isakov] I was supported at the elections by the democratic forces, and, thanks to them, I obtained a deputy's mandate. My political opponents were representatives of the party leadership, so all is clear here. But if we assume office under the banner of democracy, it is our duty, surely, not only to proclaim its principles but also be guided by them.

I was recently in my constituency, in Sverdlovsk's Kirovskiy Rayon, which is saturated with science and high-tech enterprises. The meetings were very difficult, very. But I saw for myself that people, even those with a

very good grasp of the political situation, are simply not prepared to believe that in moving away from one party dictatorship we have so quickly and unexpectedly arrived at another and that, while sincerely aspiring to democracy, we have obtained that same diktat, only painted in a different color. But gradually, not finding an intelligent answer to the question of what the real basis of the Republic's unchecked confrontation with the Union is, many people are nonetheless concluding that the main reason therefore is the clash of irreconcilable party interests. And the people's most vital interests are already finding themselves in the fire of the struggle meanwhile, the Union is collapsing and the economy is caving in.

Although you have rightly mentioned that calls for the recall of Deputy Isakov have been heard, I nonetheless believe that the more candid we all are in our evaluations, the more normal the situation in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will be.

In the heat of political conflict people's nerves are stretched to the limit. There is no desire to investigate who is right and who is to blame, and no effort is made to probe people's arguments—people are often simply reluctant to listen to one another. Serve some people the socialist choice, others cannot bear the smell of it. The very confrontation at which society has now arrived and people's excited state—this is the worst result that a policy could have.

It seems to me that a prudent policy and a prudent politician would stabilize social life, winning for himself as many supporters and friends as possible. Unfortunately, and this needs to be recognized also, our leader of the Russian Supreme Soviet is increasingly preoccupied with a search for enemies. This is the result: In order to be able to take a step he continually wants to point out who is preventing him doing so. Today it is the center, Staraya Square and the KGB. Tomorrow there will be new ones. The very logic of motion amounts to the search for an enemy, evidently.

[Vladimirova] But your warning about "guerrilla methods" and about the fact that the Russian parliament is by its actions itself contributing to the increase of chaos in the country and the war of budgets and laws was not understood in the Supreme Soviet either. Was it not from there that there was sharp opposition to the statement of the six leaders and the charge against them of a dishonorable approach?

[Isakov] I would not say that we were not understood in the Supreme Soviet because the emotional response which followed our statement does not, for all that, reflect the deputies' true position. It needs to be judged not only by the microphone battles but primarily by the results of the voting. And the Supreme Soviet voted by chamber to convene a special congress. The assertion that the congress was imposed by the Communists of Russia shows a lack of respect for the wishes of the highest organ of power—the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. I

see this as a very dangerous trend: an endeavor to counterpose the constitutional organs of power to the people and set them on a collision course.

We are today astonishing the world with our lack of respect for our own laws and our own decisions: The congress or the Supreme Soviet formulates one policy line, but the leader pursues another essentially canceling out the decisions of the collegial body, which in fact endowed him with authority.

[Vladimirova] You mean the attitude toward the Union treaty?

[Isakov] Yes, included. The congress and the Supreme Soviet expressed themselves "for." But Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is constantly questioning both the need for a Union treaty and the signing thereof. What should our attitude toward this be? Does this correspond to the civilized framework and the ideal of a state based on the rule of law, about which we are having so much to say and which was enshrined in the Declaration of the Sovereignty of Russia?

[Vladimirova] What do you see as the role of the intelligentsia under these conditions?

[Isakov] It seems to me that many people underestimate the fact that we live in a traditional society thoroughly impregnated with dogmas, myths, and customs. The spiritual life of our society may be compared with the condition of the tundra—it is very easily injured and is restored with great difficulty. We are paying insufficient attention to the preservation of the dignity of the fatherland and are displaying coarseness in respect to both its history and ourselves. Whence also the disrespect for one another and the reluctance to take stock of the opinion of an opponent, and, what is more, this also applies to the deputies.

Today the intelligentsia is split. People called upon to consolidate society have dispersed to different sides of the barricades. And some, frightened by the genie of the political lack of culture which has been released, are preferring to remain silent. The intelligentsia could be a conciliatory, stabilizing force. We need to desist from political malice and from embroiling antagonistic forces. There can be no victory or victors in this conflict. From my viewpoint, the person who helps us take a step toward civic peace and harmony is acting intelligently and responsibly in this situation.

[Vladimirova] What do you think, might this detente ensue as a result of the congress?

[Isakov] I would very much like to hope so, although all three items on the agenda—B.N. Yeltsin's report and the questions concerning the Union and federal treaties—will undoubtedly give rise to the keenest debate, primarily because many deputies have either already arrived or are arriving at a similar evaluation of the situation in the Russian parliament and its leadership. I repeat, instead of consolidation, we have an abrupt flare of interparty

struggle. It has essentially divided parliament and will, evidently, divide the congress, and it can already be seen that it is dividing society. The Congress of People's Deputies, as the highest organ of power responsible for the fate of the people and for the fate of the republic, must put an end to this process. But it cannot be ruled out that the congress will disagree with us and that the deputies who have come from the localities will characterize the situation differently. In this case we will have to resign. I see nothing tragic about this. A sense of duty forced us to present the political statement.

I believe that the question of the recall of B.N. Yeltsin also could arise, although I would consider it more correct for Boris Nikolayevich to continue to work in his office. He is supported by masses of people, and this is not simply a force, it is capital which could be relied on in the transformatory activity of the Supreme Soviet. Losing this capital would mean making the work of the Russian parliament extraordinarily more difficult. But cooperation is possible only on a fundamental basis of compliance with Russian laws and the decisions of congresses, not on the subjective, confrontational narrow party policy which the leader of the Russian Supreme Soviet has begun to pursue, particularly of late.

[Vladimirova] And if the version of your resignation arises? It would then, after all, affect all six leaders of parliament, and this also would not be for the best....

[Isakov] Were we not to do so, we would involuntarily be subscribers to a policy that we do not share and consider mistaken and impasse-bound and would be assuming responsibility for its consequences. If the congress does not support our positions and does not agree with us, political ethics will, of course, force us to resign. But only time and subsequent events will show who was right, and who, wrong. History ultimately is evaluated not by weeks or days.

[Vladimirova] And what are your forecasts of the decisions in respect to the two other items on the agenda?

[Isakov] I believe that the complex situation in respect to the Union treaty has been created to a large extent artificially and represents the latest round in the political game with the center. But policy at the level of leadership of a republic is not a game of tennis. From my viewpoint, the fundamental interests of the multinational people of Russia have now come to be sacrificed to this game. I believe that the Union treaty is perfectly compatible with the sovereignty of the republics. It in no way conflicts with their bilateral and multilateral relations here.

With the federal treaty the situation is, of course, more complex. Work thereon should, of course, have proceeded ahead of the work on the Union treaty. It would have been natural to have operated as follows: All state formations within the RSFSR have reached an understanding and are proceeding together to negotiate at the Union level. Such an understanding is lacking currently, although attempts at this work were made. For this reason we aspired when working on the Union treaty to

a model that did not conflict with any versions of decisions pertaining to questions of the federation. Work on the Union treaty brought us willy-nilly to the question of what the Russian Federation is.

I would like to emphasize that the following logic and the following correlation are emerging increasingly distinctly: abrupt, imprudent, and unbalanced decisions concerning the Union treaty immediately hit at the federal treaty. They are so interconnected that any disparagement of the Union of SSR immediately hits at the interests of the Russian Federation.

[Vladimirova] Could you not give an example?

[Isakov] We have this year suddenly collected all taxes for Russia, specifying that we will transfer to the Union the amount that it should receive. Not too bad, seemingly. But it transpired that the republic is not ready to realize the powers that formerly resided with the Union. Now a tremendous number of complaints are being leveled at Russia—you have omitted this and this and this and this.... Those who previously were financed by the Union budget believe that Russia has appropriated these resources for itself. But this is just one aspect of the problem. A second is that since Russia has acted thus in respect to the Union, why may a kray or oblast or autonomous republic not act the same in respect of Russia itself?

This is why during discussion of the federal treaty question it is essential to adhere particularly strictly to the principle of the equality of the subjects of the federation. There are no great and small nations. In a large home—whether this home be the Union or the Russian Federation—everyone should feel assured and at ease. A very complex task if it is considered that economic structures are now extremely deformed and that economic thinking itself is oriented more toward division and redivision than organization and production.

We need to restore to the idea of the Union its true essence and never again allow things to go to extremes.

Shakhray on RSFSR Special Congress Session

91UN1147A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 12,
18 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the Committee for Legislation of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by Ye. Tipikin; place and date not given: "The Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies: Prognosis From Various Standpoints. Blind Alleys of Confrontation"]

[Text] [Shakhray] We have found ourselves in a situation where we can already speak of the "regular extraordinary congress." It seems that all Russia has had extraordinary congresses.

It seems to me that we absolutely must understand that the occasion for which the congress was convened—the report of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet—is not the main reason.

Here again they are taking advantage of the fact that the deputies are illiterate about the law or are inadequately informed. According to the Constitution of Russia, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet reports to the congress or the Supreme Soviet. And if we are really speaking about the chairman's report, about the attempt to hear it and figure out where we are going, then it is certainly not mandatory to convene a congress. So, is the real task something else? Apparently it is fairly simple: to replace Yeltsin. And on a broader plane—the Supreme Soviet.

So one should not think that a congress is necessary in order to hear a report. But to replace Yeltsin—it is. This cannot be done without a congress.

I shall conventionally call this scenario for the development of events the "constitutional coup." Since the "test of strength" in the Lithuanian variant showed that conditions have not ripened for other events.

It seems to me that the attempt to replace Yeltsin by sudden attack has almost no chance of success. And an attempt to transform the Supreme Soviet can be carried out only half way—by its dissolution. Because any attempt to hold elections for another Supreme Soviet is also doomed to failure: The alignment of forces is such that, in all probability, neither one will occur.

Hence, in my view, follows the deeper task, which was apparently set within the walls of the Russian Communist Party and, possibly, in the central structures of the state and party apparatus at the Union level: to completely eliminate the Supreme Soviet of Russia in its present form. For if there is only a congress left, it cannot be in session permanently. It will have to be convened twice a year, and this will essentially be the same as the old system. That is, after Yeltsin's replacement, the next step should probably be to disband the Supreme Soviet. But a different development of events is also possible. The sudden attack to replace Yeltsin is repulsed and the congress will most likely end up at an impasse, and the deputies will go on talking for weeks on end... At this point it would be possible to conduct extraordinary sessions of oblast and kray soviets and supreme soviets of autonomous republics. This is the unit of the state apparatus where the guard, the flower of the party nomenklatura, has assembled. And at these sessions it is possible to adopt decisions expressing no confidence in the Russian parliament and appeal to the USSR president. Of course, this means the introduction of presidential rule in Russia.

Possibly these are just my fantasies. Perhaps nobody will agree to the variant we have already counted on and expect. But, in my view, there is also a broader plan: in general, to point out the decay and lack of necessity for this "idiotic" parliamentarianism and return to organs formed in the quiet of the offices, a strong executive

power—it can be called various things. The essence is the same: restoring the decorative role of the soviets and the parliament.

And in this connection one cannot rule out the variant that the congress can be pushed to the point of disbanding itself. And the chairman of the Supreme Soviet can be pushed to the point of appealing directly to the people. Well, it is better to have a disastrous end than disaster without end. Unfortunately, we are now between a rock and a hard place, where each step taken by the leftists and rightists along their lines brings us closer to a catastrophe. Here it is important to stop both. We must simply stop and not take a single step toward the edge of the abyss. And we must try to find a political solution: Neither side may have a "clearcut" victory. A "clearcut" victory achieved by force, after a certain amount of time (73 years?), will end up as an illusion of victory.

[Tipikin] Is the confrontation between the leadership of the Center and Russia a genuine reality of our life?

[Shakhrai] I am not so naive as to reduce the conflict between the two leaders to personal animosity. They have different political forces behind them, and this exacerbates the tragedy. Behind one is the party apparatus, the military-industrial complex, and "proponents of the socialist option." Behind the other is the new democracy. There are, of course, weeds there, but there are also useful shoots.

But we are caught up by the fact that the USSR is supposed to be equated to Pavlov or Gorbachev. That is, specific officials and state organs. And those who criticize these officials (whether fairly or not is another question) automatically become people who are opposing the Union. This is simply a deception. There is no war of laws or parade of sovereignties. These are just eloquent words. Sovereignty is a national form of political struggle. And the war of laws is the war with the law, legality, and statehood in general.

What does the war between Russian and Union laws mean? A whole year after the election of the USSR Supreme Soviet the present Supreme Soviet did not exist in Russia. And what happened? If one is to believe the Union parliamentarians, the laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet did not work. That is, the fact that the Union laws did not work was linked directly to whether or not there was a Russian parliament. But then the Supreme Soviet of Russia held its own congress and adopted many laws. Are these laws being implemented anywhere at all? Practically nowhere. That is, in practice there is no war of laws: There can be no war with something that is not working.

On the other hand, when the jurisdictions of the Union and the republics are not distinguished from one another, each tries to pull the blanket over itself. But there are also many examples in which the Union is violating the USSR Constitution by invading the jurisdiction of the republic.

But legality suffers as a result. And I am speaking out in favor of a moratorium on this question: The positions of the Union and republic were determined at the level of the plan.

[Tipikin] And the post of president of Russia? Are we really speaking about an objective need of the republic or is the post being created for a particular individual?

[Shakhrai] I generally think that in one state there should be one president. But we like to reduce any idea to the absurd, and in terms of the number of presidents per capita we have apparently taken over first place in the world. And I think we will even go much farther: Within Russia alone there are 88 different national-territorial formations. But, apparently, having said that in some sense this is absurd, we must accept it as a given. We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that the structure of executive power is accepting its head, which is called a president. This is not so terrible in and of itself if we create a system of counterbalances, and authorities are clearly delimited. Ultimately the unification of everything will be easier for those republics that have the same power structures.

But Russia is not Armenia or Georgia and it cannot simply declare its state sovereignty. Look for yourselves. While for other republics there is no problem with turning over questions of defense, for example, to the exclusive competence of Union leadership, in Russia are concentrated 85 percent of all the defense enterprises, and 70 percent of Russia's industry is defense-related. Therefore, the struggle for its statehood has turned into the struggle for the president. And the more the center resists the objective development of events, the more it contributes to splitting the Union apart.

Yes, today one can see precisely who will claim the post of president of Russia if it is introduced. But the breakdown of the forces makes it possible to say that if the Russian parliament does not end up in a blind ally and does not fall apart altogether, there might not be a president-tsar. Because the present Russian parliament will undoubtedly oppose the president with strong counterbalances.

Abdulatipov on RSFSR Special Congress

91UN1147B Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 12,
18 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by Ye. Tipikin; place and date not given: "Not Because We Like It"]

[Text] [Abdulatipov] First of all, we should probably say that the congress is not convening because it wants to. The processes taking place in political and socioeconomic life today show that we are falling deeper into the crisis. And if we cannot see and honestly admit this today, tomorrow will be too late. For both conservatives and democrats.

So the need to convene the congress was brought about by the processes taking place in Russia today, and also by the inadequacy of our policy to handle the crisis, a policy which we frequently implement without taking existing realities into account. Today we need a more balanced, a more realistic, and, the main thing, a more consistently creative policy. There is a critical need for us to take a definite political stand, and it is very primitive to reduce this simply to a question of the struggle between Yeltsin's supporters and opponents. There are also attempts to reduce the forthcoming congress to a matter of this confrontation. The causes of the crisis lie deeper—in the policy imposed on the Supreme Soviet and government by individual figures.

In my view, the problem is that our country is essentially patriarchal to a large extent. And in a patriarchal society a patriarchal consciousness always prevails, one structured mainly around stereotypes and cults, the extremes of the mass psychology of the crowd. It takes, say, a ready-made ideal, fetish, or leader, and all the rest of the policy is built on this.

The personality cult in Russia has always been established on the basis of a rejection of everything that preceded it. Moreover, liberal politics, in Russia especially, have never been regarded as creative politics. And suddenly there appears the tough opposition personality who speaks not in refined philosophical language but in plain terms—that is, he fully corresponds to the idea of a leader in the patriarchal consciousness. And all the attention in the search for someone like this is concentrated on Yeltsin. And, as recent events show, he himself has nothing against this.

This is a brief, if you will, philosophical examination of the personality cult, and here we find the style of the political behavior of the leader and those closest to him. And the fact that all policy has been concentrated around the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. And the fact that nobody keeps track of the degree to which this policy and the leader's actions correspond to the decisions of the congress and the Supreme Soviet. And the desire to circumvent the congress and the Supreme Soviet and make the chairman a president as quickly as possible... He is becoming a hostage to the image of the leader charged up by some of the press, and the people's deputies and the Supreme Soviet are his hostages. Such a position is degrading for the majority of deputies. But some also like it. Hence the fact that our political statements are taken as nothing more than attacks against Boris Nikolayevich.

Nobody has betrayed Yeltsin. Perhaps I even sympathize with him as a person. But I absolutely disagree with his political line and with his inconsistent policy. I think we have a right to demand an accounting from him. And we must do a reckoning. In brief, we must take a stand at the congress, and the congress must make sure that the ship of deputies is on course.

The ideal variant of the work of the congress would be a normal interpretation and clarification of our political strategy and tactics and the return of the chairman himself to the course of the normal policy. Without confrontation or opposition. But if I know the deputy corps, confrontation is practically inevitable. But in this situation, even if Boris Nikolayevich retires, we will not have fulfilled our main task: interpretation. He could be replaced by exactly the same kind of politician. With the same people around him. And he could behave in exactly the same way. Today we must proceed to conceptually new approaches in politics and determine a new work style for organs of authority and new norms for political activity.

And the people want stability, well-being, and peace. Today's politics do not provide for that. And if the congress is not capable of making changes here, we will have to leave.

[Tipikin] Who do you mean by "we?"

[Abdulatipov] The deputy corps in general. All of it. Or else we must take a stand. But I still think that even with all the costs and shortcomings of our electoral system, we could still concentrate the healthiest forces in the deputy corps. I would even allow opposition for the sake of the cause, for the sake of creativity.

[Tipikin] What if the stand the congress takes makes it necessary for you to leave?

[Abdulatipov] I have already experienced a desire to move on to another job and free myself from these fetters. But to do that would be betraying myself and the people who did and still do believe in me. Therefore, I cannot simply retire today.

But if the congress, having taken a stand with respect to policy, thought I had no other choice—then I would leave with no hard feelings. So the level of my commitment is less than that of many others. But I do not intend either to desert or to settle accounts. I want to do whatever I can to help to understand the threatening situation with which our people are faced today.

[Tipikin] Do you agree with those who say that the standoff between the leaders of Russia and the center is an accomplished fact?

[Abdulatipov] When we speak of a standoff again we are getting into an analysis of the positions of individuals, since to a large extent this is a standoff between two leaders and the political lines they are imposing on the two supreme soviets and the two governments: Union and republic. Let the USSR Supreme Soviet figure out the political strategy of the president and the government. They do not inspire very much optimism in me. But it does seem to me that they are ready and predisposed to cooperate.

A large amount of blame lies with us, the leaders of Russia. Look at the declaration of our sovereignty: the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the RSFSR

throughout the entire territory of the Republic. This means that we are actually withdrawing from the USSR. Thus we are breaking apart the unified state. I, for example, voted in favor of the declaration but against the fifth point. For we have paralyzed the country. Our struggle against the center has ended up as a fight against ourselves, against Russia. Imagine that both the Union and Russian laws apply to some area. What are we going to do? We will simply not obey either one of them and invent a third, our own, one that is homemade. And that is already anarchy, chaos.

Or take the campaign that is getting underway to subvert the Union treaty with various kinds of lateral agreements and attempts to create a parallel center. If a person is against preserving the USSR, he should come right out and say so. Why beat around the bush? I do not know of a single democrat who is in favor of preserving the USSR. He will find thousands of arguments and excuses. But how would they feel if the country voted in favor of the Union? I still believe in this possibility. Recently people have been talking a lot about the breakup of Russia, its statehood, supposedly because the former autonomous regions—including national-state formations, incidentally—will be participating in the signing of the new Union treaty. Another attempt to get the upper hand over someone. Nobody from the republics of the RSFSR claims the role of the violator of Russian statehood. According to their demand, this federative treaty, seemingly directed toward preserving the integrity of the RSFSR, was adopted as a basis in the Soviet of the Federation. But the "democrats" actively blocked it at that time. We cannot be constantly playing a game of competition with these extremely serious issues. Serious politics, on which the fates of millions of people depend, must be taken more seriously.

[Tipikin] In your opinion, does Russia need to have its own president? Or is this post being introduced today for a specific individual?

[Abdulatipov] We are now seeing a tendency for very many presidents to appear. And even serious people, deputies, are talking like this: Why is Russia not good enough to have one? Lord, is that supposed to be an argument?

Although in principle I am not against a presidency. But nobody knows anything yet. What will be the specific form of rule? What authority will the president have? Will there be, say, local "governors" appointed by him? Or elected? Nothing is clear but the race is already on...

I would think that we should first prepare all the documents and publish them and then consult with the people. Nobody knows any of this, but the name of the specific person who is supposed to be the only candidate for this post is being publicized everywhere. Another personality cult. But first we must do everything possible to make sure that the president does not become a dictator (the conditions for this exist). And there are many brilliant individuals on the horizon. Russia is

great. It is time to discover new personalities and leaders and not restrict ourselves to the same old people for decades. The president must concentrate healthy and creative forces.

In conclusion, I wish to express my deep gratitude to those people who are continuing to work, who are continuing to remain normal people, in spite of the political leapfrog. And we are increasingly being drawn into this policy. And if the political standoff continues, the people will become hostages in a senseless struggle. Yet they should remain free of dogmas and illusions of this kind. Only free people will advance the country. Only a country liberated from cults and stereotypes is capable of creativity.

And so on 28 March the RSFSR people's deputies will gather at their special congress. Judging from the points of view expressed in these two interviews [reference to 91UN1147.a, interview with Sergey Shakhrai, chairman of the Committee for Legislation of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by Ye. Tipikin; Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No. 12, 18 March 91 p 3], its work will be difficult. But, in spite of how critical the forthcoming debates may be and in spite of the confrontation between the deputy groups, we shall hope that reason, good will, and real concern for the fate of Russia and the well-being of her peoples will win out.

Need for Russian Peasant Party Discussed

91UN1068A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 9, 6 Mar 91 p 9

[Article by Yu. Chernichenko under the rubric "Politics: The Writer and Society": "For Whom and Why a Peasant Party Is Needed"]

[Text] "It is terrible that a depraved ruling class—the multimillion-strong party-state nomenklatura—is not able to give up any of the privileges it has seized," writes A.I. Solzhenitsyn in his famous work on the system of Russia. The first of its privileges in time and in significance was its monopolistic and purely feudal ownership of land.

The six-year experience of perestroika proves that the Communist Party will not voluntarily give up land to any other structure. There have been many loud words, and almost as much time has passed as NEP [New Economic Plan] lasted, but there has been almost no movement. Every lie, every goblin or ghost, everything that is unconscious in the lumpen is thrown into the affair in order to stave off real reform, that is, a change in the power of property ownership in the agrarian relations of a starving country.

Famine without war, without a blockade, despite a record harvest—it is historically unprecedented. It is not one of those famines that ends with the new harvest. It is a sign of the general crisis of the system and its unfitness for people's lives. It is impossible for cosmetic repair of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz institution or a doubling of

investments in the agricultural gulag to achieve anything—even the delegates of the 28th CPSU Congress agreed with this, having turned down Ye. Ligachev and his idea of a "redoubling." The paralysis of the agricultural system is not an evil fabrication of economists and publicists but the logical result of dictatorship. There is no sense in working the land in any fashion, never mind well, because there is nothing for which to exchange the harvest. There is no money, there is no exchange of goods, and there is no sense in producing surplus output. According to circumstances, the kolkhoz turns into a large subsistence economy from which grain and cattle can only be obtained using forceful requisitioning methods. But the mechanism of coercion (with the CPSU raykom as its chief link) has rusted and grown weak, and the food requisition detachment is deprived of forces. That reinforces the permanent famine in a country that sows the greatest area of wheat on earth.

The ruling regime no longer has any constructive agricultural ideas—other than to say "No." "No" to the laws of Yeltsin and Silayev, "No" to private ownership of land, "No" to equality for the peasant and the private farmer with the kolkhoz, "No" to market relations in the countryside... As a move in the game, the rank of a chairman and director is raised almost to the status of a state structure. Enforcement functions are given to any soviets of kolkhozes and agricultural unions—in return, permission is given to criticize the highest authorities of blunders, errors, and infringement of their interests. "...It is a Slavic house divided, an old dispute..." Apparently there will now be "promotion of the guilty party," as happened with Ligachev: Let him make a lot of noise and then publicly fail. Starodubtsev will be next after Yegor Kuzmich.

Although there was reason for some hope two or three years ago, now everything is bitterly clear: 1) Famine will reign as long as a state monopoly on the land exists; 2) Economically, the agricultural gulag will disintegrate much faster than can be considered safe for the people, but politically it can be preserved for a dangerously long time; 3) Not recognizing anything but force, the nomenklatura can yield only to force. We need a political force that will push aside the absolutism of the CPSU in the countryside. This task is beyond the strength of the trade union associations and cooperative and other alliances, which the CPSU not only tolerates but encourages and cultivates. We specifically need a political union of people who think alike on agrarian reform and are able to offer a practical, alternative path!

The Peasant Party of Russia, established September 1990, continues a process that was begun by the Socialist Revolutionaries [SR]. Do you think that is terrifying? You must confess that "SR" sounds more dangerous than "imperialist" or "bourgeois" today. The populist parties of the SR's were pounded into the dust of the camps, their legacy was scattered and forgotten, and in this instance the 70-year regime tolerated no mistakes. It

was either "free labor on free land" and "land for the peasants," or the dictatorship of the proletariat and land in the hands of the state!

The SR slogan of nationalization of the land also made the October Revolution as light as a "feather" (Lenin). Back in the summer of 1917 the Bolshevik Central Committee and Lenin were not preparing to give the land of the country estates to the peasants. Using the large and cultivated farms, the Communists proposed to create state properties with rural hired workers—those "grain factories" that would have turned the mass of individual peasants into a proletariat. The "sovkhoz" is older than the "kolkhoz!" But the ideas of the SR's—the abolishment of private property—brought them a majority in the Constituent Assembly. In an ingenious tactic, Lenin snatched from the SR's their Decree on Land and used it as a lever for the revolution. V. Korolenko called the universal seizure of land and property simply "robbery."

Why was it impossible to carry out the land reform of 1917 legally and peacefully without the burning of Trigor'skiy and Shakhmatov? Because then the peasants would have supported the true authors of the Decree on Land, the SR's, and October Revolution would not have become the fuse of the world proletarian revolution. The triumphant procession of Soviet power along the agrarian road was, for the most part, bloodless. "Stab the fierce landowner with the knife" was more a refined image by Mayakovskiy than a social norm, but economic devastation—that was a reality! Out of approximately 30,000 established food-producing estates, only one-tenth survived and were turned into goskhozes [state farms] and communes: Some 2,900 "Soviet estates" began a parasitic existence... As soon as the Bolsheviks' October Revolution had succeeded, Lenin quietly took down the slogan of **nationalization** of the land and replaced it with the **socialization** of land. This was supposed to be that same populist approach—**social** ownership. But another half-turn—"land is state property"—and the deception of the century was completed. By 1919 the land had become the property of the people's commissars, which today are the departments. The departments were units of the party structure, and authority over the land was transferred to a single master: The Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). Who else has managed, by simply juggling notions around, to achieve such a political effect?

Stalin, driving 25 million peasant households into the kolkhoz, did not take their land from them. It was no longer the peasant's to lose by the time NEP came around, or even under war communism!

Until 23 November 1990, when the RSFSR Supreme Soviet abolished the state's monopoly over land on the territory of Russia, the words "private ownership of land" were interpreted as counterrevolution and smelled of the KGB and the camps. Yeltsin's parliament proclaimed the laws "On Land Reform" and "On the Peasant (Private) Farm" valid starting the day they were

adopted. Beginning the end of November 1990 each member of a kolkhoz (and worker on a sovkhoz) receives the right to a share in the form of a plot of land when he leaves the organization. But in a mere ten days, coming to its senses, the apparat began a long and bitter struggle with the supporters of Yeltsin: On 3 December the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies limited itself to adoption of a truncated version of property ownership without the right to sell the land for a period of 10 years—a period of time covering the active years of the present generation. But even this yielding, weak formula that no longer served fundamental reform and acknowledged the threatening power of the regime, proved so dangerous that it revived the specter of a referendum, which had wandering among the draft laws since the time of the unfortunate 500 days program. A referendum for what?... On whether to starve or not? For the Russian voter to support his own parliament or to obey orders and drive out Yeltsin?

No, this is just humanitarian camouflage: The land, they say, is the mother of all our wealth, it is divine; after all, even the SR's stood for this... And what can one say, it is true—except for one small detail. Under a **democratic** system even nationalization would guarantee the right to land. Under a **totalitarian** system, all forms of property other than private property are a facade for monopoly of the party. Therefore, private ownership and disposal of land is for the citizen both a method of defending human rights and a road out of lifelong bondage. The regime is right: Absolute power disappears with the loss of that part which it, the power, does not presently control. If not **everything**, then **nothing**. When five private farmers work alongside 1,000 members of a kolkhoz, it is the end of the accustomed order.

The winter of 1990-1991, the winter of Vilnius, Riga, and Husayn, and the spring 70 years after the transition to NEP, the hungriest spring with full grain elevators and a spring of sinister increases in the price of food without an explanation for this misfortune, have practically been lost for agrarian reform. The hint of a referendum has been interpreted in the rayons as a signal to "clamp down." At a congress of AKKOR [Association of Peasant Farms and Agriculturalists of Russia], a delegate from Vologda said, "It is not the law that will not give us the land—it is our CPSU raykom that will not give it out! In Russia they do not know or read the laws, and the local Communist will not release land!"

Society needs the Russian Peasant Party [KPR] in order to extract the agricultural economy from the kolkhoz-sovkhoz impasse. Without a political representative the peasantry will not become a serious force in the arena of social struggle. The private farmer is an outsider, an alien body to the system. "The individual is trash, the individual is nothing..."—the poet of socialism is absolutely right. As long as the peasant farm remains an exploited island serving as the support and salvation of a drowning kolkhoz, the regime will resign itself to it. But as soon as a group, a cooperative or an association of farms declares **equality** with the kolkhoz and **demands**

that equality in practice, it will come under fire until it is destroyed. As soon as the peasant movement quits expecting charity and refuses to view the allotment of land as a **voluntary** act of a benevolent state, the need for a defending party, a party as a parliamentary forum, will become a priority.

Let us enumerate—"perestroyka, glasnost, and democracy." But none of these things have reached the average kolkhoz! The kolkhoz is the only finished structure created by Bolshevism which distinguishes the USSR today from the other countries of the world. In all the other states of Eurasia slave agriculture has been repudiated. We do not rule out that by force of political inertia and even the psychology of the people the kolkhoz—with its well-known modernization—will be able to exist and compete with private farm cooperatives for more than one five-year period. But a force is needed that is able to made the competition between economic systems open and honest, a force that could help the process of **foreign** competition (the kolkhoz versus the Western private farmer) begin **inside** the country, as well with the participation of many millions of consumers acting as the judge. Without a peasant party able to send its delegates to the parliament—the village, rayon, and oblast soviets and the Supreme Soviet—this will most likely not be achieved.

Private ownership of land for the peasants alongside state ownership of property. A market economy. Free labor on free land. And a peasant home, a peasant family as the center and meaning of the entire political struggle. These are the foundations upon which the KPR is erected. Among other things, it departs from the CPSU's principles of democratic centralism (the KPR does not need it) and party discipline (joining and leaving the KPR is entirely voluntary, and the private life and conscience of a member of the KPR is inviolable).

That one is the party of power and this one is the party of life. That one is the party of the future (the present is only a material, a means for achieving goals), and this one is the party of the present: There will be no other life. That one is the party of declared sacrifice of everything for the sake of ideas, a national party that left space in the USSR state emblem for inscriptions in English, German, Japanese, etc. for some reason at the center of the globe, and this one is the party of the family, our own home, a Russian party but without the deadly spirit of chauvinism. The work, daily life, and income of each individual family, the health, cultural interests, and future of the children, economic and political equality, social protection of the tiller of the Russian land—this is the modest circle of tasks of a party that believes in a simple truth: The peasant is a farmer who, by caring about his own family and himself, feeds the people and the state. If things are the opposite, if "there are no other concerns beyond the survival of the country," the result is the kolkhoz, coupons, imported goods, queues, and the charity of the West. The time for convincing oneself of this is past.

The KPR not only does not set the private farmer against the member of the kolkhoz and the peasant against the citizen, but it recognizes and declares that ruin is at the end of this road. A country of refugees from the kolkhoz to the city, a country where for 60 years the Sickle has been hidden from the Hammer, today's urban Russia desperately wants land. The material poverty, which turns feeding oneself into overtime labor for the urban worker, the wish to have something stable, something of one's own in an enslaving ocean of the absolute power of the state, the yearning for living nature—all of this, even the demented patchwork "dachas" where there is nowhere to put the other foot down, makes the dream unquenchable! It is to be expected that in three years Gorbachev has not even been able to fulfill his promise to give each urban family six-hundredths of a hectare: The apparat, we will agree to say, did not give it out!

But the city is a giant resource of people and energy in terms of not only dachas but also private farms and goods. Today's urbanite, having eaten "bitter bread," does not scare easily and is a jack of all trades able to go head to head with the schooled elite and the contingent of chairmen—for the most part he even formed the first thousand pioneers of the new peasantry. What hostility and hatred this "new kulak" met when he settled in the abandoned countryside! His family voluntarily set off for a front-line, besieged life—at any minute one could expect an assault from the frightened nomenklatura and the agricultural lumpen it so needed. The rule of giving the peasant the worst and most exhausted land is evidence to anyone of the fear of a free peasant and acknowledgement of his advantages: If one does not handicap such a man, he will win in no time! And where do the crippled pastures, overgrown meadows, and abandoned towns with alders growing in the streets come from? Are they not the result of that kolkhoz system? The rural school, which is certainly worse than the urban school, the rural hospital, which you do not ever want to use, communications, trade, and the roads—are these not the consequence of the initial second-class status of the peasantry compared to the urban proletariat, are they not the result of the self-colonization of the people under the Bolshevik banner?

Concerning the partition into private farmer and member of a kolkhoz... Viktor Ivanovich Shtepo, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agrarian Questions and Food, director of the Volgo-Don production association, suddenly betrayed Starodubtsev and left to join the ranks of the private farmer, heading the energetic peasant detachment of Volgograd. Was it a betrayal? Nonsense! Shtepo is a master of organization, he needs a young, dynamic cause, and, rather than waste his remaining years on something that is critically ill, he decided to work with those who do not need to be urged to perform. Young Vladimir Fadeyev, the chief agronomist of the Nizhegorod Zaprudnovskiy Sovkhoz, instead of avoiding misfortune and hardship, abandoned his post, his car, and his salary and is now forging a peasant cooperative:

Grain, the fattening of cattle, an independent existence... Such a transition between "communicating vessels" is natural and normal, and the KPR distinctly realizes that farmers are not created from air, new classes are not created by laws, and a peasantry that is regenerating itself will, of course, collect all kinds of specimens of "Homo Sovieticus"—Soviet man.

Objective reality itself forms the new type. A family in which the spouses are not bound by love will never eat their fill on a private farm. Belief in oneself and in one's strength has always been a feature of a farmer. The drunkard is not strong enough for a farm, the timid man will not like the responsibilities of command, and the man who does not love the land or is of lazy intellect or whose wife controls his paycheck fears the independent production of grain like the devil fears the cross. And so it should be. Every dark cloud has a silver lining: Having liquidated the peasantry as a class, the kolkhoz system makes today's private farming a purely voluntary choice, and the only new thing that has appeared among the people under Gorbachev is the free entrepreneur who tills the land, still rare but strong. Such a man makes up the core of the KPR.

As opposed to the mass of other political associations that have appeared like mushrooms, the KPR has an economic base. It is not a party of leisure and late-night debates—the KPR shares victories and defeats with the farmer, it is with him in the field, when times are good, in his concerns about loans, and in the torments of Soviet life. The special interests of the peasant wife, the lively world of childhood, the communications of people, the "happy world of the soul"—nothing human is alien to the political union of peasants. And if one should dream of something, then it should be of the rayon party conference on an Indian summer day. With a brass band under old linden trees, with a keg or two of foaming beer and everything that healthy peasant wives have cooked, not to the detriment of common sense and profit, but to their benefit!

Russia has had its share of hard times. "We still have not reached the bottom," predicts Gosplan [State Planning Committee]. In Stolypin's reform the direction of movement was beyond the Urals; today reform is opening for settlement the abandoned land that fed Aleksandr Nevskiy, Pozharskiy, Pushkin, and Glinka. The non-Chernozem region—this word is beginning to die out together with the latest campaign to "resuscitate" it... Slave agriculture can **resuscitate** nothing—it is already flat on its back itself! As for the "bottom"... The first thousands of free peasants on the first hundreds of thousands of hectares of arable land have already left the "bottom." At just one Yaroslavl kolkhoz 17 families immediately decided to leave the land and their portions of the means of production; the monopoly is really beginning to crack. "Will the private farmer feed us?" This question, which is heard so often, reveals the slave in man. Either the members of a private farm or a contingent in the camps can **feed** or **support** people. The free man himself eats! In terms of income and his table,

the private farmer "eats according to his labor"—he is not burdened with the task of feeding others but with the desire to stand on his own feet, to become stronger and survive! True, he survives only by replenishing the shelves of stores and putting back on the market many things that we have not seen in a long time. "To feed the country!" is the slogan of the agricultural gulag. "To help the people feed themselves!" is the requirement of a free party of Russian peasants.

The first Congress of the KPR will take place in Moscow on 16 March. It is expected that it will approve the program and statutes adopted by the Constituent Congress, elect leading organs, and work out policy in agrarian reform. One may say with great confidence that the peasants will support the course of agrarian policy of the administration of the RSFSR. We already have contacts with the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party, and we belong to the "Democratic Russia" movement—without the help of others we would have little clout. Is it true that a class-based party is a sign of undeveloped democracy? That there could not be a party of rural proprietors in countries with democracy firmly established? Who knows... Once land reform triumphs in Russia and famine disappears, the KPR, God willing, will victoriously declare its own dissolution.

Magadan Official on Power of Local Soviets

91UN1145A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 1

[Interview with L. Musin, chairman of the Magadan City Soviet of People's Deputies, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Vladimir Androsenko in Magadan; date not given: "Who Needs Vicegerents?"]

[Text] Our correspondent asked L. Musin, chairman of the Magadan City Soviet of People's Deputies, to express his attitude towards the activities of the Russian parliament and recent statements by B.N. Yeltsin.

[Correspondent] Leonid Mikhaylovich, how do the decisions of the republic Supreme Soviet and its leaders affect the actions of local organs of power?

[Musin] For a long time now this thought has tormented me: Has the Supreme Soviet of Russia deliberately opted for a policy of undermining soviet power locally? Facts prompt us to conclude so. Initially, many promises were made to us: that the soviets would implement their own tax and land policies independently, that they would be able to influence economic operations on their territories, that they would begin drawing budgets from the bottom up... Alas, to this day the Russian parliament has failed to pass a single law ensuring the rights of local soviets. Even the laws that are under discussion, for example the law on local self-government, reduce the soviets to the level of building committees. At present, we cannot influence the economy in any way, and our potential in the social sphere is restricted.

I am not the only one to have drawn such conclusions. A conference of the chairmen of city soviets from oblast seats and large industrial cities of Russia has just ended in Moscow. So, all of us have the same problems. We have complained sharply about it to R. Khasbulatov, who attended the meeting, but he could not tell us anything intelligible in response. It is notable that Comrade Khasbulatov attempted to draw us into the political squabbles that have flared up, but the chairmen of city soviets refused to participate in them.

As I compare the actual current situation of the soviets with a recent statement by B.N. Yeltsin concerning the introduction of the institution of commissioners appointed by the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, I come to the conclusion that we are dealing with a well thought-out and verified policy to eliminate soviet power. Here is a logical question: If a corps of vicegerents operates—and this is precisely how we may call these commissioners—what will happen to the body of deputies? After all, in this event it will have to be dissolved. Can you imagine the political explosion this will result in?

[Correspondent] Leonid Mikhaylovich, a Supreme Soviet-RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution refers to dispatching to the field observers of the progress of the referendum who will be endowed with special rights from among the people's deputies of Russia. It is no secret that many of them have criss-crossed cities and rural areas with slogans "No to the Union" and "No to the referendum." Is the voters' objectivity of choice not out of the question, given the fact that people preaching these ideas have gained access to election precincts? In general, how are we to view the appearance of such observers?

[Musin] I view this as a first step toward the appearance of vicegerency. We needed help very badly during preparations for the referendum, and at that stage we would not have objected to observers.

In a word, we need assistants, but by no means observers. Why watch Soviet people who are the same as all of us?

This is the question: Why all of a sudden? Is it because the people for the most part were inclined to vote in favor of the Union? I have met with many people, and I feel that the people want to preserve our state, of course, on a new foundation, on the basis of strong sovereign republics—in this instance, all of us support the aspiration to enhance the role of Russia and to improve its situation. However, in the absence of the Union it will be tough for all of us. The citizens of Magadan see from their own experience what even the partial disintegration of the Union costs them. We do not have foodstuffs and goods which we used to receive from other republics. Only people who are extremely naive may expect that supplies will improve and our life will improve if all of us scatter to our own corners.

[Correspondent] In his program-setting presentation in the House of Cinematography, B. Yeltsin openly acknowledged his opponents to be enemies and called for waging a struggle against them. Despite the fact that he later tried to justify his outburst in the press, one should think before one speaks, as they put it. Well, is an enemy image being created again?

[Musin] These are horrible words. Their sound is particularly frightening here, in Magadan, which remembers well the endless convoys of "enemies of the people." Millions of lives were needlessly lost, and seas of blood were spilled. Was all of this for the ideas of dictatorial leaders to triumph?

It is a fact that at present the enemy image is being vigorously created. Just listen to the speeches of members of the anticommunist league or some of the so-called democrats who blame the communists and proponents of preserving the USSR for all troubles. What does this bring about? Somebody called the chairman of a precinct commission on the telephone and threatened that he, the chairman, would be in trouble if the referendum in his precinct proceeded normally. And why not—he is the enemy, after all, and, as is known, the enemy is to be destroyed.

Such words make one shudder. They should not have come from the lips of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia in any case.

In summation, I will say the following. Having visited Moscow this time, I felt how heated political passions were there, and how close the agitated masses were to a desperate clash. Fortunately, this has not been the case in Magadan so far. We have succeeded in avoiding serious standoffs and deep conflicts. In the center, they frequently accuse us of provincial conservatism. I for one think that the conservatism which enables us to preserve peace and quiet is the right one for us.

As The Issue Was Being Typeset

According to preliminary data, more than 66 percent of the voters participated in the referendum in Magadan and on the Kolyma. Of them, 63.7 percent voted in favor of preserving the Soviet Union.

This is how they voted on the issue of the presidency in Russia: Only 49 percent of the voters on the rolls came out "in favor." Therefore, the citizens of Magadan preferred the Supreme Soviet to the president.

Polozkov KOMMUNIST Article Critiqued

91UN0856A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[Article by Anatoliy Druzenko: "Time, in Reverse?: Questions and Notes in the Margins of Ivan Polozkov's Article"; for text of Polozkov's article see FBIS-SOV-91-039-s, 27 Feb 91, pp 48-55.]

[Text] The article was published in the issue of the journal *KOMMUNIST* which has just appeared (No. 2 for 1991). It is called "For the Socialist Nature of Perestroika."

The very style of the title hints, you will agree, at continuity and emphasizes the connection with wording that was in extensive circulation in well-known times. You remember? "For industrialization," "For the 100-pood [unit of weight] harvest," "For universal literacy"....

Although, it has to be observed, we have to agree with some of the thoughts and evaluations which the first secretary of the RSFSR CP Central Committee decided to share. Who, specifically, would deny the need for an in-depth interpretation of the most critical period, as the author observes, in the history of the Soviet socialist state? It is wholly a matter of the nature of the interpretation and the view of history.

It is hardly worth wasting our wits on a debate concerning some professional formal pessimism which allegedly exists today—as a counterweight to the former contrived formal optimism—which is being used, as I. Polozkov states right at the start of his article, to instill in the people "negative enthusiasm." The consequences of this, according to the author, are appalling: "An orgy of the doomed, hating one another, scorning their past and terrified of the future and with faith no more in their own creative powers—this is what is being incited for the purpose of the ultimate demoralization of society and the state and a break with the existing social and political and constitutional system."

We will not dwell on the above proposition in detail but would note merely, however strange this might seem, that it could—and should even, it would seem—evoke the anger of the so-called "patriots," who always react mercilessly to any manifestation, in their opinion, of a disrespectful attitude toward the people and their intellectual, labor, and moral potential. But does not the author of the article "For the Socialist Nature of Perestroika" also not merit complaints in this respect? Does he not portray our splendid people as some silly fellow who, it transpires, may quite simply be incited "for the purpose of ultimate demoralization," some negative enthusiasm having been instilled in him? Not to mention the notorious "enemy image" which manifestly emerges in this proposition and some "shady forces" playing with the people, as with a tumbler doll. Although, if one tries to get a deeper grasp of the article, it turns out that such a "manipulative" attitude toward the masses is not an individual fragment but an important component of the ideology defended by the author.

Nor, again, can we fail to agree with I. Polozkov when he maintains that it is essential at the difficult moment for the fate of the country that "the people may freely make a conscious economic, political, and moral choice which all parties and currents are bound to respect." We may also vote with both hands in support of the conclusion

emphasized by the author: "*It is fundamentally important that the choice of methods of a solution of the crisis and the strategic direction of further development be made by the people in their own interests, not by some people behind their back and for purposes alien to them.*"

Let us remember the key words: free, conscious choice binding on all parties, the choice of the people themselves, not of some people behind their back or, I would add, above them.

I now ask you to observe to what extent the following paragraph of the article, which follows this assertion, is "consonant" with it:

"Communists of the Soviet Union, Russians included, of course, cannot and should not remain aloof from the process of self-determination of the Soviet people. They are **required to correctly express the interests of the working people**, formulate the strategy and tactics of their realization, and organize the masses for purposive action. This is the Communist Party's vanguard role."

So what are we talking about, after all—the free self-determination of the people or a choice which should be "determined" for them? And if the communists "cannot and should not remain aloof," why should other parties and currents remain somewhere "behind the back?" Finally, does not the recognition of a vanguard role for one party not transparently show a certain attitude toward the masses as "cogs" for which it is necessary to think and which it is necessary to teach how to live? Are the people themselves, then, incapable of this? Insufficiently developed? Not entirely mature? But what, once again, would the "patriots" have to say about this?

Nonetheless, the author of the article must be given his due: He poses truly the most urgent questions that trouble our society today: "What has happened to the people and the country in the past seven decades? Where are we? Who is right, who to blame? What needs to be done, where do we need to start? By which paths to proceed further?" In addition, the author believes that these questions require "honest answers." Honest, of course, there is no denying. But correct also? This is, certainly, what is most important. But it is not a question of epithets. It is important to begin the response to I. Polozkov from the beginning.

"Today," he writes, "it is fashionable to indict for all problems the socialist choice of the workers and peasants in October 1917. But it would not be inappropriate to investigate what is implied by this and *what kind of socialism* is meant."

Reading these lines, this is what came to mind. If a question mark were placed after the words italicized by the author and the question—what kind of socialism—were put to that same "rank-and-file worker" whose interests I. Polozkov so wishes to defend, what would the result be? Is it that important for him today what kind of socialism is meant? Or socialism in general? And is not the present virtually Hamlet-like skirmishing of our

domestic theorists on the "socialism or capitalism" topic a glaring example of the detachment of "theory" from "practice?" Do we not have a situation in which it is all the same to the majority what, according to theory, its living arrangement is called inasmuch as the question of the quality and standard of this life is far more acute?

But let us continue the quotation—concerning the kind of socialism that is meant:

"The kind with which the intervention of the imperialist states could do nothing, which in a very short period of history created an advanced industry, science, and culture, smashed the terrible force of imperialism—German fascism—was able in a few years to recover from the consequences of the invasion and, erecting a nuclear shield, to avert a new war, and which was the first to break through into space? Or the socialism which, from devil-may-care plans for catching and overtaking America in a few years in terms of meat and milk and reaching the highest world level of productivity by the end of the century, has sunk to food alms from a once defeated Germany?"

So we have two socialisms: one that has taken shape from historical achievements, the other that has sunk to "alms." My God! If it were all so simple! If there were in real life an opportunity for separating achievements from failures and preserving "successful" and abrogating "unsuccessful" socialism! This very separation betrays an absence in the author of a systemic approach to an evaluation of what has happened to our country in the past seven decades. For, given just such an approach, it would have done no harm to accommodate alongside the enumerated achievements, well-known from textbooks, objective information showing how from year to year and from decade to decade there was a shrinkage, like shagreen leather, in the Soviet socialist state's place in the world community, a shrinkage, what is more, in terms of practically all indicators concerning industry and agriculture, science and culture and, most importantly, the people's living standard. In this case the description of the social and political system we have built would have been both fuller and more objective.

The author's lack of a systemic approach is indicated also by the characterization he makes of "bad" socialism. Note what he sees as the cause of its existence. It is all a question, apparently, of some people's (he is talking about party and state leaders of years gone by, it has to be assumed) "devil-may-care" plans. And that's it. In other words, if we had good plans, things would be fine. Whence also the conclusion, which suggests itself: It is not the present model that is to blame for our "results" but individual comrades who boisterously turned the principle of centralized planning from an advantage of socialism into its imperfection and who used this principle not for the good of socialism but to its detriment.

In addition, the percipient reader who is able to read between the lines easily discovers that the achievements

of socialism enumerated by I. Polozkov are accommodated, in the main, in the Stalin period of our history, and the failures of "sunken" socialism began mainly with the Khrushchev period ("catching up and overtaking America in a few years in terms of meat and milk") and whose accumulation was continued by his successors ("reaching by the end of the century the highest world level of productivity"). The author of the article abides by this logic subsequently also.

Having very fleetingly, in the form of a rhetorical question, touched on the most appalling page in our history ("A painful question is: To whom to ascribe the crimes of the times of the cult of personality, the death of innocent people, and the deformation of the spiritual and moral foundations of the life of the people?") and without going in depth into an investigation of the sources of the dictatorship that took shape, I. Polozkov somehow very hastily switches the discussion to an entirely different plane and attempts once again to divide the people into a majority that toiled selflessly and served the fatherland and a minority that lived, apparently, merely to extract from current conditions "the maximum possible for themselves personally" (whom does he mean, incidentally, wastrels or the official party and state schedule of appointees?). And—amazingly—not another word about the millions of casualties sacrificed on the altar of the Stalin dictatorship. It seems to the author far more important than going into these "details" stating that "today's... talk about our common sin and the calls for general repentance sound fraudulent, to say the least. *The millions of people who have lived honest lives need not repentance but truthful words about the essence of what has happened and what is continuing to happen to the country.*"

But, first, it is not entirely clear what the difference between repentance and truthful words is. And, second—this is the question!—who today believes the truthfulness of these words?

Having gotten away with patter concerning the crimes of the times of the cult of personality, the author of the article cannot, nonetheless, avoid this hemorrhaging question and attempts to answer it. Undoubtedly, a key moment, so let us read the verbose paragraph somewhat more closely, particularly the italicized words:

"Could the defilement of the socialist idea have been avoided and a more humane path of development less brutal for the people's masses have been secured? Historians will argue about the alternative for a long time to come. It is obviously necessary here to investigate carefully why the creative potential contained in Lenin's concept of the New Economic Policy was not fully realized. And although history cannot be 'replayed,' the scholars who believe that *an alternative not only existed but was implemented to a certain extent* in our country, in the 1920's-1950's included, are, for all that, close, I believe, to the truth. Was there not in that period an objective process of the self-development of a revolutionary people risen to historical creativity, whose

meaning was not only much broader than the ideology and practice of Stalinism but was also a radical denial of it? The enthusiasm and disinterested selfish devotion of socialist building cannot be explained by the blind excitement of an unconscious throng. The powerful recognized democratic principle was present in it."

The reader should not be fooled by the parenthesis employed in the middle of the paragraph emphasizing, as it were, the conjectural nature of the words "I believe." The author really does think thus. He may be denied some things, perhaps, but not certainty of opinions. To what extent these opinions correspond to the truth of that same history which, as I. Polozkov acknowledges, can no longer be "replayed" is another matter. And the assertion that there not only was in our country in the 1920's-1950's an alternative to Stalinism but that it was **implemented**, is this not an attempt to "replay" history? Of what, for pity's sake, kind of objective process of "self-development of a revolutionary people" could it be a question at all at that time? And, then, if the historical creativity of the masses was a radical denial of Stalinism, which masses are in fact meant—not the millions who were swallowed up by the GULAG archipelago? But how in this case is it possible to write about the fact that there was present in the disinterested selfish devotion of socialist building "the powerful recognized democratic principle?" An understanding of democracy which is more than strange!

The further it goes, the worse it gets. Maintaining that the creative enthusiasm of the working masses blazed a trail for itself in spite of all the distortions of the socialist idea (but who, incidentally, distorted it?), Ivan Polozkov transfers in a twinkling of the eye this proposition to our complex times: "And its (the country's—author) future will depend directly on the extent to which the working people are the driving force of revolutionary socialist perestroika and on how fully it realizes their interests. Only thus is it possible to halt the degeneration of perestroika in an antipopular direction and restore it to the channel of transformations which are socialist in spirit and meaning." If we continue the logical series of propositions expressed by the leader of Russia's communists, the conclusion formulates itself: Perestroika will be of a socialist nature if the people do not forgo the principles which we idolized in the most tragic and blackest period of our contemporary history.

And once again—as though there are no lessons to be learned from history—this amazing assurance of his own "supra-popular" destiny, knowledge of what the masses need and capacity for determining what kind of perestroika is "popular," and what "antipopular." But for what reason? By what right? Had they built a paradise for the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia, but no, it has all been the other way about, yet nonetheless, they continue to devote themselves to "the representation and defense of the *class* interests of the working man." I would like to ask Ivan Kuzmich, as a Marxist: What, for all that, comes first: class being or class consciousness? If

the first, it is easy to imagine what the working classes in our country think about the defense of their interests....

While having used the word "class" and understanding, generally, that today it has not at all as specific a resonance as 70 years ago and that hesitant readers are beginning to ask, for example, about the living standard of the working class in the developed capitalist countries, the author of the article recognizes the existence of the question, so to speak, but answers it in his own key:

"...While recognizing the indisputable successes of Western social democracy in raising the people's living standard and defending their economic interests, it should not be forgotten here that the wide-ranging social reforms are not only and not so much even to its credit. They have become possible thanks to a number of revolutionary changes of the 20th century which were initiated by the October Revolution. This is the reality which is now stubbornly being glossed over, but which does not cease to exist.

"It was October that proved that it is possible to defend the vital interests of the people in another way also: not resting content with what has been given "from above," by the powers that be, but struggling to ensure that the working people *themselves* create the underlying conditions for their life, contribute to the historical creativity of the masses the conscious, organizing principle...."

First of all, the assertion that the influence of the October Revolution on the world process is now stubbornly glossed over is wrong (this, for example, has been said in a whole number of articles published by IZVESTIYA). Nor does the other conclusion manifestly downplaying the role of Western social democracy withstand criticism: It transpires, according to the author, that the living standard attained in certain countries in which the social democrats have been in office is by no means to the credit of them, the social democrats, but the result (an abstraction once again!) of "revolutionary changes of the 20th century." What is most important: I. Polozkov continues to insist on the existence of a higher choice than the developed capitalist countries, the choice made by the working people themselves, creating thereby the "underlying conditions of their life." Once again with astonishing doggedness the following fundamental question—What is the result—is left out of the equation. Why is it that there, given conditions imposed "from above," the working people live better than in our country, where the way of life has allegedly been predetermined "from below?"

A whole section of I. Polozkov's article is devoted to problems of the transition to a market economy. It affirms just as firmly the primacy of class interests. The people are divided, as it were, into two hostile camps: workers, peasants, and the laboring intelligentsia on the one hand and the owners of shadow capital together with their allies from the bureaucratic corrupted apparatus on the other. Assuming that with the advent of the spontaneity of the market the lives of the working people will be

even worse than now, the author points to two politically and economically incompatible currents that have emerged as of late: "One of them is turning increasingly definitely toward a restoration of capitalist relations in the interests of neocapitalist elements and a criminal bourgeoisie which sprang up in our country in the preceding period and which are developing rapidly. The other is geared to a renewal of socialism in the interests of the working people. On one side of the political barricades are devotees of the liberal-shopkeeper ideal, those in whose interests it is to disarticulate society and liquidate it as a major world power. To this end they are actively making common cause today with nationalist forces. Assembling on the other side are genuinely democratic forces fighting for the survival and independent prosperity of the fatherland on the principles of the power of the people, social justice, national equality, and human dignity."

So, face to face. On the one hand "elements," "liberals, and shopkeepers" and profit-seekers, on the other the toiling people. Once again something painfully familiar shows through in these lines. Yes, of course! We read on, about barricades:

"Some people greatly dislike the fact that the central problem of the day appears in the social consciousness in just this way. Many of the mass media are attempting in hundreds and thousands of publications to conceal this *main, truly class contradiction between the laboring people and the bourgeois-democratic bloc opposed to them.*"

Paraphrasing the classical conclusion of "the leader and teacher of all peoples," it could be said after I. Polozkov: With the transition to the market economy, class contradictions in our country will intensify. With all the—known from history—consequences.

I cannot resist specifying that, apparently, the main contradiction of the day is being specially concealed, as the author of the article writes, because the "two-party" system of manipulation of the consciousness and behavior of the masses has been discovered and has long been in use. There is no better way of disorienting the people and robbing them of independence than imposing on them a fraudulent alternative and involving them in a fratricidal strife of interests which are equally alien to them." And once again, for the umpteenth time, we have before us the poor, credulous people who do not understand what their own interest is! As for the insidious "two-party system" imposing on them, the people, a fraudulent alternative, the time-tested "one-party system" is, of course, far more reliable: the guarantees here are absolute, it has been verified here that there is no alternative.

Although the genre of these notes is "questions in the margins," I will permit myself not a question but a conviction. In the guise of a socialist nature being imparted to perestroika, attempts are being made essentially to return us to the past, to the captivity of obsolete dogmatic teachings and uncritical notions and the strict framework of the "class approach," which has failed to justify itself and which is historically hopeless. So we have at the last plenum of the CPSU Central Committee the leader of Russia's communists declaring with conviction:

"Counterposing interests common to all mankind and class interests and giving priority to planet-wide interests, we have done the socialist idea, fidelity to which was confirmed by the 28th CPSU Congress, a poor turn. The dialectical unity of the class principle and the universal principle has been violated. Yet we know that no one has ever expressed interests common to all mankind better than the working class."

Such total oversimplification, you will agree, shows through in these words that the tremendous number of opponents to I. Polozkov among communists is hardly to be wondered at. It was not fortuitous that there, at the plenum, far more realistic voices and a far more sober view of the danger of the party beginning to seek a way out of the crisis in the former infamous methods of "absolute rule" were heard and, on the contrary, the need for a transition in political activity to a new quality, account being taken primarily of how our society and life itself have changed, was emphasized. "Unless this is done," one speaker observed at the plenum, "we will be poor politicians, to put it mildly." That is it, precisely—**politicians....**

I will leave to professional economists an evaluation of the concept of the socialist vision of the market economy set forth by I. Polozkov. I was interested more in the **concealed meaning** of the article. It concludes with the following assertion:

"All that brings people closer together is good, all that disunites them is bad—this is what humanists and representatives of socialist and communist thought have believed since ancient times. Guided by this moral imperative, communists will continue to act and participate in the solution of the sum total of present-day problems also—economic and social, cultural and national, ideological and moral."

I would very much like to support this conclusion and believe in the sincerity of these generally correct words. But something prevents me. They are painfully out of tune with the content and spirit of the whole article, which is aimed, it seems to me, not at bringing together but disuniting and defending the primacy of class, not universal values, and which therefore calls us not so much forward, toward a really new life worthy of the people, but back, to the times when some people decided for the nation the kind of life it was worthy of.

Head of Panel on Moscow's Dual Capital Status Cited*PM0803113391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Single Edition p 3*

[A. Gamov report: "What Form Will Moscow Take?"]

[Text] The commission set up in accordance with the USSR presidential decree "On Improving the Administration of Moscow City" has met in regular session. N.D. Pivovarov, commission leader and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of People's Deputies and Management and Self-Management Development Committee, acquainted the participants with materials prepared by the USSR presidential commission pertaining to the question under discussion, which, together with the proposals from Moscow City Soviet, labor collectives, and individual citizens, are to serve as the basis for drafting the USSR law on Moscow's status as capital of the USSR and RSFSR.

It was noted in particular that the problem of improving Moscow's administration and reinforcing executive power in the city had become an urgent one; it needs to be solved without delay and in direct conjunction with the implementation of tasks of transferring the city economy to market relations and the comprehensive reinforcement of legality and law and order, and in coordination with the elaboration of the new Union Treaty and the RSFSR Federation Treaty.

"Our commission consists of 15 individuals," N.D. Pivovarov recounts. "Its members include representatives of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets, Moscow City and Oblast Soviets, envoys from the major union republics—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine—as well as inhabitants of the capital, and social scientists. We have already had four sessions. The full commission membership met with the leadership of Moscow City and rayon soviets, with all rayon executive committee chairmen, and with leaders of the capital's departments, enterprises, and organizations. We received a mass of interesting proposals. Apart from that, we are studying world practice. We would like to know how things are done in Washington, London, Paris, Brasilia, Mexico, Islamabad, Delhi..."

One would like to believe and hope that the efforts of the presidential commission will be crowned with success, and that Moscow will at last acquire a law on its status as the capital of the Union and of Russia.

Attempted Murder of Dagestan Legislator Reported*PM0503171891 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 7, 17-24 Feb 91 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "'Makhachkala' He Knew Too Much"]

[Text] Two unknown persons tried to kill Gazis Gadzhiyev, chairman of the Commission on Socialist

Legality, Law and Order of the Dagestan Supreme Soviet and assistant professor of the local university. The criminals hit him over the head and stabbed him in the back, injuring one lung. In critical condition, the deputy was taken to the hospital and immediately operated on.

The case is being investigated by a special team of examining magistrates headed by Osman Aliyev, Deputy Minister of the Interior Ministry of Dagestan. What are the main findings of the investigation team? Gadzhiyev made much effort to combat trade mafia and unlawful privileges of Dagestan's nomenklatura elite. In the republican paper of democratic forces Dagestan, he published a list of high-ranking officials who misuse their posts to illegally get cars, and such things as imported video equipment otherwise meant to encourage those who sell meat to the city. The latter has actually disappeared from the diet of Dagestan residents. This list of several dozen names includes senior officials of the regional party committee, the republican Council of Ministers, first secretaries of the CPSU district committees as well as Vice Chairman of the republican KGB and a world-famous poet. Shortly before the attack, Gazis Gadzhiyev sent a letter to the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, requesting it investigate the illegal actions of Dagestan's party and economic nomenklatura.

Aliyev's investigating team, examining the attempt on the deputy's life, was joined by staff from Russia's criminal investigation department and the board of inquiry under the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The case is now being supervised by the Supreme Soviet of Russia.

Western Republics**Moldovan Ukase on Ensuring Development of Ukrainian Culture***91UN1144A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 1*

["Ukase of the President of the Moldovan SSR: On Measures To Ensure Development of Ethnic Culture in the Republic"]

[Text] In accordance with the State Comprehensive Program for Ensuring the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldovan SSR and with the goal of creating the necessary conditions for development of the culture of people of Ukrainian nationality residing in the republic and a native-language education program for them, I decree:

1. To support the initiative of the Society of Ukrainian Culture in the Moldovan SSR to develop Ukrainian ethnic culture.

2. For the government of the Moldovan SSR to examine the aforementioned issue in the immediate future and to adopt an appropriate ruling on the implementation of the proposals of the Society of Ukrainian SSR Culture in the Moldovan SSR which will stipulate:

—implementation (at the wish of the parent) of the translation of training and educational programs into Ukrainian in institutions of public education of population centers with a majority Ukrainian population;

- training at educational institutions of the Ukrainian SSR of cadres of teachers, cultural and educational workers, and other specialists for the aforementioned population centers;
- provision in all newly created Ukrainian language institutes of public education for the study of the necessary conditions to ensure that each graduate masters the state language of the Moldovan SSR;
- creation within the structure of National Radio and Television of the appropriate editorial staffs for broadcasting in Ukrainian;
- provision to the Society of one-time financial aid to maintain a staff, purchase inventory and equipment, and pay for other needs;
- allotment under leasing conditions of locations for the accommodation of a Ukrainian Cultural Center and its branches, a library, and the editorial office of the newspaper PROSVITA.

3. For the Moldovan SSR Ministry of Culture and Religions, the Moldovan SSR Ministry of Science and Education, and the local soviets of people's deputies of the republic and their organs to render assistance and practical aid to the Society of Ukrainian Culture in the Moldovan SSR in the resolution of the aforementioned tasks.

4. Taking into consideration the importance of implementing the measures stipulated by this ukase, supervision over its execution is entrusted to the Chancellery of the president of the Moldovan SSR.

M. Snegur, president,
Moldovan SSR
Kishinev, 22 February 1991

Caucasus

Armenian Law on Sociopolitical Organizations

91US0410A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
5 Mar 91 p 3

["Law of the Republic of Armenia on Sociopolitical Organizations"]

[Text] Article 1. Concept of a Sociopolitical Organization

A sociopolitical organization is an association of citizens of the Republic of Armenia who have come of age and have united on a voluntary basis, has a program and statutes, and participates via elections in the formation of the organs of state power and their activity and also in the sociopolitical, socioeconomic and cultural life of the republic.

Article 2. Formation of a Sociopolitical Organization

In the Republic of Armenia a sociopolitical organization is formed at a congress or constituent assembly of the

sociopolitical organization with confirmation of the program and statutes and the election of the directive bodies of the sociopolitical organization.

Citizens working in the ministries of justice and the interior, the KGB, the procuracy, state arbitration, the judicial authorities and the customs service and also people working in the Army may not while working or serving in the said authorities be members of any sociopolitical organization.

Article 3. Principles of the Activity of a Sociopolitical Organization

A sociopolitical organization operates within the framework of legislation of the Republic of Armenia, guided by its own statutes and program.

Sociopolitical organizations registered on the territory of the Republic of Armenia have equal rights.

The directive body of the sociopolitical organization is located on the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

A sociopolitical organization does not have the right:

- to be directed by organizations and state authorities operating outside of Armenia or to become a part of the organizational structure of these organizations;
- to engage in a forcible change of power and the form of government and political system of the Republic of Armenia and forcible actions aimed against citizens and organizations or to appeal for such and cooperate with organizations resorting to violence;
- to incite hatred between national, racial, religious and social groups;
- to obtain financial and material assistance from sources outside of the Republic of Armenia and also from official bodies and state institutions of the Republic of Armenia, except in instances determined by law;
- to establish organizational structures in official bodies and also in institutions, enterprises, organizations and educational institutions;
- to possess facilities engaging in financial and economic activity, except in instances provided for by this law;
- to engage in other activity contrary to legislation.

Prevention of the legitimate activity of sociopolitical organizations is liable to prosecution in accordance with the law.

Article 4. Registration of a Sociopolitical Organization

A sociopolitical organization is registered by the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Justice.

A sociopolitical organization is registered within one month following presentation to the Ministry of Justice of the application, statutes and minutes of the congress or constituent assembly, if the requirements of this law have not been violated.

The registration of a sociopolitical organization is refused if another sociopolitical organization has already been registered under the same name.

In the event of registration of a sociopolitical organization being refused, the founders are notified in writing not later than three days following expiration of the time specified for registration, the reasons for the refusal being specified.

Changes in the statutes are registered in the procedure determined by this article.

As of the time of registration of a sociopolitical organization it and also the organizations listed in the statutes acquire the status of legal entity.

A refusal to register a sociopolitical organization may be appealed in the Republic of Armenia Supreme Court.

Article 5. Liability of a Sociopolitical Organization

A sociopolitical organization which has by its unlawful actions caused the Republic of Armenia, enterprises, establishments, organizations and citizens material or moral damage or which has otherwise transgressed legislation of the Republic of Armenia is liable in the procedure determined by law.

Article 6. Property and Resources of a Sociopolitical Organization

Buildings, monetary resources and means of transport and property necessary to it for the accomplishment of its program and statutory tasks may belong to a sociopolitical organization on an ownership basis.

A sociopolitical organization may on a rented basis or in accordance with a leasing agreement with state-owned enterprises, public organizations and the citizens utilize their buildings and property.

The resources of a sociopolitical organization are formed from membership dues, publishing activity, donations from nonstate sources, inherited property and cultural activities.

The income of a sociopolitical organization is taxable in the procedure determined by law.

The legality of income and its sources and expenditure and also the property of a sociopolitical organization is subject to government financial control.

A sociopolitical presents to the financial authorities a declaration concerning financial activity for the year, which is published in the press.

Article 7. Suspension and Termination of the Activity of a Sociopolitical Organization

In the event of a breach of legislation of the Republic of Armenia, the activity of a sociopolitical organization is upon a submission of the prosecutor general or the

Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia suspended or terminated by the Republic of Armenia Supreme Court.

In the event of a suspension of the activity of a sociopolitical organization, its directive bodies are notified in writing of the decision and the legal infractions committed by the sociopolitical organization, and a period of time for an end to these infractions is established.

Following a cessation of the legal infractions, the sociopolitical organization notifies the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Justice of this, which within one month following the completion of the period of time determined by the Republic of Armenia Supreme Court gives permission for the sociopolitical organization to continue its activity.

A decision on the suspension of activity of a sociopolitical organization may be reviewed by the Republic of Armenia Supreme Court upon a submission of the Ministry of Justice.

In the period of suspension of activity of a sociopolitical organization it is not allowed to avail itself of the rights envisaged by this law.

The activity of a sociopolitical organization may be suspended for a term of up to six months.

If, following a termination of its activity, a sociopolitical organization does not cease the violations or within one year of the suspension of its activity commits a new legal infraction, its activity is suspended for one year in the procedure specified in the first part of this article.

In the event of a new legal infraction within one year following a repeat suspension, the activity of a sociopolitical organization may be prohibited in the procedure specified in the first part of this article.

Article 8. Control of the Legality of the Activity of a Sociopolitical Organization

The legality of the activity of sociopolitical organizations is controlled by the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Justice.

Citizens, public, and sociopolitical organizations, official bodies and other legal entities of the Republic of Armenia have the right to appeal to the Ministry of Justice concerning the legality of the activity of a sociopolitical organization.

L. Ter-Petrosyan, chairman,
Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet
A. Saakyan, secretary,
Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet.
Yerevan, 26 February 1991

Armenian Supreme Soviet To Debate 1921 Russo-Turkish Treaty

NC1603123191 Yerevan International Service
in Armenian 1630 GMT 15 Mar 91

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The papers report that the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium met under the chairmanship of Babken Ararktsyan, first deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

In connection with the appeals made by a number of people's deputies to convene an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet to debate the question "On Considering as Illegal the 1921 Russo-Turkish Treaty's Articles Relating to Armenia," and in line with the proposal made by the Supreme Soviet's Standing Commission on Foreign Relations, the Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to convene a meeting to formulate the stance of the republic's supreme organ of power regarding the aforementioned treaty.

Other problems pertaining to the republic's social and political life were also examined at the meeting.

Armenian Official Comments on Joint Ventures

NC0603153491 Yerevan International Service
in Armenian 1630 GMT 2 Mar 91

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The daily HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN has published an interview with Ruben Barsegyan, director of the Joint Ventures Department at the Armenian Foreign Economic Relations Ministry, entitled "Window Opening to International Market."

This department was set up very recently with the intention of turning it into an organ to coordinate, oversee, and regulate work in connection with the joint ventures. At present the department is engaged in re-registering the joint ventures already registered in the republic. Priority is being given to those ventures that will process local raw materials, help to meet the demands of the domestic market in the first place, invest foreign capital in the republic, and help in the accumulation of wealth.

So far, 33 joint ventures have been re-registered at the ministry. All of them are already in operation.

Ruben Barsegyan added: As regards the operations of the joint ventures, our policy is unequivocal: We want to introduce advanced foreign technologies and experience in production organization, and to utilize local raw materials and intellectual capacity in order to be able to produce goods that will meet international demands. We regard the joint ventures as windows opening to the international market.

Yerevan Reports Tension, Incidents in Nagorno-Karabakh

NC0503163191 Yerevan International Service
in Armenian 1630 GMT 4 Mar 91

["A report From Nagorno-Karabakh"—radio headline]

[Text] By all accounts, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is getting acute.

On 2 March, near the (?Chartar) village in Martuninskiy rayon, the members of the Azerbaijani Internal Affairs Ministry's Special Purpose Militia fired from the direction of the Azerbaijani village of Veysalli on a tractor carrying Armenian collective workers to the field on its trailer. Two persons were killed and two injured. Four Armenians were taken hostage. Two of them were later released and two managed to escape.

Again on 2 March in the same region, an attack took place on the farm of Garmir-Shuka settlement and 60 cattle were driven away. The Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia in Askeranskiy rayon attacked the Armenian village of (?Barukh) on the night of 2-3 March. A serviceman of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry who was defending the village was slightly injured.

The Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia also attacked the village of (?Hatek) in Mardakertskiy rayon and drove away the herd of cattle from the village farm. The Armenian guard at the farm was killed.

Between 1700 and 1900 on 2 March in the same region, nearly 80 Azerbaijani militia attacked the village of Talish. The attackers were armed with automatic weapons. The villagers defended themselves and repulsed the attack.

On 2 March three Azerbaijanis were injured when a Zhiguli car came under fire in Martuninskiy rayon. An Azerbaijani was killed during an exchange of fire in village of Khodzhevend.

Such incidents are the result of the fact that the decision on Nagorno-Karabakh problem promised by the Soviet president has not been endorsed.

At present, the lack of constitutional organs in the oblast is providing the ground for the criminal policy aimed at deporting the Armenians from Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh], and is further destabilizing the situation. The Armenian population has to defend itself. All this is fraught with new grave consequences, whereas, the central authorities are taking no decisive measures for the self-determination of the Armenians of Artsakh.

Schools on Strike in Stepanakert Over Detention of Youths

NC0803153291 Yerevan International Service
in Armenian 1830 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Text] A strike has resulted in the temporary suspension of studies in Stepanakert schools. The oblast's educational affairs administration reports that teachers and

students resorted to this extreme measure to protest the activities of military servicemen. Servicemen detained three youths who found themselves by chance near the scene of the explosion at the lower section of the city's road on 24 February. The detainees were savagely beaten by servicemen of the Special Purpose Militia and then imprisoned in Shusha, where the Azerbaijanis are in control, without any preliminary interrogation or any court decision.

The leadership at Stepanakert's building materials enterprise has also protested these inhuman actions by the servicemen, actions which have become frequent of late.

USSR Justice Minister's Apology to Azerbaijan Reported

NC0403102691 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1700 GMT 1 Mar 91

[Text] IZVESTIYA published an interview with (?Burshikov), USSR minister of justice, by one of its correspondents on 14 February. The interview was published under the rubric: Presidential Rule in the USSR and its Objectives and Means.

The interview discussed the role and place of the presidential system, which is a new concept for the Soviet Union, and the problems of presidential rule in the USSR. In expressing his opinion on the establishment of law and order in the troubled regions in the country, (?Burshikov) said that a very cautious approach should be maintained on the declaration of presidential rule in the Baltic republics. However, according to (?Burshikov), the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], Fergana, Osh Oblast, and a number of other regions should have been brought under presidential rule a long time ago.

It was impossible for the people and leaders in our republic not to receive this statement negatively. El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Republic of Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, sent a telegram to (?Burshikov) reminding him that it was essential for the officials to maintain a balanced approach based on political realism in the views they convey to the press. Gasan Gasanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, sent a detailed letter to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The text of the letter was published in RES-PUBLIKA on 23 February.

(?Burshikov's) letters to El'mira Kafarova and Gasan Gasanov explained the stand of the USSR justice minister to a certain degree. (?Burshikov) said the following:

I am grieved that the distorted report published in IZVESTIYA on 14 February 1991 has created a misunderstanding in Azerbaijan, which is a fraternal republic that I wholeheartedly respect. I have always supported the inviolable rights of the Azerbaijani people on their own lands both in and outside the USSR Supreme Soviet. I expressed my opinion about the concept of

presidential rule and the possibility of implementing presidential rule in a way which completely complied with the laws.

As far as I am concerned, presidential rule means reinstating the legal rights of the peoples and restoring law, order, and justice. To speak about the incidents in the NKAO and about the system of presidential rule is difficult. This is because the first incidents in the NKAO occurred a very long time before the adoption of the presidential system in the Soviet Union. I deeply regret not having expressed my views appropriately. I apologize for the emotion the interview caused.

State Security Buildings in NKAO Attacked

NC0603114591 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 2 Mar 91

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers today publish a disclosure made by the Republic of Azerbaijan Committee for State Security on the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The disclosure says the following: Attempts have recently intensified to strain the situation in the NKAO. [Words indistinct] and the attacks on the Committee for State Security buildings in the NKAO are part of the extremist activities carried out within the framework of the open campaign which has been launched to destroy the security of the republic. The guardians of Azerbaijan wish to make it known that all the necessary measures will be taken to safeguard the republic's sovereignty rights and territorial integrity.

Georgian Official on 31 March Elections

91US0402A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
13 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with A. Chirakadze, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, by E. Akhalkatsi and V. Gogidze under the rubric "We Are Voting for Independence"; place and date not given: "Three Weeks Before the Elections"]

[Text] Archil Archilovich Chirakadze was appointed chairman of the Central Electoral Commission by a decree of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet dated 20 January 1990.

Prior to that he worked several months as the Georgian deputy minister of education. He has been with the nationalist movement since the spring of 1989. He has a biography that is fairly characteristic of a representative of the "second wave": He was born into a family of members of the intelligentsia. His father, who died in 1972, was a minister of finances and his mother was a professor at the Tbilisi conservatory; he himself was educated in the Physics Department of Tbilisi State University and at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, and he was a candidate of physical mathematical

sciences. He began his political activities in DASi [Democratic Elections in Georgia] and as a member of the Georgian People's Front. Since September 1990 he has been a member of the National Liberal Union—one of the organizations of "Round Table- Free Georgia." He is single.

[Chirakadze] Oversight of elections was previously one of several practical functions of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. And organization of all work at the local levels was carried out by the Communist Party soviet executive committees and raykoms [rayon party committees]. As of last year the situation has changed fundamentally: Our commission includes representatives of almost all the parties taking part in the elections, for example. The commission is a permanently functioning organ; its staff increases during election times. Currently it has 36 people, 23 of whom also participated in conducting the last campaign. They are representatives of various political parties. A press group, a coordination group, and organizational, legal, and financial groups exist within the structure of the Central Electoral Commission.

The Central Electoral Commission coordinates 71 rayon commissions. Each of them in turn manages a number of local electoral commissions, the sum total of which is close to 1,000—and that is the number of elected sakrebulo [assemblies].

[VESTNIK GRUZII] How are matters with the local councils of ministers? Are they fulfilling the schedule for conducting electoral measures?

[Chirakadze] With difficulty, but they are fulfilling it. There are certain difficulties in the formation of commissions in the individual rayons inasmuch as not all the parties have appointed their representatives on time. Under such circumstances the law stipulates the appointment of members of the electoral commissions from representatives of institutions and political parties. Certain difficulties have arisen in Signakhskiy Rayon with organization of telephone lines and printing works.

[VESTNIK GRUZII] How many parties are taking part in the elections?

[Chirakadze] The Central Electoral Commission has registered 28 parties taking part in the current elections. In 12 instances we refused to register parties, six parties went to court over it, and two of those—"Lemi" and the Youth Christian Democratic Union—obtained rulings in their favor. So, in addition to those already mentioned, the following are taking part in the elections: The Labor Party, the Farmer's Union, the cadets, the Progressive Democratic Party, the Party of National Unity and Social Justice, the Merab Kostava Society, the Union of Social Justice, the Independent Communist Party, the National Christian Party, the National Party of the Demographic Society of Georgia, the Helsinki Union, the Union of Traditionalists, the Selim Khimshishvili Society, the Party of Peace and Freedom, the People's Front, the St. Ilya the Righteous Society, the

sociopolitical organization "Union of Democrats" (Akhalkalaki), the Republican Party, the Party of Justice and National Unity, the National Front-Radical Union, the Democrat People's Front, the Ivane Dzhavakhishvili Society, the National Liberal Union, the Sociopolitical Organization "Svaneti," the 9 April Society, and the Union of Mountain-Dwellers.

[VESTNIK GRUZII] It is an impressive list. But several political figures in Georgia are declaring that participation in the upcoming elections have been deprived of any sense inasmuch as the introduction of the institution of the prefecture has supposedly sounded the death knell of self-government. How would you respond?

[Chirakadze] One would have to be very naive to suppose that 15-20 energetic, practical, authoritative people who enjoy the support of the population will not have any influence in a region whose residents elected them! In our situation the institution of the prefecture has been introduced to preserve the balance of forces and interest. Therefore the prefects have been given the right to cancel illegal rulings of the sakrebulo and monitor observation of republic-level interests within the rayon. The sakrebulo for its part will concern itself with the interest of the local population and monitor the activities of the prefect.

Let us also take into consideration the fact that the prefecture is only a step on the path toward democracy in the Western fashion. We cannot leap from a "communist paradise" to a democratic society in one bound. It is still a long way for us to the level of organization of self-government they have, for example, in Switzerland. It may take decades to achieve such a level. With time the powers of the prefect and the sakrebulo will change—practice will correct them. Of course I cannot for the time being say what the end result will be.

[VESTNIK GRUZII] Will elections take place in Samachablo and Abkhazia as well?

[Chirakadze] They will not take place in Abkhazia inasmuch as the Supreme Soviet of that autonomous republic has not adopted the appropriate ruling, which is its prerogative. As for Samachablo, we are making every effort there to conduct elections in Akhagorskiy and Tskhinvalski Rayons, as well as in the majority of Znaurskiy Rayon. A necessary condition for the functioning of democratic institutions, as you understand, is the cessation of combat operations on the part of Ossetian extremists.

[VESTNIK GRUZII] And a last or, more accurately, two last questions: What kind of ballots will the voters receive on 31 March? And second, in the instructions published by the Central Electoral Commission it says that the newspaper VECHERNIY TBILISI has the right to publish one interview each with representatives of each of the parties taking part in the elections. Does this mean that other newspapers are deprived of the right to report on the course of the electoral campaign?

[Chirakadze] On the first question, the upcoming elections are to be conducted on a majority basis with multicandidate districts. As a result, the voters will receive one ballot with a long list of candidates and another with the question on the self-determination of Georgia: "Do you agree with the restoration of the state independence of Georgia on the basis of the Act on Independence of 26 May 1918?" There will be two choices, "Yes" and "No," and one of them must be circled.

As for the second question, it is simply a misunderstanding. Of course all mass media have the right to print as many articles on the elections as they please. We would only ask them to observe the interests of all parties taking part in the elections. It was for this purpose that the appeal was published and not to somehow limit the freedom of the press.

Georgian Interior Minister Gives News Conference

AU1503172091 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian
1445 GMT 15 Mar 91

[Text] Today, in the House of Culture of the Republic of Georgia, a news conference was given by the Georgian Interior Minister Dilar Khabuliani. He answered numerous questions posed by journalists. They concerned such problems, which are acute for Georgia, as the conflict in Samachablo [South Ossetia], the crime-breeding situation in the republic, the creation of the National Guards, and the political situation. The journalists were greatly interested in the weapons they were shown. These weapons were a small part of the number confiscated from Ossetian extremists in Samachablo. The minister emphasized, in particular, the striving of the Georgian Government to settle all the problems concerning interethnic relations by peaceful means. Foreign journalists were also present at the news conference. Representatives of Bulgarian television expressed their desire to report objectively on the events in Samachablo. Deputy Interior ministers also answered the journalists' questions.

Situation in Georgia on Eve of Referendum

91US0382A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 12,
18 Mar 91 pp 9-10

[Article by NEDELYA special correspondent Aleksandr Annin: "Hostages"]

[Text] Nowhere else in the country, even in Moscow itself, is there such a conglomeration of Kremlin and KGB agents as in Georgia. One can easily see this for oneself by attending the mass meetings in Tbilisi, listening to the speeches at the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet and leafing through VESTNIK GRUZII or the local "nightly." Adept at their work, "they" have insinuated themselves in the republic parliament and government, are controlling and directing the actions of the opposition,

leading Ossetian militant squads and heading the movement of separatists in Abkhazia. Inhabitants of Georgia are continually hearing and reading about new exposures of "traitors working for Moscow."

The "Kremlin Agents" Simply Will Not Negotiate

Zviad Gamsakhurdia, according to him, has absolutely certain proof of relations between the arrested leaders of Shida Kartli (as South Ossetia has been called here as of late) and the USSR KGB.

But even earlier the leader of parliament himself was "found guilty" by the opposition—the so-called National Congress—of pro-communist activity. Congress, in turn, has long been acting in concert with the Kremlin, Gamsakhurdia and his supporters believe.

"Kremlin agent" is the most popular and withering epithet leveled at any political adversary. Why have the two leaders of the National Congress, Georgiy Chanturiya and Irakliy Tsereteli, suddenly "become" such? The powerful "Mkhedrioni" armed organization (approximately 6,000 members) has openly taken their side. And the national guard subordinate to Gamsakhurdia numbers as yet several hundred members—general conscription will begin only in May. An obvious preponderance in "men" has taken shape for the opposition. And, according to republic Ministry of Internal Affairs figures, what is more, "Mkhedrioni" has not been standing idle—a multitude of attacks has been carried out on the prefectures loyal to the parliament which are being formed throughout the republic. "Mkhedrioni" squads have taken militia departments by storm and attacked army units.

The "Mkhedrioni" main base was located literally next door to the parliament—in a Tbilisi suburb. Individual calls for the dispersal of parliament were heard at the mass meetings organized by the National Congress. The danger of large-scale armed clashes loomed.

Gamsakhurdia realized, of course, to what criticism he would be subjected when with the aid of USSR Armed Forces regular units he struck suddenly at the "Mkhedrioni" main base and also ordered the arrest of its leaders. It was for this reason, evidently, that he hastened to declare the leaders of this organization and the National Congress "accomplices of the Kremlin." Only the center, allegedly, benefits from a strong opposition, armed at that. Inciting clashes between "Mkhedrioni" and the army units, Gamsakhurdia believes, the pro-Kremlin opposition is prompting Gorbachev to impose presidential rule in Georgia and disband the Georgian parliament. "All attacks on the military I consider foolhardy," Gamsakhurdia declared.

And the opposition immediately made use of its opportunity. At mass meetings in the center of Tbilisi the chairman of the Supreme Soviet is being accused of cooperation with the Soviet Army command and, consequently, with the Kremlin. The mutual exposures of treachery are starting all over again....

Is a Parliament Possible for Present-Day Georgia?

As distinct from Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who declined to meet me (because I am connected with IZVESTIYA), opposition leader Georgiy Chanturiya readily agreed to an interview, setting all business aside. This is understandable: The entire Tbilisi press, radio and television are working for Gamsakhurdia (the refractory youth paper had its mouth stopped—the paper was closed down).

Chanturiya and the National Congress have no such powerful a propaganda machine—opposition publications smack as yet more of leaflets and are amateurishly printed.

"When I say 'the Kremlin,' I mean Gamsakhurdia, and vice versa," Georgiy Chanturiya began. "The point being that after a strong national liberation movement had begun in Georgia, Moscow urgently needed a force which would take power in the republic from the hands of the compromised Communist Party. And do the Kremlin's bidding, but taking nationalist phrasemongering as a basis now. Gamsakhurdia and his supporters were such a force."

"But, Giya-batone, Gamsakhurdia and his bloc did, after all, come to power as the result of general elections...."

"The point is that the electorate simply had no alternative—either the Communists or Gamsakhurdia. This was why he won. The parties that make up the National Congress declined to take part in the elections—this would, after all, have meant support for the present Soviet power structures and recognition of Georgia as part of the USSR. Initially Gamsakhurdia, who headed the St. Ilya the Righteous Society, intended to boycott the elections also. But he betrayed us at the last moment."

"You mean he announced Round Table's participation in the elections suddenly?"

"Yes. And the present parliament merely creates the illusion of its multiparty nature, incidentally. One party in fact rules—the St. Ilya the Righteous Society. The majority of the other parties have sprung from it artificially, that is, are fictitious. The danger of the dictatorship of an individual is in evidence."

"But what if the bloc of parties called the National Congress had taken part in the elections?"

"I believe that Gamsakhurdia's supporters would not have gained even 15 percent of the seats in parliament. But taking part in the elections would have meant betraying our beliefs. The existence of an independent parliament in an occupied country, which Georgia in fact is, is self-deception. Here is an interesting point, incidentally: While having deemed unlawful Georgia's occupation by Soviet Russia in 1921, the present so-called parliament has deemed unlawful itself also—after all, the elections were conducted in accordance with Union legislation!"

In connection with the rayon prefectures which are being formed in the republic, Chanturiya observed that people personally devoted to Gamsakhurdia are being appointed prefects, as a rule. And there should be no invocation of the experience of Italy and France. Here, in Georgia, the prefectures have been thought-up to one end: taking independence from the local soviets and establishing the personal power of Gamsakhurdia.

"We Have Acquired Our Own Home-Grown Karabakh"

Mass arrests are seemingly coming into vogue among the ruling bloc. Even Gamsakhurdia's supporters are at times calling these tactics ill-conceived. Truly, what reaction on the part of Ossetians were the leaders of parliament expecting when they announced the commencement of proceedings against South Ossetian leader Torez Kulumbegov?

The reaction was unequivocal, of course—bombardment of the Georgian villages of South Ossetia and the seizure of Georgian hostages. Georgians responded in the same vein.

And now a civil war on a local scale.

All this is well known—as is also the fact that as a result of the power and food blockade on the part of Georgia old people in an old people's home in Tskhinvali are dying from starvation and cold. An infant has died in the maternity ward. The hospital is without medicines.

How could the flare of hostility between the two neighboring peoples have occurred? In South Ossetia, Georgian and Ossetian villages alternate, and their inhabitants have never looked with animosity on one another.

Yet just a few years ago Armenians and Azerbaijanis got along normally in Nagorny Karabakh also. And suddenly arguments began as to whose this land is, who is a "guest" here, and who, the "host."

And, you know, it is just the same arguments that are now being conducted in connection with South Ossetia. This is the historical digression made in an open letter to Academician Dmitriy Likhachev from Kiti Machabeli, doctor of art criticism (the text was recently widespread in the republic):

"By the will of fate I come from the feudal Machabeli family, in whose possession Shida Kartli was for centuries. ...As of the late Middle Ages, the fertile Georgian land, ruined and laid waste by endless invasions, was settled by people from the North Caucasus. For centuries Georgians and Ossetians lived peaceably side by side.... It all began with the anticonstitutional declaration by the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast of a republic independent of Georgia, which meant the tearing away of its primordial land.... An analogy with a guest supplanting a kind host in his own home suggests itself."

How familiar and severe this is! For several centuries the Ossetians have developed the "ruined land" and built villages, roads, and schools here. And now they are being

called guests in "Shida Kartli." Surely Professor Machabeli knows that a mass movement of whole peoples occurred in ancient times and the Middle Ages? So that practically any national-territorial formation could, proceeding from Georgian historians' logic, lay claim to its neighbor. And operate by medieval methods here, as is the case in South Ossetia....

Ossetians' reluctance to remain under the power of Tbilisi is understandable, given such an attitude. Those with whom I spoke said roughly the following: "Everything points to Georgia seceding from the USSR. And we would then be left face-to-face with Georgian nationalists. We are now protected at least to some extent by Union laws and army units, but in an independent Georgia we would be subhumans."

Whom do the Ossetians fear—the Georgian nation? If so, they do so in vain because I am sure that the Georgian people are opposed to bloodshed. Speaking with the Tbilisi intelligentsia, I frequently heard the bitter words: "We have acquired our own home-grown Karabakh."

Zviad Gamsakhurdia also speaks virtually daily about the need for peace and harmony between the Georgian and non-Georgian population. But at this time the Russian serviceman (demobilized included) is denied the right to acquire housing and plots of land. Prefectures are being implanted in Abkhazia by force, contrary to the wishes of its people. And, finally, the question of impending citizenship in a free Georgia. Zviad Gamsakhurdia had already in advance divided all inhabitants of the republic into "citizens" and "subjects." Residence qualifications and also knowledge of Georgia have been declared a barrier in the way of obtaining the title of citizen.

Ossetians cannot, it turns out, count on becoming equal people in Georgia—their language belongs to an entirely different group from Georgian. "Subjects," however, according to Gamsakhurdia, will unfailingly be hurt when it comes to political rights.

"I Went To Protect My Mother and Father"

None of this, of course, justifies in the least the actions of the Ossetian militants terrorizing Georgian villages. They are engaged in shelling, including rocket bombardment, blindly—they are setting fire to the homes of peaceful Georgians, not the motor vehicles of armed Georgian militia detachments. Two Georgian schools have been burned down in Tskhinvali.

In their embittered state Ossetian militants, calling themselves patriots, are not allowing convoys with medicines, food, and warm clothing sent from Tbilisi into Tskhinvali. Three times this year the Georgian Red Cross Society has attempted to help the population of South Ossetia, regardless of national affiliation. But the Ossetian "patriots" have no wish to receive help from Georgians.

Assistance is accepted only from over the Caucasus range—across the territory of North Ossetia. I spoke with one of those who recently accompanied a cargo of medicines and warm clothing to Tskhinvali—all this had been collected in Ossetian communities of Moscow and Leningrad.

"I was shocked by what I saw in the Tskhinvali hospital," Dzhambulat Lokhov, originally from the Ossetian village of Khetagurov, said. Eighty wounded plus dozens of people who had been badly beaten could obtain no assistance—there were no medicines. They are dying of that from which under normal conditions the doctors could easily save a person."

"In the maternity ward it is six degrees below. I am told that fuel and power are not being supplied from Georgia. Why? Two plants in Tskhinvali were allegedly making weapons for the Ossetian detachments, and it was decided to cut off the power to these enterprises. But the whole oblast cannot be deprived of power, in winter, what is more.

"I went to my native village to protect my mother and father. My sister and her family were already there—they had been driven out of the neighboring village by Georgians. There was absolutely nothing to eat in the house, and my brother-in-law would leave early in the morning by foot for Tskhinvali to find bread. And I would keep watch with the gun. In the daytime at the home, at nights, at a post near the village. There were frequent exchanges of fire with the Georgians, after all, right alongside is their village."

Dzhambulat agrees that both parties are to blame in this war. He acknowledges that, indeed, there have been far more Georgians among the dead than Ossetians. And at the same time.... "We will not come to an amicable arrangement with the Georgians. For us secession from Georgia is a matter of life and death. In addition, we have to settle scores with the Georgians for 1920, when their armed detachments overthrew Soviet power in Ossetia. They slaughtered 6,000 Ossetians that year, and a further 13,000 refugees died from cold and typhus."

These old tragic events, forgotten over the years, are now on the lips of many Ossetians, which is inflaming the armed boys even more. The reciprocal count continues to grow: Crudely put, for each Georgian killed his fellow tribesmen make short work of five Ossetians; these, in turn, wipe out two dozen Georgians.... And it does not matter, what is more, whether they are related to the killers or not. This is not a blood feud in classical form but extermination on a national basis.

What was important was the impetus, and rocks of mutual hatred started rolling, increasing the power of the landslide.

How Many Political Hostages Are There in Georgia?

Thousands of Ossetian refugees are moving across the pass toward Vladikavkaz. And Georgians, hastening to

leave South Ossetia, are constantly coming south with their belongings—to Tbilisi and Gori.

The implacable hatred among political leaders is intensifying the calamitous situation of hundreds of thousands of people. Two-thirds of the industrial enterprises in Tbilisi were fully or partially paralyzed by the start of March. Workers have been laid off for two or three months, but this forced leave has been paid only partially almost everywhere.

I was told this by Malkhaz Geleishvili, president of the Alioni electronics firm. His enterprise recently became a leased enterprise, and people had good earnings and hopes for a secure future. More than 120 persons—those with a particular length of service—acquired company stock, 8,000-9,000 rubles [R] worth on average.

"But now we are on the verge of bankruptcy," Malkhaz Davidovich said. "We handle the repairs and maintenance of electronic equipment, and we had more than 700 clients. Two-thirds of them have now declined Alioni's services—there is no power at the plant, and the equipment is standing idle. Under these conditions I should dismiss a third of my employees, but this would be too harsh. We will pay people from our reserves...."

Why is there a power shortage in Tbilisi? Malkhaz Geleishvili explained: A number of nuclear power stations in the Transcaucasus have been shut down, and the Georgian hydroelectric power plants have always operated at half-power in wintertime. We have to wait for the snow to thaw. But the republic's parliament is giving the situation a political coloring: It is the center, allegedly, which has organized the power blockade of Georgia. And many people believe this, remembering the short-sighted blockade of Lithuania.

Voices of the following kind are being heard also: Had a pro-communist leadership come to power in Georgia, additional power supplies from other regions of the country would have been organized. Such a version cannot be ruled out, evidently, the more so in that the Georgian parliament is refusing to sign the Union treaty.

Whatever, the attitude of the peoples of the republic toward whether Georgia should or should not be part of the USSR will be determined on 31 March, when a referendum scheduled by the Georgian Supreme Soviet will be held here. But it is clear today even that any political victory could at best provide only moral satisfaction for some part of society.

I agree with Zviad Gamsakhurdia: It is not for Moscow to indicate for the parliament and people of Georgia the path for which they should opt. For Stanislav Govorukhin said it correctly in his sensational film: "Can a remiss, profligate manager tell his neighbor how to live?"

It was simply distressing seeing the impoverishment of what was not that long ago a flourishing region. It was painful seeing for myself and hearing from others how

many thousands of people who have become hostages of a political clash are suffering.

Gamsakhurdia 9 March Press Conference

91US0404A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
13 Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Report on press conference of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia for Georgian, Soviet, and foreign journalists on 9 March 1991]

[Text] **GEORGIAN MESSENGER:** Both the conservative and the Democratic Russian press and also right-wing, left-wing, liberal, and pro-communist publications of the West are accusing you of favoring a dictatorship. One journalist even compared you to Mussolini. The essence of other accusations is that you place the rights of the nation above the rights of the individual and separate the one from the other. Hence the conclusion—because of this the rights of the non-Georgian population are being encroached upon.

[Gamsakhurdia] You know that representatives of other nationalities living in Turkey are declared to be Turks. There is only one entry for nationality in the passports—Turk. But representatives of the non-Georgian population living in Georgia retain their nationality and their language and their culture and their religion. And nobody persecutes them for that. We are not taking any steps to encroach on their rights. Moreover, in places where the non-Georgian population is dense, the rights of Georgians are encroached upon. This pertains most of all to Samachablo where the Georgian population is illegal. They are persecuted and many of them have become refugees in their own land. There is discrimination against the Georgian population. In general, this is more disinformation and, understandably, these fabrications come from the Kremlin, which wants to discredit us. As for the dictatorship, what they call dictatorship is the fact that we are arresting the leaders of illegal military formations for specific violations of the law, mugging, robbery, and attacks on people. If this is dictatorship, then the whole world is in its chains, including the United States and France. So such arguments are absolutely groundless. About the rights of the individual. The individual is more free here than in other countries. Any individual who arranges a demonstration or rally in front of the White House and even insults the government must be held liable. Here rallies take place every day and nobody is arrested because of it. So this accusation is also groundless. Nobody here encroaches on individual rights or on the freedom of speech, religion, conscience, or emigration.

GEORGIAN MESSENGER: Another question. Newspapers like TIMES [as published] express the opinion that the main conflict in Georgia is the struggle between the Supreme Soviet and the National Congress, and a civil war could start because of it. This is an ingrained stereotype. In general, the information disseminated in

the West is basically different from that disseminated in Moscow. How do you explain the fact that Western journalists do not take the side of the oppressed people?

[Gamsakhurdia] By the fact that the governments of the free countries are all in the same boat. Today they are on the side of the oppressors, the empire, the center. They prefer cooperation with the center for a number of reasons. They include the crisis in the Persian Gulf, in which the West would like for the Soviet Union to take its side. They also want to control the question of strategic and conventional arms. And this is why they do not want to let individual republics spoil their relations, and the journalists follow the lead of their governments.

SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA: Your meeting with representatives of the intelligentsia has just ended. Tell us about it if you can.

[Gamsakhurdia] The meeting was with opposition representatives of the intelligentsia. They have complaints against us. For instance, they are demanding the release of the recently arrested Ioseliani and greater freedom for the press. We have proved that there are no restrictions on television or the press. Any statement of the opposition except for out-and-out insults may be published. As for Ioseliani's arrest, he was arrested for a criminally punishable crime. The discussion was mainly about these issues. Ultimately we came to an agreement that there should be a national reconciliation and that we must fight together for victory in the referendum scheduled for 31 March.

Press Center of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs: I wish to take advantage of the fact that there are foreign journalists and representatives of the USSR mass media here. Yesterday the program "Vremya" reported information received from the committee under the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic that Georgian fighting men had attacked the village of Monasteri and killed two Ossetian residents. I wish to state with complete certainty that this is another lie. In fact on the morning of 8 March a band of about 100 Ossetian extremists attacked the villages of Monasteri and Zemo-Achabeti. Taniel Khetagashvili, a Georgian, was killed. The Ossetians who were killed were members of the band. Central television, TASS, and the newspapers are spreading false, tendentious information, relying on the information from this committee. They are thus discrediting the national liberation movement of Georgia and declaring Georgian militiamen to be bandits. Do you not consider it necessary to register an official protest against the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ossetia, since the committee was created under him?

[Gamsakhurdia] We have decided to make such a protest. The text is being composed. Moreover, we must deliver an ultimatum to Union television—in the event that the transmission of false information continues, we will stop showing Central Television programs in Georgia.

Georgian Radio: On 11 March it will have been a year since the adoption of the declaration on Lithuanian independence. Do you intend to send any communication to Vilnius?

[Gamsakhurdia] We shall definitely send our congratulations. This date will remind the world once again that the so-called Soviet Union includes people annexed by armed force, for whose independence countries of the West should fight—something which is frequently forgotten.

VESTNIK GRUZII: The situation in Abkhazia is getting worse. A new bloc has been created there, which includes Aydgylara, the Democratic Union of Abkhazia, and the Armenian Krunk society. What is the Supreme Soviet doing to stabilize the situation in Abkhazia? And the second thing. In connection with the increased flow of disinformation, how do you evaluate the work of the Permanent Mission of Georgia in Moscow?

[Gamsakhurdia] The Permanent Mission is operating very poorly. But we are trying to step up its activity. As for Abkhazia, we are taking measures so that the so-called Soviet referendum will not be held. And we want to appeal to the Abkhazians and the Armenians living in Abkhazia not to participate in this referendum because this will be a betrayal not only of Georgia but of Armenia as well. Armenia, as we know, is not participating in the Union referendum. Moreover, we suggested that V. Ardzinba present the prefect candidates. If this does not happen, we will appoint prefects to Abkhazia ourselves. We have the right to do this according to the law.

KURANTY: Do you intend to go to Moscow to solve any problems?

[Gamsakhurdia] So far I have no intentions of going there since Moscow is not relinquishing its dictatorship and is trying to impose its laws and its policy on us. I have said that I would not cross the threshold of the Kremlin until Georgia gained her freedom.

SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA: In the Soviet Union there is an attack on democracy which is disturbing all people with common sense. In your opinion, is it possible to oppose this process?

[Gamsakhurdia] Only an association of democratic forces of the entire Soviet Union could. And they would have to exert all efforts so that the West would support them.

Georgian Television: In a month it will have been two years since the tragic events of 9 April. We are disturbed by the conclusion of the USSR Procuracy which did not find a corpus delicti in the actions of the guilty parties. What is the position of the Georgian Supreme Soviet regarding this?

[Gamsakhurdia] Of course, it is sharply negative. We have received this conclusion and have sent back a

substantiated response. Our commission for the 9 April events is continuing its work to discover the specific guilty parties.

Georgian Television: We know that there are representatives of Georgia in the United States. If you can, tell us with whom they met. As we know, there has been no meeting with White House representatives yet.

[Gamsakhurdia] No, not with the White House. But there was a meeting with official representatives of the U.S. Congress. They have a benevolent attitude toward Georgia. Although there is no official support, such as, incidentally, the Baltic countries have. There was a meeting with Reagan. Apparently a group of senators and congressmen will visit Georgia.

Norwegian Television: What comment do you have about these words of yours: "The referendum will reveal not only the proponents of Georgian independence but also those who deserve to be Georgian citizens. For is it thinkable to grant Georgian citizenship to a person who does not wish for the restoration of our independent statehood?"

[Gamsakhurdia] In any country, citizenship is granted to an individual who is loyal to the authorities and the system that exists in the country, as well as to the people who live there. Nowhere is citizenship granted to those who are hostile to the country. There is nothing undemocratic in this. To those who are hostile to Georgia and do not wish for Georgian independence, those who want Georgia without Georgians, we will not grant citizenship, and we will certainly not grant them Georgian land.

VESTNIK GRUZII: Have any steps been taken which would lead to stabilization of the situation, for example, in Samachablo?

[Gamsakhurdia] We are doing everything we can to enter into dialogue with them but they will not cooperate because the Kremlin does not want this. The Kremlin has decided to get them to help fight us and keep us from restoring our independence. The Kremlin has come right out and stated: "Until you have signed the Union treaty, until you participate in the Union referendum, both in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, you will have problems." That is, the bloodletting will continue. This has been discussed directly. The events in Samachablo are the Kremlin's punitive operation.

Norwegian Television: You have spoken about the fact that Moscow is supplying arms to the Ossetians. Do you have proof of this?

[Gamsakhurdia] Our Ministry of Internal Affairs has information that Soviet troops stationed in Samachablo are supplying the Ossetians with the latest arms and missiles. The time has come for foreign journalists to take an interest in this. They must go to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and ask to see these documents and evidence and models of the weapons. Additionally, there

is my letter to Gorbachev in which I listed the names of those Ossetian officers who are supplying the bandits with arms.

GEORGIAN MESSENGER: Does Georgia declare its independence under the same USSR law that contains the mechanism for withdrawing from the country or is this linked to a concrete political situation?

[Gamsakhurdia] We do not recognize the Soviet laws or Constitution—for us they do not exist. As soon as the political situation presents an opportunity, we will take advantage of it.

Nana Gongadze, staff correspondent of the USSR State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting: Perhaps even today is the time for us to think about withdrawing Georgian television from the Union structure in order to have greater opportunities to convey truthful information to the West.

[Gamsakhurdia] This issue will be discussed. I repeat—a boycott of Union television will be carried out if they do not call off the present information blockade and information war against Georgia.

SAKINFORM: During the war in the Persian Gulf there was a coming together of moral criteria in the world. Do you think this was the result of a reconsideration of values or was the main reason for the unification the Near Eastern oil?

[Gamsakhurdia] The war in the Persian Gulf in and of itself was the greatest moral act. For the first time in recent history large countries protected and liberated the enslaved and annexed Kuwait. And we will believe even more in the moral side if steps are taken to release other countries and peoples. Unless, of course, oil was the main factor here.

SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA: Academician Simonia, when working in Moscow, expressed an interesting idea about B. Yeltsin. He said that Yeltsin is not a democrat but a populist. Populism usually leads to dictatorship. What is your opinion about this?

[Gamsakhurdia] That is Kremlin terminology. Incidentally, when our movement became stronger and the election campaign became more active, its agents called me a populist. Like all the local Kremlin agents who drew up Resolution No. 24 in Prague and accused Georgia of oppressing other peoples. They also call me a populist. That is a Kremlin term. People who are popular among the people are called populists, but they say nothing about why these leaders are popular. This is a well-known method. Here they have used it against Yeltsin.

SMENA (Leningrad): Mr. Chairman, why was Boris Yeltsin's visit to Georgia postponed? And, briefly, how are relations with Russia developing?

[Gamsakhurdia] Our meeting with Yeltsin was to have taken place two weeks ago but, for reasons unknown to

me, Yeltsin changed his mind and gave no excuse except to say he was sick. But I suspect that the center and the KGB had a hand in this. You know that there have been two attempts on Yeltsin's life. Once in Spain and once in Moscow. It cannot be ruled out that there was a danger of a third terrorist attack and that is why Yeltsin postponed his visit.

TBILISI: You have said that you have no opposition as such. But you met with representatives of the intelligentsia. Does this not mean that an opposition at the governmental level is being created in Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] In my opinion, yes. This is the only way we will come to a mutual agreement. As for the criminal elements, we do not recognize their opposition. And we will not enter into dialogue with them. Opposition is one thing, but hostility and betrayal of the country is something else. I have here the Abkhazian newspaper AYDGYLARA. Abkhazia has created an Interfront which has united several parties that are hostile to Georgia. There was a two-day rally in Ochamchira at which they spoke out against the institution of the prefect and against Georgia. Georgian "congressmen" participated in it. They were not opposition—they were traitors. They are responsible for the betrayal of the homeland. For example, those Lithuanians who speak out against Landsbergis at Interfront meetings are not opposition, and the position of the Lithuanian Government toward them is clear. We feel the same way about our traitors. We respond in the language of the law and what is right. We must distinguish the opposition from the traitors. Interfront leaders are proud of the fact that members of the National Congress went along with them! An Interfront has also been created in Samachablo. In the likeness of the National Salvation Committee created in Lithuania. This committee is called the VChK—temporary extraordinary committee—and it includes Chochiyev and other extremists. With the creation of such a committee, the Kremlin is trying to repeat here the events that took place in Lithuania, to bring in troops, and to suppress the national liberation movement. Any Georgian who supports their position, whether he is a congressman or not, is a traitor to the homeland and will receive his just deserts—such is our position.

But with real opposition we will have dialogue and cooperation.

SMENA: How do you feel about the statement of the students at Tbilisi University who demand regulation of relations with the opposition?

[Gamsakhurdia] These are absolutely and completely unjustified demands. They allege that there is some kind of dictatorship over the press and television. That is a lie. Various opinions are published in the Georgian press except, of course, those that are direct insults and abuse. There is no dictatorship. They make complaints: Why does television convey the contents of letters that criticize the position of some of the workers and students of

Tbilisi University. But it was conveyed. Now there should be responses as well. The more so since one of the university professors said she does not share the position of this small part of the people who are demanding the release of criminals.

VRASTAN: Will the results of the referendum be conveyed to the international organizations?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, of course. Moreover, we have invited international observers. There will be representatives of the parliaments of Russia and the Baltics.

VRASTAN: How do you assess Georgia's relations with the neighboring republics—Armenia and Azerbaijan?

[Gamsakhurdia] We must show good will. We do not want to intervene in this conflict. Moreover, we want to reconcile them. Incidentally, an interview was published recently in an Armenian newspaper which quoted my words from long ago to the effect that Karabakh belongs to Armenia. But now I do not wish to interfere in this issue because interference will only aggravate the situation. I no longer hold this position and I would like for both sides to reach an agreement. And we will always have good relations. If, of course, the Armenian population of Georgia does not oppose the national movement and the Georgian parliament. Now, for example, certain difficulties have arisen in Bogdanovka. They will not accept our prefect and want to elect their own. And this already reveals a desire to declare themselves autonomous. I have asked Mr. Ter-Petrosyan to help resolve this issue. For on our territory one cannot fail to obey our laws, the more so since the deputy will be an Armenian since the interests of the Armenians will be taken into account. We want to resolve all this through negotiations since we do not want a confrontation either with the Armenians or the Azeris. And in general any confrontation will only play into the Kremlin's hand and give it inspiration.

Georgian Radio: We know the position of the government of Moldova and its people concerning the Union referendum. But a couple of days ago PRAVDA published an article entitled "Communists for the Referendum." It was about Kishinev Communists. In reference to this, what do our Communists intend to do?

[Gamsakhurdia] Our Communists have not said anything yet.

I think they will support conducting the referendum.

NOVOSTI: Will normal conditions be created for the work of the prefects in Abkhazia if the Supreme Soviet supports them?

[Gamsakhurdia] This is a very difficult question. It will take a large amount of propaganda to explain that this is for everyone's good. For now they are still clinging to Soviet structures that are obsolete and have been rejected by time. And they must try as hard as they can to get away from these positions.

NOVOSTI: And this question. The National Congress thinks that Georgia will not achieve independence as a result of the transition period. Moreover, it is asserted that it is proceeding toward an abyss. What is this, a statement of fact or an attempt at discreditation?

[Gamsakhurdia] This is discreditation. And it is not surprising. As always, the so-called National Congress is rejecting everything. For example, they think that the referendum is not necessary, but we are convinced that it is necessary, for its results will be a historical document. A great deal of time has passed since 1918. There have been many generations. We must show the entire world that today's Georgia wants independence and is aspiring to freedom.

KABADONI-8: How do you assess the statement of the Freedom bloc published in the latest issue of the newspaper MAMULI?

[Gamsakhurdia] The criticism from parliament regarding the so-called South Ossetia was a provocation in and of itself because Moscow's role is not taken into account in this situation. After all, everything happening there is controlled from Moscow. The parliament had no means other than those that were used. It was impossible to abolish the autonomous region because they had declared themselves a republic, thus creating a threat to Georgia's territorial integrity.

Incidentally, the press and television are filled with criticism about you. Just take MAMULI, 7 DGE, DVRITA, KARTULI PILMI, IVERIYA, and KARTULI KHRONIKA. Incidentally, these are also the newspapers that print a lot of slander about the parliament and vent their spleen.

KABADONI-8: And the last question. As we know, you have always shown respect for Akakiy Bakradze. Have your relations changed because of recent events?

[Gamsakhurdia] No. I was surprised by his attitude toward the criminal elements. So I do not understand his position.

SAKINFORM: There is information to the effect that the situation has worsened in Adzharia. They say that you intend to go there. How much truth is there to that?

[Gamsakhurdia] When the need arises, I will go there. So far there is no need. Everything is going normally in Adzharia. The Kremlin agent Khakhva could not get his way: He was trying to prevent the appointment of the prefects, but their nomination went quite well both in Keda and in Khelvachauri. Things are going fairly well in other places too. The attempts of the communist mafia to discredit our policy were frustrated.

VECHERNIY TBILISI: Today is 9 March. The 35th anniversary of the bloody slaughter in Tbilisi in 1956.

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, this is a tragic date. I was a participant in these events along with my friends. And not on the side of the Stalinists, of course. At that time we tried to turn the demonstration in the direction of demands for restoration of independence. Of course, this was an act of

banditry on the part of the empire which, I would say, awakened the Georgian people. I recall how the column of red flags moved toward the House of Communications, when they fired at it and the first row was mowed down by a burst of machine gun fire, all 5,000 people threw away their flags and started stamping their feet. This gunfire and this terror stirred up the Georgian people and brought them out of their many years of slumber. A new wave of the national movement began on 9 March and it reached its crest on 9 April. As a result, a bloodless revolution was accomplished in Georgia.

VESTNIK GRUZII: We receive very many letters requesting us to organize meetings with you and broad segments of the population and representatives of the intelligentsia. Will such meetings take place?

[Gamsakhurdia] Yes, of course. They will. I will be very happy to participate in them.

Mkhedrioni in Adzharia Surrenders Weapons

*AU0803173891 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian
1445 GMT 8 Mar 91*

[Text] A meeting of an informational character dedicated to introducing the institution of prefecture and the nomination of prefects in the Adzharia Autonomous Republic was organized on the Teatralnaya Ploshchad [Theater Square] by the regional organization Roundtable-Free Georgia. Having supported the decree issued by the Georgian Supreme Soviet on the nomination of prefects, the participants in the meeting pointed out that, nowadays, everything must be done to prevent confrontation. It is necessary to do as much as possible to render comprehensive assistance to prefects in resolving numerous problems during the transitional period.

Then the participants went to the building of the Supreme Soviet of the Adzharia Autonomous Republic and demanded an explanation on separate questions from its leadership. A dialogue took place between the chairman of the Presidium of the Adzharia Supreme Soviet [name indistinct] (?Khafla) and the public.

This visit [word indistinct] of the regional organization Roundtable-Free Georgia summarized the activity of the local division of Mkhedrioni [illegal armed formation]. Its representatives declared their intention to voluntarily surrender a (?Shmaitzer?) submachinegun and other weapons and munitions to Interior Ministry officials. The Mkhedrioni organization has perpetrated numerous bandit actions: armed attacks, highjackings of automobiles, and burglaries at gunpoint. We want to believe that all of this has come to an end. The regional organization Roundtable-Free Georgia, which has incorporated the all-Georgian society [name indistinct], intends to nominate its candidates in every electoral district for the upcoming parliamentary elections in Adzharia. Supporting, on the whole, the positions of the central organization, the regional organization, in its election campaign, is taking into account specific local features of the autonomous republic. Nationwide interests of Georgia are considered to be of prime importance, as well as actual and not declarative protection of the rights of its citizens and the establishment of the principles of social justice.

Coexistence Between Moldavians, Russians Foreseen

91UN1134A Kishinev CURIERUL DE SEARA
in Moldavian 9 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Valeriu Renita: "Coexistence Opportunities Between Moldavians and Russians"]

[Text] Curiously enough, the Russians of Moldavia are struggling to ensure respect for international human rights. Curious at least for the Moldavian intellectuals, who until recently were doomed to silence, and whose collective spiritual life was reduced to wine-soaked evenings in basements where they huddled around radio sets tuned to BBC. What were the Russian intellectuals of Moldavia doing at the same time? More or less the same thing. They "gulped" vodka and listened to the Svoboda speaker. Although the traditional belief is that our Russian intellectuals had it better than their colleagues in Moscow.

It is of course very important to know what we were doing then as an additional point of reference when we attempt to analyze the current situation.

The dramatic quality of the present becomes more evident when one realizes that our politicians have managed to deploy on opposite battle positions two armies of intellectuals distinguished by nationality. But is this difference culturally and morally important to the intellectuals? Obviously not. The fact that I did not lose my friends among the Russian intellectuals, the fact that some of my Moldavian friends continue to find, as before, a common language and common topics with their Russian-speaking friends is a continuing argument for the idea that the difference of nationality is not of prime importance for people equipped with an intellect, i.e., for those who practice reasoning professions.

Is this article intended as a conciliation manifesto between Russian and Moldavian intellectuals? No. Mine is a different purpose, namely to find out whether we quarrelled in the first place. Because all the anti-Russian or anti-Moldavian writings on which the press has been feeding were not written by real intellectuals. What terms could we invoke to express the exaggerated caution we are using toward each other and the uncertainty that is affecting both Moldavian and Russian intellectuals?

It is amoral for Moldavian intellectuals to pretend not to notice confusions between antitotalitarian and anti-Russian regulations, although this kind of fake indifference has a logical explanation: because of a regrettable mistake it is thought of as a sure sign of progress toward victory in the struggle for sovereignty. It is amoral for Russian intellectuals to pretend not to notice when the struggle for human rights is confused with that for pro-imperial ideas. Here, too, the carelessness has the same explanation: cowardice. I dare to state that precisely hypocrisy, whose recourse is cowardice—the hypocrisy that has become a way of life for both Russian

and Moldavian intellectuals—is the expression of the apparent hostility that divides us.

We live at a time when the need for cohesion among intellectuals, regardless of nationality, no longer needs to be demonstrated. The proofs appear sometimes in the press—addressed especially to those equipped with a political sense—but in such a primitive form that instead of appealing to reason they always trigger emotions.

Thus, to this day no means was found to resolve the apparent conflict between Russian and Moldavian intellectuals.

Hence, the problem is how to get rid of this hypocrisy, or rather, how to get rid of this vice without highlighting too much the indecent aspect of the procedure, because anyway, we are responsible for the fact that the rank and file—the "people," in politicians' parlance—are consciously cultivating anti-Russian and imperialist feelings. To my mind, the way to solve the problem is seemingly simple enough: learning from each other some of the things so far specific to either Russians or Moldavians, so that together we can build the civilized society that we need.

I was standing next to a Moldavian volunteer when the squads were close to a Gagauz village; the latter asked Mircea Druc: "Why don't we attack, why aren't we doing anything, have we come all this way for nothing?" The prime minister answered: "Because if we do, Europe will turn its back on us and will not extend us credit." Mircea Druc could, of course, have thought of a more Christian-like answer, but it would have been less convincing to the questioner. The Moldavian intellectuals very frequently feel discouraged vis-a-vis examples of real economic reasoning.

What the Moldavian intellectuals obviously lack, in their struggle to promote the current reforms, is profound economic thinking. I am referring not to the absence of specialists in this area, but to the curious stubbornness with which we refuse to recognize that some political freedoms cannot be achieved without economic freedoms. Not to mention those who believe that we can implement the economic reform while depriving ourselves if not of all, at least of some of the Russian-speaking minds and arms. We, who aspire for a civilized society, should know that peoples who have a market economy have long discovered the fact that economic freedom is one of the component elements of and conditions for freedom in the broader sense of the word. Moreover, economic freedom separates economic and political power, and forces them to maintain a mutual balance, something that is vitally important for both Russians and Moldavians. Because economic freedom offers people what they want, not what they should want according to the requirements of a certain social group. It is precisely this value of the civilized world that in my opinion the Moldavian, and, of course, the Russian intellectuals should adopt, although the latter, judging by my personal observations, are better prepared to adopt it

than the former, or have even adopted it in part. I do not want to dwell on the economic performances of the Russian intellectuals or of Moldavian Russians in general, because I would inevitably run into issues alien to this context.

The problem, thus, is not that the Moldavian intellectuals should rid themselves of an improper racist feeling, because that can be achieved with minimum sacrifice. The problem is that they should adopt a statute of civilized life which requires capitalizing on the good features of the Russian intelligentsia. And the other way around: It is no problem for the Russian intellectuals to repudiate some utopian ideas, although Russia and the entire Soviet state have spent enormous resources of human energy on feeding them. The problem is that the Russian intelligentsia must learn to respect Moldavia's sovereignty, and when I say that, I do not mean a specific parliament or government. Regardless of the economic space in which we will live tomorrow, the reality suggests that we will have to capitalize on the union market in order to integrate in the European market, and that for the good of this republic, whose citizens we all are, we will have to respect its sovereignty. That is because a state may become primarily a subject of the international economy, but not before it becomes a legal subject or entity. As soon as we, both Russians and Moldavians, manage to grasp the above issues, we will be on the point of forgiving each other in the Christian sense of the term.

I began with the fact that in the recent past we used to drink vodka and wine while somehow listening to the voice of civilization. I could have begun with the fact that we used to search libraries for and spend nights reading "forbidden books;" in one word, the fact is that until recently we, the intellectuals, took our vocation to be a permanent quest for enriching the spirit. It would be interesting to do a sociological study of how, after studying the culture of centuries of civilization and learning so much about right and wrong, we have now come to such different understanding of these fundamental ideas. The main thing now is not to degenerate into political fighting. As a point of departure we could at least adopt the "Palmerston principle:" we have neither permanent foes nor permanent allies, only permanent interests.

Yerevan on Growing Closeness of Turkish-Azerbaijani Ties

NC1403003591 *Yerevan International Service in Armenian* 1630 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Text] The political and spiritual ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey have recently grown even closer and this process could well gain even more momentum now that the Baku-Istanbul air route has opened. Various Azerbaijani leaders visiting Turkey invariably raise the issue of Armenia and the Armenian people, and naturally Turkish newspapers and television broadcasts devote a lot of space to their statements.

During a visit to Turkey, Elcibey [formerly known as Ebulfaz Aliyev], one of the leaders of the so-called Popular Movement of Azerbaijan, made a statement to Voice of Turkey radio and declared that Azerbaijan has never before found itself in such an exceedingly grave situation. According to him, the war in the Gulf and the pressures brought on Azerbaijan have raised the number of unemployed to 1 million. He also said that nearly 2 million people in Azerbaijan are starving, and that the situation of the 200,000 Turks, to use his words, from Armenia is particularly grave, for they are living on the streets.

Elcibey has found the right audience, and, as is customary for him, he utters lies and falsehoods without the slightest qualms. Of course, he did not reveal that they have occupied most of the houses abandoned by the 300,000 Armenian refugees or that thousands of houses have been specially built for them in Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh]. He had to cry so that his wealthy brother would not hesitate to dig into his pocket.

At the same time, he expressed resolve and optimism and declared that they aspire to create an independent Azerbaijan, develop closer ties with southern Azerbaijan, and eventually unite with it, creating a country with a population of 40 million.

Apparently, the appetite of the leaders of the Azerbaijan Popular Front is insatiable. It seems they are not afraid to covet Iranian territory and dream of uniting with Iranian Azerbaijan to create a greater Azerbaijan, a component part of the Great Turan.

Azerbaijan Signs Cultural Agreement With Georgian SSR

NC0403095291 *Baku Domestic Service in Azeri* 0440 GMT 2 Mar 91

[From the republican press review]

[Text] Cultural relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic have a long history. Azerbaijan signed a cultural agreement with the Georgian SSR today. The agreement was signed by Polat Bulbuloglu, minister of culture of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Georgiy [name indistinct], Georgian SSR deputy minister of culture. According to the agreement, the two sides will create conditions needed for cultural cooperation between the nationalities living in the two republics. [passage indistinct]

Considering that 208,000 Azerbaijanis live in the Georgian SSR and 11,000 Georgians live in Azerbaijan, the two sides agreed that significant attention should be focused on the establishment of national and cultural associations in the two republics and an effort should be made to facilitate the multisided work to be carried out by these associations.

The KOMMUNIST, KHAYAT, and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY today published reports on the signing of the cultural agreement.

Armenians in Tbilisi Support Georgian Referendum

*NC2803012991 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
0700 GMT 27 Mar 91*

[Text] The people of Georgia will take part in a referendum on 31 March on the issue of restoration of the republic's independence.

Nearly half a million of Georgia's population is Armenian. Whose side will they take? Are they ready to say yes to Georgia's independence?

The rally, which drew a few thousand people, took place on 24 March in the park near the theater. Placards

decorated the theater house and nearby streets and buildings. The slogans on placards called on the Armenians to vote with the Georgians on 31 March in favor of a united, independent and democratic Georgia.

The representatives of the Armenian intellectuals and [word indistinct] in Tbilisi spoke in turn. A guest from Armenia, the director of Kirovakan's drama theater and a renown cultural figure in Armenia, Shahe Vaheshahr- atyan, also spoke at the rally and supported a vote in favor of Georgia's independence and freedom.

[Name indistinct] people's deputy at the Georgian Republic's Supreme Soviet and construction engineer [name indistinct] and many others also spoke.

A resolution was adopted at the rally addressed to all the Armenians residing in Georgia. It called on them to vigorously participate in the 31 March referendum.

Greater Legal Protection in Courts Sought

91UN1194A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Mar 91
Second Edition p 4

[Article by V. Savitskiy, doctor of juridical sciences, Moscow: "Which Way Are Members of the Bar Being Pushed?"]

[Text] Several years ago I had occasion to start a discussion in PRAVDA about the prestige of the legal profession and the reputation of defense counsels [1987, 22 March and 15 November]. The discussion at that time was about the deplorable position of our legal profession, its legal and actual lack of rights, and its exposure to illegal interference on the part of organs of state administration.

Since that time, of course, some things have changed. A USSR Lawyers Union has been established, and there are similar unions in some of the republics. They are called on to coordinate the work of separate local boards and be concerned about the observance of the professional interests of lawyers. The boards themselves have expanded considerably, owing to experienced lawyers. Local organs of authority are applying less pressure on them. And what is especially gratifying is that the USSR Ministry of Justice has officially renounced interference in affairs of the legal profession. All of this seems to have given the legal profession a second breath and energized its role in the conduct of justice.

And, nevertheless, investigative and judicial mistakes, unfortunately, are still being encountered, and there are quite a few of them. Almost in every issue of the newspaper, we run into the usual court drama: An innocent person was convicted, an adolescent was punished here too severely... But there is the question: Where were the defense counsel-lawyers, and why did they not prevent illegality?

It is not easy to answer this. First of all, it is necessary to realize that a defense counsel does not decide things by himself—he is only one of the parties in a trial. A lawyer analyzes the proof, seeking in it that which can ease the lot of a defendant, and he expresses his opinions to the court. And here frequently positions do not jibe.

Most often the court fully or partially rejects the arguments of the lawyer and pronounces a sentence that basically corresponds to the opinion of the public prosecutor. Here, perhaps, it may be appropriate to mention that in 1989-1990, not-guilty verdicts were a tiny part of the total number of all of the sentences—0.3 percent. If all of those convicted actually committed that of which they were accused—then honor and praise to the court for just and soundly based decisions. But, alas, guilty verdicts appear frequently not because the public prosecutor [prokuror] presented the court convincing proof of guilt, but because he is the public prosecutor. We will be frank: The judge does not like to argue with the public prosecutor—he has quite a bit of authority.

We will be frank to the end: The judge remained actually just as dependent as he was, despite a number of recent laws that would seem to reinforce his status. There was no real reinforcement, and now sensible voices, including the authors of the official draft of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Ye. Smolentsev, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, believe that it is necessary to return to the idea—which was rejected several years ago as "bourgeois"—to appoint judges to the bench for life by a decision of higher state authority, more precisely, when a certain age is reached, and that they be guaranteed irremovability. In the authoritative opinion of Senator E. Kennedy, with whom I had occasion to speak in Washington recently, it is life appointment and irremovability that are the main guarantees of the independence of judges. But as long as we do not have such guarantees, the judge will go along with the public prosecutor and with local authority, no matter with what indignation some would refute this.

Something must be said here about one more important circumstance. The point of view has prevailed for many years in theory and in practice that the public prosecutor, while supporting an accusation in court simultaneously exercises oversight over the very same court. This erroneous position, unfortunately, finds support in the Law on the USSR Procuracy that is in force. It states there that public prosecutors "exercise oversight over the fulfillment of laws in examining cases in court" (Article 31). But this is sheer nonsense: To build a law-governed state, to establish an independent judicial authority in it, and to place this authority under the oversight of the procuracy. A court that is under the oversight of the prosecutor is that paradoxical situation which inevitably prompts the pronouncement of illegal verdicts.

To the credit of N. Trubin, the new USSR Procurator General, it must be said: He is the first of the leaders of the Soviet procuracy who in its entire long history understood the absurdity of such interrelated relations of the public prosecutor and the court, and he declared firmly that the concept where the prosecutor exercises oversight over the examination of criminal cases in courts is outdated (PRAVDA, 21 February 1991). We will hope that the consequence of this new approach will be changes that are just as necessary both in legislation and in practice.

Incidentally, about legislation. One of the commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet is now developing a draft of the fundamentals of criminal trial legislation, which should formulate the most important principles of justice on criminal matters. This draft also has a special section "Trial Participants." It would seem that if we want to put the democratic principle of contention and equal rights of the litigants into practice, then it is precisely this section that must define the legal status of all trial participants.

But look at the draft. Named among the trial participants are the suspect, the defendant, and the counsel for the

defense, but you will not find there the prosecutor-accuser; he is placed outside the scope of this section. Why, and on what grounds? Well, my colleagues on the commission answer me, the public prosecutor, of course, participates in the trial, but he is a special participant, he has special powers, he guards the law, he acts on behalf of the state, and, therefore, he cannot be put in the same class with lawyers. Clear? As we see, the syndrome of respect for rank, which has been cultivated over the decades, continues to work.

In my opinion, there can be no alternative here. If in the law being prepared, the prosecutor and the defense counsel are not placed in an equal position as participants (I emphasize: participants!) in a criminal trial, if the public prosecutor is again actually outside the normal trial rules and his privileges are retained, which only at first glance appear to be purely terminological (now the prosecutor states his "finding" in court, and the defense counsel only an "opinion"; the public prosecutor registers a "protest" to a sentence, but the defense counsel—a submissive "complaint," etc.), then I am firmly convinced that we will never arrive at an adversary character of the judicial process, and we will not get rid of the guilty verdict bias.

It may seem to the reader that the discussion of the role of the prosecutor-accuser has distracted us from the problems of the legal profession. By no means. The defense counsel always has only one trial opponent—the accuser. Therefore, it does not make sense to try to raise the prestige of the legal profession without simultaneously reforming the present position of the public prosecutor in a trial. He should occupy the place of an ordinary litigant in the judicial dispute, and not oversee the behavior of the defense counsel or the court.

Another reason for the weak activeness of lawyers in the prevention and correction of judicial errors is the lack of adequate legal possibilities for this. In general, as all of us have long since become convinced, our citizens have had the devil of a time when it came to personal rights and freedoms. On paper, they are very democratic, but in life—they are the most hypocritical. This also relates to the rights of the accused, proclaimed as far back as the constitution of 1936, and repeated in the current Constitution, but which still remain scanty and curtailed.

But, as is known, times change. International treaties and agreements signed by the USSR, especially the summary document of the Vienna meeting (January 1989) forced us to study carefully the conventional standards for protecting the accused and the treatment of persons who are imprisoned. As a result, a law appeared on 10 April 1990 that permits a defense counsel to participate in any case from the moment a suspect is charged, detained, or arrested. This unquestionably was a step forward, bringing us closer to civilized forms of human rights protection. But here is the tough luck: The new law had not yet begun to function when the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee received a petition

of the All-Union Conference of Lawyers to declare this law in conflict with the Constitution.

But where is the problem? It is in the fact that the 10 April law deprived defense counsels of a number of trial rights that they previously had. Previously, in cases with adolescents, blind persons, mutes, etc., a defense counsel was allowed in a case from the moment a charge was filed. From that moment, he had a right to familiarize himself with material in the case. But now in this category of cases, he can read accumulated material only after the investigation is already completed. There is a clear contraction of opportunities for defense counsel (but they were used, and no one challenged them for 30 years), and, consequently, a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to defense. True, the Constitutional Oversight Committee has still not formulated its finding, but I hope it will indicate the need to restore all of those rights that a defense counsel had previously.

The 10 April 1990 law also limited the right of defense counsel to a meeting with a suspect or the accused who is under arrest. Such a meeting is permitted only after the first interrogation of a prisoner. But then if defense counsel did not have the opportunity before the interrogation to talk with his client and does not know his arguments and his relationship in the case, he will end up in the role of a simple extra during the interrogation, and through his presence will only create a favorable situation for the investigator. The right of the prisoner to an immediate meeting with defense counsel is an elementary precept of justice in civilized countries. No one has a right to demand that a prisoner give testimony before he talks to defense counsel. In our country, the tacit assumption is made: If a prisoner is interrogated before meeting with defense counsel, then the chances of getting an admission of his guilt will be greater. There it is, the real reason for prohibiting defense counsel from meeting with a client before the first interrogation. The infamous admission—"the queen of evidence"—continues to hover invisibly over the allegedly renovated building of our justice.

Not long ago, one of the juridical journals published a draft of a republic law on the legal profession that was developed by the RSFSR Ministry of Justice. This draft leaves a strange impression. On the one hand, it proclaims the legal profession to be an independent legal institution, but, on the other hand, it practically makes it fully dependent on the organs of state administration. The draft stipulates that a person can engage in legal activity who received a license that is issued by the Council of Ministers of autonomous republics and the ispolkoms [executive committee] of local soviets of peoples deputies. The license is issued on the basis of a decision of appropriately qualified commissions. And they examine materials on the misdemeanors of lawyers for which licenses can be removed.

If such commissions functioned under the selection organs of the legal profession, then this would be proper (qualified boards of judges exist under the court system).

But according to the draft, the commissions must function under local organs of justice, but above them is the Higher Qualification Commission of the RSFSR Ministry of Justice, whose decisions are final and cannot be subject to appeal. And although the staffs of local commissions, confirmed by the orders of the leadership of departments of justice, include lawyers, in addition to workers of these departments, it is apparent that the influence of these officials will dominate in them. So there is your independent legal profession. If you add to this that the draft eliminates regional boards of lawyers, then there is every reason to assert that the planned reform of the legal profession in the RSFSR can lead only to the nationalization of this still self-administered organization and never to creative freedom and effective service to the law.

And the last consideration is elicited not by the law but, alas, by the market. The activity of a lawyer is free from commercial principles: He receives payment only for his labor (an honorarium)—for the provision of legal assistance. According to the old Russian tradition, sacredly respected by the legal profession, the profession of a lawyer is not only not compatible with entrepreneurial activity, but with all kinds of other activity, except for scientific and pedagogical activity. This is in the interests of the "purity of the profession." The legal profession does not extract profits. Therefore, it does not have any other kind of resources, other than those that are deducted by lawyers from their earnings on a board and legal consultation. These deductions (for the payment for premises and the salaries of technical workers, etc.) comprise approximately one-third of all of the consulting sums stipulated by law that come into the cash fund. The work of lawyers, who perform on assignment by an investigator or the court, is paid for from these receipts when a defendant does not have the means to hire a defense counsel, although according to the law the state is supposed to carry these expenditures. And the dues for social security (and this year they grew from 7 to 28 percent), contrary to established labor legislation, are produced from these same lawyers' honorariums. And here is some more news: For the first time in their history, attempts are being made to tax lawyers' boards for services—and this is in the absence of profits! It is not surprising, therefore, that of every 100 rubles [R] brought into the consultation fund, a lawyer will now receive less than R40. But this, naturally, will hit mostly citizens who need legal assistance, inasmuch as this inevitably will lead to a rate increase. This is what the legal profession is being pushed into.

As we see, our justice and legal profession have more than enough problems. And they have to be resolved immediately in order to guarantee citizens, enterprises, and institutions qualified legal assistance and lawyers at a time that is difficult for our society.

Political Motives in KGB 'Sabotage' Cases

91UF0585A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent S. Blagodarov: "Political Economics: Who Fabricates Economic Sabotage Cases and Why"]

[Text] KGB organs have uncovered the largest case of "economic sabotage" in the Ukraine in the city of Kirovograd. Criminal proceedings against those guilty have been instituted, and they will now be impressed with the strength of geographical arguments in a purely economic debate somewhere at the Kolyma.

This is how it happened: In the fall of last year, before snow fell, the youth commercial association Harmony, registered as affiliated with the Kirovograd Pishmash Association, purchased 20 tons of above-the-plan hogs at commercial prices from the Dawn Sovkhoz and shipped the first batch to Moscow. This is when a triple covering detachment of the KGB, the BKhSS [Department for Combating the Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation], and the GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] pounced on these characters, as if from a tree branch. They were waiting for the villains at the oblast border. The meat was confiscated and kept for several days. The pork turned slimy, and it was shipped away "for processing."

Yet another piece of small-town nonsense was inflated into a major case of "economic sabotage." E. Levitskiy, deputy chairman of the oblast KGB, wrote the following in KIROVOGRADSKAYA PRAVDA: "Shadow economy operators and members of organized criminal gangs have clearly perceived the participation of KGB functionaries in combating economic sabotage as a threat to their interests (for example, meat of the Harmony association). Unfortunately, modern writers are rather involved in politics; they break up old parties and attempt to create new parties and fronts which would finally do in the hated Soviet Union."

Unfortunately, the department for combating ideological opponents and dissidents, which E. Levitskiy headed for many years, was eliminated at the Kirovograd KGB. Eduard Petrovich is coming up with new "witches" now, having set himself up as a major specialist on economics.

In the process of blowing an ideological bubble out of a regular commercial transaction, the organs resorted to customary social demagoguery and the class flair of the proletariat. They impressed on the workers of Pishmash that "merchant-swindlers" and "the nascent bourgeoisie" had tried to skim the workers' funds. However, in this matter the detectives were doomed to nothing but guessing.

Director of the Dawn Sovkhoz Ye. Talpa stared at the correspondent with utter amazement: "We sold above-the-plan meat to Harmony, not to the detriment of the Pishmash. I cannot understand why the KGB is stirring up the people?"

It is possible that the director could not surmise "why the KGB is stirring up the people." Perhaps, analogies with the 1930's did not occur to him; at the time, cases of "economic subversives" and "saboteurs" were likewise trumped up, and "industrial proceedings" in the courts were fabricated. At present, it is once again necessary to defend the purity of "socialist principles" in the economy as well. This is how the new cases of ANT and Artem Tarasov develop... "The Ukrainian case" is smaller in scope but ideal from the point of view of the transparency of the ideological motives of the attacking side. We may say that this is a classical and pure model of how the "competent" organs fabricate "economic sabotage" cases, sowing mistrust of a new economic policy and compromising business people.

Deputy Chairman of the Kirovograd KGB E. Levitskiy exclaimed: "You know, the general director of the Pishmash Production Association travels abroad all the time. He has harbored Harmony at his enterprise, and the former has tried to exchange three million rubles [R] into hard currency in order to buy video cassettes in America. This is the same as 'the R140 billion case,' but smaller. We put an end to it. In general, the director has established no end of some kind of production cooperatives at the Pishmash and stratified the workers..."

Listening to these reflections bores you to death. A person with this wretched standard of "economic" thinking believes that he has the right to make a judgment on complex economic problems and to break up operating concerns. Customary ideological demagoguery is the only forte of these people because they are unable to raise an objection on the essence of the matter. I am certain that they are the men of the hour. However, the problem is that they manage to mess things up even in an hour.

Sergey Sugak, chairman of the Instrument Builder Cooperative affiliated with the Pishmash, who previously worked as chief of the assembly unit, told our correspondent: "We bring our Yatran typewriters to proper standards. The KGB says that we make a lot. However, 500 people previously worked in this facility, and at present 206 members of the cooperative do the same work. Productivity has increased by a factor of 1.8, whereas salaries have grown by a factor of just 1.3. Any financier will be able to appreciate this. We make R452 on the average."

A. Rybalko, chairman of Wave Cooperative, said: "We manufacture spare parts for passenger cars. You would know how hard it is to get them, and what the prices for them are in the black market. Our per capita output has increased by 200 percent..."

Apparently the organs fail to understand that the future of our industry belongs specifically to the associations of independent collectives united on a cooperative basis. To be sure, the "organs" are neither the only nor the major player. V. Filonenko, deputy chairman of the Kirovograd Oblast Ispolkom [Executive Committee],

who is in charge of trade in the oblast and a number of other people are behind the campaign which has been mounted. The articles needed have been arranged in the oblast party press.

With the appearance of cooperatives, small enterprises, and new commercial and economic structures, members of the nomenklatura have lost a monopoly on distribution and the goods in short supply.

Let us look at the "affair with R3.5 million," which the KGB brought to a halt. Based on letters of guarantee signed by Pishmash and the Svetlovodsk Construction Materials Plant, Harmony received R3.5 million from the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development. By agreement with the people's concern BUTEK [expansion not identified], these R3.5 million were to be exchanged into dollars in order to purchase 100,000 videocassettes in the United States for Kirovograd. This transaction would have been extremely advantageous for the consumers of the city. One cassette would have cost only R35 to R40 (at present, a cassette costs between 70 and 90 "wooden" rubles). However, the valiant chekists smashed all of this. Apparently, the words "foreigner" and "million" still make a striking impression on them.

Meanwhile, it is being impressed on the workers of the Pishmash that, supposedly, Soviet millionaires tried to do business with the Americans using the workers' money. The illiterate and aggressive ignoramus carrying out yet another political assignment cannot understand that prices for all videocassettes would have unavoidably fallen had 100,000 video cassettes at R40 each arrived in small Kirovograd.

Another case: Harmony purchased large amounts of champagne and cognac for New Year's day from the Tolyatti Champagne and Cognac Combine. This was like a godsend for the city in which neither had been for sale for a long time (no wonder—speculators charge up to R50 for a bottle of cognac or champagne). Taking the overhead into account, Harmony sold an R15.80 bottle of cognac for R17, and champagne at R6 instead of R5.50. At the height of handing out New Year packages, young guys from the BKhSS drove up to the office of Harmony, impounded the warehouse, and drove away... for almost a month.

Having failed to come up with anything regarding the cognac and champagne, they nonetheless wrote in a protocol which they slapped together: "...products received from the Tolyatti Champagne and Cognac Combine were sold by Harmony at prices higher than state retail in violation of the instructions of the USSR State Committee for Prices dated 8 August 1978. The surplus amounting to R55,462 and a fine amounting to R64,887, a total of R120,349, will be collected as state revenues."

Tell me, who is going to engage in commerce after this? However, why would the aforementioned deputy chairman of the Kirovograd KGB, E. Levitskiy, not go to

the deputy chairman of the Kirovograd Oblast Ispolkom, V. Filonenko, and ask him why state trade establishments in the city of Kirovograd sold champagne at the same time for... R28 and nothing happened—no instructions dating back 14 years cropped up?

It would also be stupid to ask why an R1 can of salmon is sold for R8.48 in the shops of Kirovograd at present (as it is, it is better to have salmon at this contract price than not at all). However, why do they not allow Harmony to do this? A transaction of the commercial association calling for the delivery of several tons of salmon caviar in barrels and salmon-family fish —at state prices!— to Kirovograd failed because of the open season on the association and the freezing of its bank accounts on V. Filonenko's oral instructions (the tradition of a bureaucrat is to leave no written traces). This is a far cry from the eightfold surcharge on canned salmon which the state trade establishments managed to secure.

I believe that the above examples suffice to understand the motives for the persecution of Harmony and non-state, commercial structures similar to it.

This is why "a panel of three," a commission consisting of KGB, KRU [Control and Auditing Administration], and BKhSS employees, charged with strangling Harmony, was set up. After two months of investigations, this puppet commission compiled a protocol full of exaggerations and distortions. It said: "The Youth Association of Variety Music Harmony was set up to conduct educational work among young people aimed at developing a communist view of the world. However, the association became involved in commercial activities, despite the fact that, given its line of business, both Harmony and the order department Mriya, set up by it, have no right to engage in commercial and purchasing operations."

Once again, this is a cocktail made of truths and lies. Protocol No. 8 of the general meeting of Harmony dated 29 May 1990, as well as Protocol No. 1 dated 11 January 1990, directly provide for commercial operations.

All of this is known to the commission which literally studied for two months every letter in the documents confiscated from Harmony. However, "the panel of three" had other political orders.

P. Rabochiy, KRU senior inspector-auditor, told our correspondent: "Filonenko called in my chief and me and ordered us to sort things out with Harmony. To be sure, we do not see [published in Ukrainian] crimes for gain in their case."

Despite the fact that they "do not see," and that it is clear from the documents that Harmony and its order department may engage in commercial activities, the protocol was deliberately compiled so as to put a financial stranglehold on the youth commercial association. Criminal proceedings against the head of the association, A. Agura, were instituted on orders from above. Go and

try transcending the framework of "communist education" after that! It happened like in the scriptures: "By the sweat of your brow and blood will you earn your bread, and you will eat it in sorrow."

The "fur-coat case" also caught the roving eye of the commission. Harmony made a wholesale purchase of an exposition of Greek fur coats for R1 million from the Kiev production and commercial company Ledan, organized advertisement, had experts assess the fur coats, and sold them at a profit.

However, proceeding from the original falsehood that Harmony cannot engage in commercial and procurement operations, the protocol said: "...excessively generated profits amounting to **R455,933** are to be contributed to state revenues." I repeat: Who is going to engage in commerce given all of this?

Fur evaluator Ye. Vinnichuk told our correspondent: "KGB functionaries came to my house. They told me to get going. I said I could not, my child was sick. They promised me that this would take 20 minutes, and they took me to their administration. They kept me for more than two hours, intimidating me with not letting me return to my child until I told them who I had bribed in order to be paid so much for assessing furs. Later, they made me sign a pledge to return the money received from Harmony..."

A criminal aura was artificially created around the commercial association, and unfavorable public opinion was shaped by squeezing out the needed testimony and making people pay back the money received. The people who have used modest but guaranteed state board and lodging for their entire lives took their social revenge this time by indicating who should make how much. However, is it up to the KGB to judge whether Harmony, an independent corporate person with its own current account, paid a little or a lot to a particular employee?

Two people in plainclothes also forced their way into my hotel room at 2400 hours—midnight—yelling through the door that they had a right to enter under a presidential ukase. I opened the door. They rushed in to poke around in my room. They did not find anybody but me. A. Reznik, a criminal investigations inspector of the Leninskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs, was clearly disappointed.

He said impudently: "Girls who have venereal diseases make their rounds here. It is your health that we are concerned about."

...However, teaching the commercial structures themselves a lesson is not enough for the hunter-eliminators of new economic relations. Through Harmony they are trying to get to the heads of state enterprises and banks who did business with Harmony and its ilk. They are trying to slap the state managers hard in full view of the entire city, once again proceeding from social demagoguery and flirting with the working class.

Chief of the BKhSS Kirovskiy Department V. Pavlii orated before the workers of Pishmash: "Why do you allow Harmony to make this mess at your plant? Why don't you hold your director and the management who have harbored the crooks strictly accountable, in working class-style?"

Indeed, what "mess" has Harmony made at the Pishmash? It organized a credit association with more than 2,000 members. Every member contributes R20 or more, and this is how statutory capital is accumulated which at present amounts to R800,000. This money is used to purchase consumer goods throughout the country which are sold to the members with an 8 percent surcharge (seven percent is refunded when a member decides to withdraw his contribution). During my visit, I saw terry sheets, towels, fashionable men's shirts, ladies' down coats, and cutlery sets being sold to the members. Incidentally, the same down coats which were being purchased at the Pishmash for R237 cost R1,500 at a flea market in Kirovograd.

In addition to Pishmash, Harmony has the Svetlovodsk Construction Materials Plant among its contributors (due to this, Pishmash workers will receive 1 million bricks as early as this year), the collectives of the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development and the tourist hotel—understandably, based on mutual interest.

...I believe that all of these facts taken together have said everything I have asked them to say. Indeed, the extent of our consent to slavery or freedom is a part of the inner self of all of us. All of us opt for our own way. In essence, this is a conflict between two generations, two views of the world. Age is not the only issue, but it does matter. The head of Harmony, A. Agura, is about 40. His deputy, A. Tokalenko, is 24, and another deputy, Ye. Poltanov, is 32. Both have college degrees. Poltanov worked at Pishmash as ASU [Automated Control System] chief. Having understood that one can work freely indeed for Agura, he transferred to Harmony. The young people assure me that they could create an abundance of goods in the city, driving prices sharply down in the only wretched commercial shop in Kirovograd. If only they were given a free rein!

However... they suspended operation of Harmony and refused to register two small enterprises—Kompakt and Komtek—and the Elema Studio. Kompakt would have handled the entire sphere of services for the Pishmash—tailor and shoemaker shops, a barber shop, an order department, and a store. Komtek was shot down in mid-flight: It was supposed to produce irons, mixers, and satellite antennas. Equipment has been purchased to this end, and subcontracted parts were in storage.

...My last meeting, with G.S. Zakrzhevskaya, manager of the Oblast Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development, took place in the cardiology ward of a hospital. Unlike the men, General Director of Pishmash Production Association N. Maleta, Director of

Dawn Sovkhoz Ye. Talpa, and the head of the Youth Commercial Association, A. Agura, Galina Semenovna could not stand this shameful persecution and was laid up with heart trouble.

G. Zakrzhevskaya said: "I do not understand the position of the KGB in this episode. Enterprising people should be supported rather than done in. I proposed to the chief of Universal Trade Complex of the city of Kirovograd, I. Gubarev, to sell the fur coats of Harmony at a city auction: This would have generated both merchandise sales and contributions to the city budget. Other goods could have been sold in this manner. However, it appears that trade officials have no use for extra efforts... In the organs, they hint that I gave loans to Harmony for bribes rather than just like that. It is truly advantageous for us to extend credit, such as Harmony—funds are turned around quickly and returned to the bank at a decent rate of interest. This is an incentive for the development of any normal economy."

...All of this is sad, and it is also strange. If it is truly necessary to tackle "economic sabotage," why should the competent organs not take an interest in new factory buildings in Kirovograd which have been vacant for years now, and the area of which is one or two percent utilized? After all, this means losses going into billions. For some reason, they scared away Americans who were ready to produce, say, soybean and vegetable oil on the vacant premises... Is the KGB aware of the fact that many warehouses are overflowing with goods, that the Kirovograd furniture company is refusing to accept products from furniture factories because there is nowhere to put them—the warehouses are packed with merchandise? Yet, where can one find all of this in the stores? Are they waiting for a price increase or for people to explode? There truly are things which the "competent" organs could work on, but it is different orders, political ones, that are currently a priority for them in the oblast.

Origins of Crime During Mass Demonstrations Investigated

91UN1195A Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Deputy USSR Procurator General A.V. Frolov by TASS correspondent V. Zenkovich, special for TRUD: "Blood Is Thicker Than Water"; date not given]

[Text] Moscow—Like oozing wounds, "hot spots" are covering our country. Alma-Ata and Fergana, Osh and Dushanbe, Novyy Uzen and Tskhinvali...

At first our law enforcement organs found themselves helpless in fighting a phenomenon long forgotten in our country—mass unrest. Legislation based on ideological dogmas did not even consider the possibility that such things could emerge.

Deputy USSR Procurator General A.V. Frolov heads a recently created investigative group in the all-Union procurator's office that specializes in uncovering crimes committed during the period of mass unrest. A TASS correspondent met with him and asked him to tell about his work.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, in your opinion, what makes the work of a procuracy investigator in the "hot spots" so difficult?

[Frolov] The conditions under which they have to operate. For instance, the Tashlak and Kokand City Militia Departments in Fergana Oblast has been attacked by crowds 7,000 to 8,000 people strong. Almost 20,000 people participated in the "march" on Uzgen. It is very difficult to isolate one person who commits a crime in a crowd of thousands, and to prove his guilt.

It was especially difficult in the beginning. We did not have any experience, and were catastrophically short of investigators. During the events in Osh Oblast alone, 4,000 crimes were registered, over 800 homes burned, and 302 people killed. Can you imagine how many people are needed to investigate this?

We were hoping to get help with this from the Union republics. We thought that highly skilled investigators would arrive and help us sort it all out. They never came. Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia even adopted resolutions on a government level that forbid the involvement of their law enforcement personnel in the investigation of inter-ethnic conflicts outside the republics' territories. I think such policy is nearsighted: There is not a single republic in our country that is insured against potential mass unrest. I hope I am wrong, but it may happen that some day these republics will need help, too.

After the Osh events the USSR Council of Ministers permitted the USSR Procurator's Office to increase our group's staff by 140 investigators. In addition, we have about 400 MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] operatives and almost 100 KGB officers were assigned to help our office. When we have to work in "hot spots," the MVD changes their people in our investigative group every two to three months, and the KGB rotates personnel monthly. Only the procuracy investigators work there permanently. Therefore it often happens that an investigation gets handled by five or six people. Who can we hold responsible for the results?

The number of "hot spots" in the country, unfortunately, keeps growing, and now we are again short on personnel. We have to search for enthusiasts who are willing to work for months away from their families and under extremely hard conditions. I myself, for instance, spent practically no time at home during the last two years....

The decision of the Union parliament permitting people to have a lawyer from the moment they are apprehended was a good and democratic one. But where can I get a

lawyer for an apprehended pogrom participant in a situation where the whole city is engulfed in unrest, where houses are burning and bullets whistle by? But if I do not get one I violate the Soviet citizen's guaranteed legal protection.

As is known, in Osh Oblast the clashes were between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations. Eighty percent of the law enforcement officers in the area are Kyrgyz. Under such circumstances not a single Uzbek will go for help either to the Militia, or the procuracy. But the majority of the victims are Uzbeks!

Many problems are the result of oversights and omissions in our legislation. For instance, the investigation into the killings of Azeris in Armenia is complete. But which court will deliberate these issues?

[Correspondent] I think that by law it is the Supreme Court of the Republic of Armenia...

[Frolov] You are correct. But because of the unending inter-ethnic confrontation not a single Azeri will dare come to Armenia or, what is more, show up in court there. It is impossible to proceed with the trial; thus, the murderers are not charged. The same is happening in Fergana, Osh, and many other "hot spots."

[Correspondent] So what are we to do?

[Frolov] We could send temporary courts formed by the Ministry of Justice to the "hot spots." They could include representatives of the Union republics. I believe that there should be an agreement on this between the subjects of our federation.

But no matter how hard it is, on the whole our group has been successful in its work. We have referred over 500 criminal cases to the people's courts. Almost 800 people have been charged with committing grave crimes. We also indicted tens of those who, in the middle of large gatherings of people in nationalistic moods, incited violence and provoked mass unrest.

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, is the motive that drives people to a pogrom? It is really political?

[Frolov] Of course not! Brutal rogues in Osh Oblast were even killing children. What kind of ideas would one kill a child for?

Quite often ordinary criminals hide in the clothes of the "fighters for national rebirth." In words they fight "for the idea," but in deed they greedily tear gold rings off dead bodies.

[Correspondent] Perhaps all these conflicts are instigated by the mafia?

[Frolov] That is unlikely. First, the shadow economy dealers reap their greatest profits in a conflict-free situation. Besides, the areas where mass unrests are taking place are usually crowded with law enforcement officers, and the possibility of the criminal being "exposed" is

several times greater. I do not think they are interested in doing this. They do not create the pre-conditions for conflicts.

[Correspondent] Then who?

[Frolov] As a rule, local powers and irresponsible politicians. For instance, there have always been certain tensions between the Meskhetian Turks, who were forcibly evicted from Georgia, and the native Uzbek population in the Fergana Valley. In the past, the "lid" was kept on by the rigid administrative command system. Once democratization started, nothing could hold the intolerance towards "outsiders" in check. First there was a fight on commonplace matters between Meskhetian Turks and Uzbeks. Local informals blew this event up to the scale of inter-ethnic conflict. We have established that they participated in spreading incendiary rumors in the oblast: "A band of Meskhetian Turks has cut up all the Uzbek children in a day care center," "another band" broke into public baths and committed an outrage on Uzbek women." Then Uzbeks who believed this garbage rose in a "holy war."

The position of the local government in this respect was most strange. Five days before the conflict in Osh Oblast the republic Committee for State Security and MVD warned local authorities and the leadership of Kyrgyzstan that unrest was possible, and recommended the introduction of preventive martial law. More than 10 memos were sent on this to party and soviet organs. But the necessary measures were not taken.

What actually started the tragic events in Osh Oblast were unwise actions by local authorities in allocating plots of land. The personnel of local law enforcement organs—which, as I have already mentioned, are 80 percent Kyrgyz—only aggravated the situation. During the mass unrest actions they used their truncheons mainly on Uzbeks.

I have been present many times at various extraordinary plenums of CPSU committees, all kinds of aktivs, sessions of local soviets, where they have created special fact-finding commissions on the origin of mass unrest. Without waiting for our investigation to be complete, these commissions some time later came up with their own version of events. All these reports resemble each other to an amazing degree. No matter what happens, it is the "destructive forces," "mafia clans," and "those who do not want perestroika" who are pronounced to be at fault—in short, everybody except themselves. And I do not have the power to charge members of the leadership whose actions, perhaps inadvertently, have led to tragic events.

[Correspondent] Why?

[Frolov] I have the power to start criminal proceedings only against the immediate participants of mass unrest, those who personally committed arson or a murder. Besides, many unwise decisions are made by the law-makers themselves, by the sessions of soviets of various

levels. The power cannot judge itself. So far, the politicians answer only to history...

MVD Investigates Weapons Leaks

OW0503043891 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Feb 91

[F. Simakov video report on Izhevsk Weapons Plant; from the "Utro 120 + 30" program]

[Text] Izhevsk has long been considered a city of weapons makers. Indeed, weapons plants have been built here since ancient times. There are many defense enterprises in the city, and this has caused quite a few problems recently. The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] had to take special measures to safeguard the weapons. Our correspondent explains to what extent this decision was justified.

[Begin recording] [Simakov] Izhevsk weapons have a good reputation. During the war, in one day, Izhevsk produced enough small arms to equip a division. We are not talking about the good reputation of museum pieces that, for peace of mind, ought to rest as such.

[Video shows museum pieces, then cuts to show a rifle with what appears to be a crude silencer attached, and a collection of portable two-way radios, ammunition, explosives, and a woollen mask] This rifle still can be fired even if it is a museum piece. The weapons, as you can see, are most varied. However, what is most disappointing is that some bear the Izhevsk brand. All of this—not the least the weapons—has been confiscated by an operational investigation group of the Udmurt ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] procuracy, the MVD, and the KGB. It was confiscated after a recent major series of searches and detentions of suspects.

[Video moves to Simakov interviewing an unidentified security agent sitting with back to camera] [Simakov] The case of misappropriation of hunting rifles has not had time to cool, and now once again you are in a fever. Where are the weapons from this time, who's are they?

[Agent] On 15 January, the Udmurt ASSR procuracy instigated criminal proceedings against a bandit group. It operated in Izhevsk for a considerable period of time. During the investigations by the investigative team, firearms were confiscated. In the words of the accused, the weapons were obtained from private citizens. I consider this to be one of the methods of protecting the source of these weapons—that is, by saying it was obtained from private citizens. The real source of these weapons is not given specifically. Among the confiscated weapons, there are sawed-off guns, homemade small caliber pistols, ammunition, special chemicals, canisters of nerve paralyzing tear gas, and explosive packets. [Video shows ammunition, pistols, television receivers,

stereo equipment, barrels, breech mechanisms, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, canisters marked "cs gas 5000" in English, knives]

[Simakov] As you know, there are pistols with the Izhevsk brand here.

[Agent] Yes, such pistols were confiscated. I think that the investigation will put maximum effort into this matter, to determine how the leakage of these pistols occurred from enterprises and organizations, and to put a stop to it all. [End recording]

Experiment Grants Parole, Other Benefits to Female Inmates

91UN1175A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[Interview with Aleksandr Mikhlin, department chief of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, by V. Reshetnikov; place and date not given: "On Parole From Jail"]

[Text] Over a period of nine months of last year the administration of seven women's colonies granted prisoners parole, and also leave. The purposes and results of this experiment, which is unprecedented for the Soviet corrective labor system, are discussed by the department chief of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Mikhlin.

[Mikhlin] The main purpose of the experiment is to create more favorable conditions for female prisoners to give birth to and rear children and also to make conditions easier for their social adaptation after release.

According to our observations, pregnancy and maternity improve the behavior of the majority of prisoners. Concern for the child usually crowds out the hostility and aggressiveness. The prisoner's nature becomes milder and, as a result, there is less probability that the woman will commit another crime.

During the time of the experiment we detained 203 pregnant women in colonies. There were 355 children in homes attached to the colony. Also, some of the women had children up to three years of age who were living with relatives or in public health institutions.

It was decided to check and see how the babies and the young mothers behaved when released from prison with permission to go home. The women were permitted to give birth in their place of residence and to live with the child until it reached three years of age.

[Reshetnikov] But then—did they go back to jail?

[Mikhlin] The women's behavior during these three years was evaluated by the local court. It paid attention to the woman's attitude toward the child, the nature of her crime, and whether her sentence has been completed or not. There are three possible decisions for the court: granting a pardon, replacing imprisonment with a less

severe punishment, and, if the behavior is negative, sending them back to the colony to finish out their sentence. The court may rescind its parole at any time if it thinks that the mother is not concerned about the child and is leading an antisocial life.

[Reshetnikov] Was the parole granted selectively or to all young mothers with babies in the seven colonies participating in the experiment?

[Mikhlin] Of course, not to all of them. First, we found out if the prisoner had housing, whether she had preserved her family, whether her relatives could take the woman in, and if the necessary conditions existed for the life and education of a child. Attention was also paid to the behavior of the prisoner in the colony. Paroles were not granted to women convicted of premeditated murder, causing serious bodily harm, and committing aggravated robbery, or to recidivists who have been convicted more than twice.

Parole was granted to 85 prisoners. So far only one woman did not justify our hopes and committed another crime.

[Reshetnikov] How humane is it, in your opinion, to keep children in children's homes in the prison colonies?

[Mikhlin] I frequently have to answer that question. People also ask if it is not better to keep the children in public health institutions. But this would mean to take the child away from its mother, deprive it of the possibility of communication, and this has a negative effect on both. Moreover, to keep the child in the colony is the mother's right and not her duty. The mother may send her child to her relatives at any time, which, incidentally, the majority of prisoners do.

I must say that the children's homes in the colonies are fairly well equipped and are outside the residential and production zones. And another small detail: We are speaking about two- and three-year-olds who are not yet aware of where they are.

[Reshetnikov] Which of the prisoners is given the right to a leave?

[Mikhlin] It is granted to those who have behaved themselves well. A 12-day leave was given to 1,170 prisoners. One of them committed another crime, two did not return from leave, and 12 were several days late. So you can see that, on the whole, the results are promising.

[Reshetnikov] Is the experiment limited to this?

[Mikhlin] Absolutely not. Conditions in the colonies were improved for all female prisoners. But especially for those who were pregnant, nursing, or ill. They were permitted to buy up to 50 rubles' worth of food per month in the stores—that is, their norm was doubled. They were also given the right to spend money—not only what they earned in the colony but also money that had been sent to them.

Sociological research has shown that the family of every other prisoner falls apart while she is in prison. This is why it was decided to increase the number of visits—from four to eight per year. Four times a year a separate room is assigned for three days for meetings with close relatives. If minor children come, the periods of the meetings are increased to five days. These can be spent outside the colony—in a hotel or rented apartment.

The prisoners may use the telephone.

Beginning with the second year in the colony, with good behavior, the prisoner may be released from work for 12 days a year. There are already 1,500 women who enjoy this right. The majority of them have also been given the opportunity to go home.

[Reshetnikov] What are the results of the experiment that was conducted?

[Mikhlin] It showed that liberalization of the system for carrying out the punishment in no way worsens discipline within the colony. This is clear from concrete figures. For example, in the Odessa women's colony in 1989, that is, before the beginning of the experiment, 221 prisoners were punished for violation of discipline, and in 1990—176. The result was similar in six other colonies.

One of the main objections of opponents of the experiment was that the leave and frequent visits would lead to a drop in labor productivity. The results dispelled these misgivings. All seven colonies fulfilled their production plans. A strict vacation schedule was drawn up. Some prisoners replaced others who had gone on leave. In that same Odessa colony, for example, the plan for production of commercial products was fulfilled by 112 percent, and for labor productivity—by 102 percent.

[Reshetnikov] The experiment is over. What next?

[Mikhlin] Since it has completely justified itself, the practice will be extended to the rest of the women's colonies.

Estonian Militia Reorganizes Into Police Force

91P50132A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 3 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by E. Uus of the Estonian News Agency: "The Militia Has Been Abolished"]

[Text] The Estonian Supreme Soviet made the decision to abolish the militia as of March 1. The chief director of the police department of the Estonian MVD, Yuri Nurme, announced that right now a complement of police personnel is being created. All of the 19 prefects [chief officers] of police have already been appointed to their posts. "It is difficult, however, to hope for immediate changes. Nothing will change in a single day. Creating a genuine police force takes a lot of time. Yet I hope that all the police employees agree that it is necessary to change their attitude toward their work," said Yu. Nurme. According to Nurme, setting up a police organization became more complicated due to economic problems.

Aarne Mesilane, deputy chief of the personnel department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, described the situation regarding those militia employees who have not yet been transferred over to the police force. Those who, prior to 1 March, have not been assigned as prefects, but who have not been dismissed, are under the jurisdiction of the MVD personnel department. Within a six-month-period, they will either have to find work in another prefecture [office of prefect], or resign. A dismissal for colonels has its hardships. Since this matter is decided in Moscow, they have two months at their disposal.

Drug Traffickers Arrested in Azerbaijan

NC0803162991 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1700 GMT 6 Mar 91

[Text] The Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Azerbaijan Committee for State Security have reported that their special units, in cooperation with units of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, carried out an operation to arrest drug traffickers. The units also seized a large amount of narcotics and raw materials and [word indistinct] used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs.

The quantity of material seized indicates that the drug traffickers' criminal activities in the republic have become more widespread and are of an organized nature.

A criminal investigation has been launched into the matter.

Gorbachev Staff Plans To Publish Newspaper

PM1903154691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 10, 10-17 Mar 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The President's 'Morning'"]

[Text] According to unofficial sources, President Gorbachev's staff is going to publish a newspaper, possibly named "Utro" (Morning).

In all likelihood, it will be printed at Krasnaya Zvezda Publishers. The publishers' chief engineer, Viktor Kukovkin, told MN that, on orders from the top, the publishing house is examining the technical possibility of printing a four-page A-2 size newspaper with a circulation of 100,000-200,000 copies. "Payment will be made at state prices," Kukovkin explained. At the same time, he preferred not to specify who exactly will pay for the printing services.

Popularity of New Independent Publications Surveyed

91UN1111A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian No 5,
28 Jan-4 Feb 91 pp 25-26

[Article by Aleksey Kondratyev and Aleksandr Perov: "The Publishing Business": "The Periodicals Market: We Are Exchanging Business and Politics for Sex and the Old Guard"]

[Text] By the end of last year the publishing business had become one of the areas in which a sharp increase in commercial activity had been noted. Many publications had entered the market simultaneously, established (or at least registered) during the latter half of last year. According to available data, in December 1990 and January 1991 Soyuzpechat delivered approximately 60 new periodicals by subscription and through retail outlets in the USSR.

However, reader demand is beginning to make major changes in that list: only about 45 new publications are in the February plan, according to preliminary figures. As the Central Retail and Subscription Agency (TsRPA) explains, either no orders were received for the remainder, or too few orders came in.

Over the past two weeks there has been a trend toward renewed demand for official newspapers, primarily from Moscow and Leningrad. According to Soyuzpechat experts the main reason for this is their more affordable price in comparison to the independent press.

In the opinion of Soyuzpechat representatives the demand for publications of a political nature has decreased. Best sellers are children's publications and light reading (about everyday life and scandals).

At the same time there is indication of large-scale rejection of the central independent publications in outlying

areas. Observers attribute this to a sharp increase in the assortment of local newspapers, magazines and other printed matter available.

According to what KOMMERSANT correspondents were told by state organizations which distribute periodicals by subscription and through retail outlets, in December 1990 and January 1991 Soyuzpechat delivered and sold within the USSR (not counting Moscow) approximately 60 new publications. Moscow newsstands received 120-130 newspaper and magazines titles (an average of 25-30 per day), with new publications comprising roughly half of them.

However, according to information received from Moscow newsstand operators only a very small portion of the new publications are steadily in demand. Among the clear leaders are MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, KOMMERSANT, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA and ROSSIYA. According to preliminary figures only about 45 new publications will be included in the February plan.

Registration of Publications With the RSFSR Ministry of Press and Mass Information (January 1991)

| | Newspapers | Magazines |
|---|------------|-----------|
| Old | 39 | 62 |
| New | 182 | 210 |
| Total Number of Registered Publications | 221 | 272 |

Registration of Publications With the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Houses and the Book Trade (January 1991)

| | New Publications | Old Publications | Total |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------|
| Total Number of Applications | 872 | 815 | 1,687 |
| Registered | 685 | 780 | 1,465 |
| Registration Certificates Issued | — | — | 1,190 |

In the opinion of KOMMERSANT experts in this case the data provided by official organizations is quite interesting. According to available information the overwhelming majority of those publishing new newspapers are attempting to use the state distribution service, as it is quite expensive and technically difficult to establish one's own circulation structure. However, Soyuzpechat accepts only those publications which have been properly registered and have circulation totals of no fewer than 12,000-15,000 copies.

According to TsRPA figures approximately 30 percent of all newspapers (including older ones) are distributed through

the Soyuzpechat system, and approximately 70 percent independently. The following means of distribution exist:

1. Distribution by Soyuzpechat (on a commission basis) on the basis of a contract with the TsRPA. In this case Soyuzpechat as a rule takes a 25-30 percent commission (based on the publication's cover price), of which one-half is paid out locally (to oblast wholesale distributors). Furthermore, losses due to failure to sell part of a press run are paid for by the newspaper or magazine (either in full or 50 percent).

2. Distribution on the basis of direct contracts with regional entrepreneurs who deal in press circulation. In this case the commission agreed upon is usually no lower than Soyuzpechat's, but the circulation stipulations (compensation for losses, transportation and record keeping) are stricter.

3. Distribution based on contracts with independent distributors, the most economically advantageous method, with a lower commission and guarantee of 100-percent sales.

4. Distribution directly through a network of the publication's own distributors; despite an undoubted economic gain (low commission rates and quick sales) this method sharply curtails circulation area.

5. Combined distribution systems.

As KOMMERSANT correspondents were told by the TsRPA, the demand for a publication is usually determined by sending order forms for new publications included in the Soyuzpechat distribution list to various regions. A large number of newspapers, including APRELSKIY LITERATOR, ARMYANSKIY VESTNIK, VEDOMOSTI GOSSNABA SSSR, DELOVOY EKSPRESS, MENORA, MENSHEVIK, MY, VOYENNYI ZHELEZNODOROZHNIK, NACHALO, TANETS, CHREZVYCHAYNOYE PROISHESTVIYE, LASKOVYI MAY, MALYY BIZNES and a number of others did not "make the grade"—Soyuzpechat regional offices have refused to distribute

them. The average return rate for new publications is not less than 20 percent, with higher figures for some publications.

According to agency personnel one of the reasons that many of the new publications are not purchased is because they are sent to the newsstands all at once in large numbers without a preliminary trial shipment which could be used to gauge the level of potential demand.

Furthermore, among the important reasons for a low rating for new independent publications is the complete absence of advertising for them, as a result of which customers simply get lost in a sea of publications. The experts feel that an important role is also played by the high prices which publishers are forced to put on publications due to sharp increases in the price of paper, printing and shipping.

Rating of New Publications on Pushkin Square

| | Cover Price (in Rubles) | Market Price (in Rubles) |
|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA | .40 | 1.00 |
| INFO-SPID | 1.00 | 2.00 |
| KURANTY | .20 | 1.00 |
| MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS | .50 | 2.00 |
| STOLITSA | 1.00 | 2.00 |

In the future publishers of independent newspapers and magazines will obviously have to face the emergence of press digests on the market; these will offer readers the most interesting articles from current periodicals in a compact form. Thus, quite professionally done periodicals like PYATYY UGOL in Moscow and 24 CHASA in Leningrad appeared on the market in January. Experience around the world indicates that digests traditionally have greater circulation than the publications which they condense or reprint.

Retail Circulation Volume of Publications Distributed by TsRPA Soyuzpechat

| Title | Periodicity | Price | Retail Circulation (in Thousands of Copies) | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|------------|---|--------------|---------------|
| | | | December 1990 | January 1991 | February 1991 |
| APRI (Agro-Industrial Advertising) | Weekly | R1.00 | 30.0 | 15.3 | 12.6 |
| BIZNES I BANKI | Thrice Weekly | 60 kopecks | 27.0 | 27.0 | 23.8 |
| DELOVOY MIR | Daily | 30 kopecks | 60.0 | 60.9 | 52.1 |
| RYNOK (Supplement to DELOVOY MIR) | Weekly | 50 kopecks | 20.0 | 12.6 | 11.5 |
| KOMMERSANT | Weekly | R1.00 | 217.0 | 217.0 | 217.0 |
| MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS | Thrice Weekly | 50 kopecks | 70.0 | 200.0 | N/A |
| MENEDZHER | Biweekly | 60 kopecks | 100.0 | 86.2 | 81.1 |
| EKHO DELOVOY ZHIZNI | Biweekly | 50 kopecks | 15.8 | 39.7 | 35.0 |

As for the drop in regional demand for independent publications published in Moscow and Leningrad, according to KOMMERSANT experts those regions are rejecting them due to the fact that a large number of local independent publications have emerged. These naturally address regional issues more specifically, and the provinces can follow the center's line quite well through official newspapers, which are, incidentally, significantly less expensive.

In January there was some change in the topics covered by the press. According to Soyuzpechat figures there was a drop in demand for purely political publications. Even the "leftist" newspaper vendors on Pushkin Square have noticed that the clear increase in demand for their papers which was evident right up until the start of winter has if not disappeared or diminished at least stabilized—and that despite the fact that Pushkin Square is one of the places where the most politicized segment of society gathers. The vendors there explain the present trend by citing the fact that despite their high prices the newspapers of various political orientations "are not printing anything new."

The highest rating on Pushkin Square was given to new publications of the classical model, i.e. those oriented toward a broad readership with a high professional level. Examples of this are NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, KOMMERSANT, KURANTY, MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS and SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNNO. Generally they are much in demand and are sold at prices two or more times their cover prices.

According to newsstand operators the majority of publications aimed at business circles do not sell well. For instance, DELOVOY MIR sells poorly (now that it has become a daily the return rate on some issues is almost 100 percent); the same is true of BIZNES I BANKI, MENEDZHER, MOSKOVSKIY BIZNES and others. However, KOMMERSANT and EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN are in demand. Incidentally, this fact was also noted by the experts at central Soyuzpechat. In their opinion the aforementioned publications are of interest mainly because they primarily publish materials which meet readers' practical needs and respond to their specific requests (texts of official documents, commentaries on them, recommendations regarding practical application of new guidelines, etc.)

A standout favorite on Pushkin Square is INFO-SPID. Despite the fact that prices for erotic publications are substantially higher than the rest they, in the universal opinion of the vendors on the square, sell out quickly and completely on a regular basis.

Also good sellers are children's publications and light reading (about everyday life and scandal-oriented material).

In the opinion of official and unofficial distributors virtually none of the "thick and beautiful" magazines printed abroad are popular. Exceptions to this were the first issues of the magazines ON and ONA. According to

newsstand operators' figures sales of DELOVYYE LYUDI and MOSCOW MAGAZINE are less than 50 percent.

The phenomenon of the past month has been a sharp burst of interest in traditional official publications. It is the general opinion of Soyuzpechat experts and Moscow newsstand operators that the absolute winner for January was KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Other hot sellers are MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET, VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA and MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. Sales of IZVESTIYA and TRUD are fair. It is interesting to note that PRAVDA has also begun to enjoy better sales.

Projected Circulation of New Publications

| | |
|-----------------------|----|
| Under 50,000 Copies | 30 |
| 50,000 | 16 |
| 50-100,000 | 5 |
| 100,000 | 28 |
| 100-200,000 | 4 |
| 200,000 | 8 |
| 300,000 | 4 |
| 500,000 | 2 |
| Over 1 Million Copies | 3 |

Subject Matter of New Publications (in Percent)

| | |
|--|----|
| Culture, Education and Humanities | 21 |
| Business and Economics | 18 |
| Social and Political Information | 14 |
| Arts and Publicistic Materials | 11 |
| Popular Science and Specialized Fields | 9 |
| Family and Children | 5 |
| Religion | 3 |
| Medicine | 3 |
| Sports | 3 |
| Advertising and Information | 3 |
| Legal Matters | 2 |
| Other | 8 |

In the opinion of newsstand operators the heightened interest in "old" publications is related to their generally affordable prices. However, KOMMERSANT experts incline to the opinion that the jump in old newspapers' popularity is also caused by the readers' desire to read the news every day, something which the alternative publications, which are mainly weeklies or monthlies, are unable to provide.

In the opinion of the customers themselves the increasing interest in retail purchase of traditional publications is due to the constantly worsening functioning of the postal service: no one wants to read the evening papers in the morning or the morning papers in the

evening. For one reason or another, it is clear that due to recent shifts in newspaper fashion the majority of newsstand operators in Moscow are thinking about increasing their orders for older newspapers.

Moscow Publishing House Staff on Leave Without Pay

*PM1903132191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4*

[S. Mostovshchikov report: "'Progress' May Be Halted"]

[Text] The director of the "Progress" Publishing House, one of the largest in the USSR, has signed an order laying off all his employees for two weeks' unpaid leave. According to Aleksandr Avelichev, approximately 1,000 people will be obliged to rest until the end of the month at their own expense, since there is no money to pay their wages.

This is the first time ever that the director has adopted a decision of this kind, since the situation in which his publishing house finds itself is also unprecedented. Aleksandr Avelichev believes that many large Soviet printing enterprises could find themselves in the same position in the very near future. The volume of production of literature has fallen sharply at "Progress" because of the lack of paper. The bank refuses to issue money to pay the staffers' wages without the deposit of an advance more than twice the size of the monthly wages fund.

So as not to end up in a still more complex situation in the next quarter, Aleksandr Avelichev has decided to take a step which will evidently be given an ambivalent reception in the collective. However, the order for the employees' formal dismissal on unpaid leave will make it possible to save money and to ensure the free working of "Progress" for two weeks.

Aleksandr Avelichev is convinced that this measure alone will not be a lot of help. It is necessary to cardinaly revise the list of literature that is published and temporarily cut back sharply the publication of scientific books and works in foreign languages. This output, according to the director, no longer brings in the necessary profit. "Progress" will very soon have to tackle mainly the production of works for a mass readership.

State 'Not Interested' in Increasing Paper Production

*91UN1088A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Article by IZVESTIYA Perm Oblast correspondent A. Pashkov: "No Paper—No Problems?: Who Suffers if the Solikamsk Pulp and Paper Combine Closes Down"]

[Text] The combine has been confronted by a dilemma: either to further drag out the state order at the expense of worker enthusiasm, running the risk every day of closing down because of a lack of basic materials, or to close

itself down in order to exacerbate the problem facing those upon whom deliveries of this basic material depend.

Director V. Varonov is critical of the latter idea. He doubts that the top echelons of authority will be distressed if there is a sudden halt in deliveries of the tinder for the fires on which the social activism of the population is being heated up. In the situation that has been created, a lack of paper for newspapers is beneficial to those who for decades have been "rationing out" basic material and thereby controlling the activities of the mass information media.

Having shut down the combine, the pulp and paper workers would objectively aggravate the problems, first of all, of those publications which lack the powerful support of all-union state and party structures. By this means, it is possible very simply to keep a check on the Press Law—if there is no paper, there also are no newspapers.

It is clear that the economic difficulties of the paper workers have arisen not only because newborn market relationships are still "poor" and "bazaar-like", but also, to no small degree, for political reasons. Indeed, as formerly, paper remains a monopoly possession of the state and the state is in no rush to share authority in its distribution with this same democratic press. And, as is known, a prescribed fast is beneficial to someone who is full and healthy, but certainly not to someone who has just been born and is learning to stand up.

Two facts demonstrate the thesis that the state is not interested in the development of a paper industry, in the creation of a real market for paper, where everyone will have equal opportunities for healthy competition—its attitude toward prices and its policy on timber raw material.

There is a belief that the sharp increase in prices for paper has turned the paper and pulp workers into Croesuses and that they are literally sitting on millions. What is not said, however, is that even such an increase does not cover actual expenditures for the production of paper. More than one hundred rubles a ton. At the same time, the difference between the old and the new price is going to cover increased prices for wood, heat, electric energy, and so on. Only a pittance goes for that which, in the future, can both substantially reduce prices and improve the quality of paper—for development of the production base, of lumbering enterprises.

You experience a state of shock on arrival at the Solikamsk Pulp and Paper Combine—the heat, the din, the hauling gaffs and the wooden trough for transporting the timber. Should we be surprised that the workers are thinking not about big policy, but rather about open fraud—the sharp rise in prices is in no way reflected either in their pay or in their working conditions. The mythical money "on the market"—six to eight thousand rubles—also sails right by their pockets.

Recently, the local KGB investigated the combine on the subject economic sabotage. The logic was as follows: In the newspaper and magazine world there had been a sharp decline in circulations while, at the same time, the paper workers had not worked any worse last year than during the previous one. Where had the paper gone? Perhaps the people at Solikamsk were actively flogging it on the side, at commercial prices?

The check did not introduce clarity. The only inarguable thing is that very little is being sold here at commercial prices. Within the limits of what is permitted by law. In fact, the Solikamsk workers were tearing at their harnesses even to earn a little butter for the black bread of the state plan. However, something else also goes without argument—that expensive paper is floating around the country. A curious puzzle, and one that demands serious study. But, it would seem, not so much by the KGB as by serious economists.

It is possible that this is connected with the fact that some people who have a monopoly on obtaining paper have found an opportunity to forego certain ideological principles for no small economic benefit. It is possible that the developing market is maneuvering on its own. Whatever the case, the producer has again turned out to be the loser, having been cut off from the results of his labor.

Paper is becoming more expensive, but its production is not increasing. Middlemen are getting rich, but the workers, who are making the middlemen even richer, are preparing to go on strike. Herein lies the essence of the problem. Naturally this does not benefit either society as a whole or its individual representatives—the workers, whose needs today are the concern of a mass of well-wishers.

But if, in the situation concerning prices, all that can be seen is some kind of general tendency with regard to the organization of a "paper starvation," which some are trying to justify in the customary way by shortcomings in the overall economic system and even by a paralysis of authority, then it is possible to discuss the basic timber-industry products diet, as they say, concretely and with names.

And so, a second fact.

I have already written once before (IZVESTIYA No 322) about how the Moscow office of the international association [mezhdgosudarstvennoye 'obyedineniye—MGO] "Prominform" seduced local authorities in Krasnovisherskiy Rayon by promising to create new Vasyuks [Vasyuki] here within a very short period of time. Instead, the office obtained a powerful basic timber products base and the Vishersk paper combine. We will note that a part of this timber also went to "feed" Solikamsk. I foresaw at the time that the grandiose projects of "Prominform" chairman S. Romanov were hardly supported by any real basis. This rayon has no large construction organizations or human resources and the seducers in the capital also lacked the necessary

technical and economic plans. To make up for this, another probability was overlooked—that the timber would start to sail right past the Vishersk and Solikamsk combines.

Unfortunately, my prediction came true. Timber production in the rayon has declined, standing timber is dying because there are no state procurement officials, and there are none of them because social and economic problems are not being solved. The Solikamsk workers remain without raw materials and the residents of Krasnovisherskiy Rayon without paradise, but to make up for it, "Prominform" has received real timber money.

A shady enterprise is what the present chairman of the Perm Oblast executive committee, M. Vystriantsev, called this story. According to his words, he intends to struggle decisively against the penetration of the intersectoral association into the Perm forests. But how?

It is not by accident that the people from Moscow have succeeded in establishing themselves so quickly on Perm soil. Because they have enjoyed the support of CPSU Central Committee secretary O. Vaklanov and Council of Ministers deputy chairman I. Belousov, and even N. Ryzhkov himself has blessed the MGO. Representatives of the military industrial complex have justified the establishment of this organization with the noble aim of providing the country's computers with technical media (perforated tape, perforated cards, etc.) But who has carried out appropriate calculations, who has considered the real social and ecological situation within the rayon, who, finally, has thought about raw material for this same Solikamsk combine? However, these questions are rhetorical, because the concrete activities of the MGO so far give few reasons to talk specifically about solution of the basic problem, and it seems that, with time, they will forget about perforated tapes altogether. Timber is an irresistible argument in barter and other deals—this is what attracted the people from the capital here.

The instantaneous penetration of "Prominform" leaves no illusions how the center reacts to the problems of the paper workers, and to a certain degree debunks the myth about its lack of power—when necessary, everything is done both quickly and precisely.

Overall, there are many owners of the Perm forests. People from Volgograd and Smolensk, Ukrainians, and Moldavians export construction materials from here. There is a large, extensive network of corrective labor institutions. More than half of the timber resources are in the hands of "Permlesprom." Each manages things according to his own mind. Hundreds of thousands of "cubics" flow out to various ends of the country and the entire world.

"In order to introduce order, they issued a decision about allocation of timber to be cut and supplying timber to the enterprises and organizations of the oblast," says M. Bystryantsev. In essence, it erects a dam against unrestrained export of the green wealth. So far, purely administrative measures predominate—the railroads

will not take out a single car without permission, motor vehicle inspection is stopping vehicles without documents. Of course, these measures are not reliable and are temporary. It is necessary to set up normal economic interrelationships between local authorities and those who are procuring and exporting timber.

In fact, if one of the corrective camps rafts rough logs to Moldova or the Ukraine, then it receives good roads and housing in return. It is possible to close the road barrier, but who will solve these problems? The Solikamsk combine understands this problem and is specifically striving to establish business contacts—to invest funds in the timber industry base. It is only a matter of “little things”—of regulating prices and reaching agreement on distribution of the timber raw-material base.

M. Bystryantsev believes that a foundation for this has been established today. This is the decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers “On Improving Administration of the Forests,” which places control and distribution of resources in the hands of the local authorities. The same “Prominform”, for example, will be deprived of its privileges in ownership of the forests if its policies should run contrary to the needs of the oblast. But, I objected to Mikhail Ivanovich, is this not a replacement of the central monopolist by the dictate of a local one? It is precisely such a concern that the general director of the “Permles” concern, S. Kuznetsov, used as a basis for the appearance of a rather curious decision by his own labor collective, which countermanded...the decree of the Russian government. What they were saying is that they are more comfortable with the dictates of the center...

Bystryantsev believes that order is not dictate. Concrete authority must protect the interests of concrete citizens and is obligated to manage natural resources in the interests of all.

Well, and how are things today with the Solikamsk combine. An early bad-roads season is cutting the forest off from the combine, there are no supplies, and there is no reason for hope. In general, the good decree of the oblast executive committee is being implemented with difficulty, and Moscow is nodding its assent to this decision—you extricate yourselves.

Yes, in Solikamsk, it is very obvious how political and economic questions have become intertwined in a tight knot. This knot will not be undone with a single wave of the hand. And it is alarming that nobody is even preparing to untie this knot.

There is no paper—are there also no problems?

Komsomol Expresses Concern Over State of Youth Publications

91UNI136A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: “Youth Press Is Respected and Cared for by VLKSM Central Committee”]

[Text] At its meeting, the Central Committee Bureau of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union] discussed the progress in implementing the decisions of the third plenum of the Central Committee on youth mass media.

The plenum decisions are aimed at preserving, during the transition to a market economy, the system of publications for youth and children that was established over many years under the VLKSM umbrella; at establishing new relationships between Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union] committees and editorial collectives; and at expanding the information and propaganda opportunities of the Komsomol. To this end, the VLKSM Central Committee has taken several steps. The USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] allocated 100 percent of the supply of paper for newspapers for youth and children. Most newspapers and magazines are printed using the typographic base of party printing houses and at the same tariffs as party publications. A decision was made to create a local youth press insurance fund to cover some of the losses from publishing activities. At this time the USSR Government is considering the proposals of the VLKSM Central Committee on bringing the youth press out of economic crisis.

Despite the steps that have already been taken, the economic situation and the state of the material and technical supply of publications remain grave. Because of the unpredictable price policies of paper-producing complexes and of the postal network, even previously highly profitable newspapers and magazines which have maintained their high distribution this year can no longer exist on the income from subscriptions alone. An extremely difficult situation has developed in the Molodaya Gvardiya Publishing and Printing House. Deliveries of imported typographic equipment, previously contracted from the former GDR, fell through. There is an acute shortage of magazine paper. Having cut back, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has not been able to return to its previous level of publishing six issues a week. Because of the uncertainty in regard to prices for paper, contracts between Komsomol committees and publishers are being delayed.

The bureau acknowledged the need to boost the joint work of the Komsomol committees and publishers in searching for a variety of financing sources through development of the advertising business, search for sponsors, creation of small enterprises as publishers' subsidiaries, etc. The efforts of the VLKSM Central Committee on the government level to receive preferential tax treatment for publications for youth and children for the current year should continue; so should the efforts to obtain a guaranteed supply of paper and newsprint within the allocations established by the USSR Gosplan.

In the period after the third plenum, a principally new mechanism for relations between Komsomol committees and the editorial collectives was refined and developed based on the USSR Law "On Publishing and Printing and Other Mass Media."

Having approved the rules and the program of action of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA; having agreed to be the paper's founder jointly with its employee collective; and having recommended that offers to co-found publications jointly with their editorial staff be attentively considered, the plenum helped to prevent and to resolve many conflicts that started to emerge as a result of journalists' desire to avoid being rigidly dependent on Komsomol committees. With rare exceptions, Komsomol committees and newspapers and magazines collectives acted as co-founders of publications.

At the same time, political confrontation in society has also led to a polarization of the youth mass media. The principle of party-affiliated press—rejected by the majority of journalists—is now being, in substance, reestablished. In some instances the political affinities of the co-founders, Komsomol committees, and editorial staffs may bring about a conflict, which causes disproportionate reaction from either side.

The resolution adopted by the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau points out the need for the youth press to support the principle of social consensus, protection of youth rights and interests, and to contribute to the implementation of the VLKSM program goals.

Members of the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau also discussed issues related to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA activities. Current relations between the VLKSM Central Committee and the editorial staff are those of equal partners. At the same time, it was noted that the newspaper does not devote enough space to expounding on VLKSM program goals; there is no deep and meaningful discussion of the uneasy worries of the youth; there is not enough information on the life of Komsomol and other youth organizations and associations. This is despite the fact that the newspaper program of action considers these priority topics. The problem may only be truly resolved if, in addition to materials prepared in the VLKSM Central Committee, and by Komsomol committees, there are essays, articles, reports, and commentaries by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA journalists—the people who several years ago contributed so much to the Komsomol renewal.

USSR TV Trends Outlined

LD1803121991 Moscow SEM DNEY in Russian No 9,
25 Feb-3 Mar 91 (signed to press 19 Feb 91) p 13 LD

[Interview with Professor M.I. Krivisheyev, honored worker of Science and Technology of the RSFSR and doctor of Technical sciences, by B. Fomin, special correspondent: "The Main Directions of Television Development"]

[Text] Part 1

We have taken our headline from the title of the first report that opened the plenary session of the intersectorial scientific and technical conference held in Suzdal at the end of last year. The participants in the conference discussed the problems and future development of Soviet television systems, equipment for receiving television images, and applied television.

Our special correspondent Boris Fomin participated in the work of the conference. After it ended he conducted an interview with Professor M.I. Krivosheyev, Honored Worker of Science and Technology of the RSFSR and Doctor of Technical Sciences, who delivered the report on the main directions of television development at the conference.

[Correspondent] Mark Iosifovich, notwithstanding that the readers of our weekly know your name already from the materials on Moscow television published last year, on behalf of our editorial and readers I would like to congratulate you on the high international assessment of your contribution to the science and practice of television as evidenced in your election as an honorary member of the Institute of Television Engineers of Japan. I would now like you to answer the following: now that 1990 has ended and this year has started, how do you evaluate what has been done in television?

[Krivosheyev] I would like to note that we have ended not only the year, but also the 12th five-year plan. Nobody has countermanded its objectives and, despite the difficulties, much has been done.

First of all it should be noted that we have a most extensive television network; indeed, in the country as a whole we have more than 100 million television sets and we produce up to 9-10 million of them annually

A total of 97.1 percent of the USSR population can receive one television program, 92 percent can receive two programs, and 45.9 percent can receive three or more programs. Unfortunately, the rural population remains inadequately served: 55.7 percent of the urban population and 26.9 percent of the rural population can watch three programs; in the RSFSR these figures are 39.2 percent and 8.8 percent respectively. Two all-union television programs are transmitted to five broadcasting zones. One hundred and twenty-four television centers handle local television. In the country as a whole there are about 600 powerful transmitting stations and more than 10,000 less powerful stations and relay stations. The "Orbita", "Ekran", and "Moskva" satellite television systems play an extremely important role in maintaining our country's television broadcasting service.

[Correspondent] What is planned for the immediate future?

[Krivosheyev] The greatest hopes in the further expansion of the television network are placed in the Comprehensive Program of Development of USSR Radio and

Television Broadcasting In the Immediate Future and In the Period Up To the Year 2005. However, the success of this latest program will totally depend on the attention it receives from society as a whole and on the resources and funds that are provided to carry it out.

According to the Comprehensive Program it is planned to bring into operation new satellite television systems and ground transmitter stations, the number of relay stations will exceed 20,000, and about 70 new television studios will begin work in regions that currently do not have their own television service. This reflects the noted trend in our society toward the sovereignty of national and territorial formations. As for the future, before long not only cities but also city districts and even city blocks will have their own television service. This will be effected primarily through the development of cable television.

[Correspondent] A week before the Suzdal conference the second all-union conference titled "Cable Television Systems and Maintenance" was held at All-Union Radio and Television Broadcasting Station in Ostankino. I was there and I saw for myself the tremendous growth in the scale of this kind of television broadcasting. Is not cable television the dominant trend in the development of television as a whole?

[Krivosheyev] No, such a claim is hardly correct. The facilities for providing television programs to viewers are developing comprehensively. Cable television systems are effective in densely populated regions. Along with ground transmitter stations and radio relay communication lines serving local broadcasting, strong development will continue to be given to satellite systems, whose appearance three decades ago enabled us not only to provide television to large areas but also to begin creating a unified network out of previously unlinked television centers. Moreover, satellite communication facilities have made television into a global phenomenon—nowadays, thanks to the system of geostationary relay satellites, the broadcasting network encompasses all continents and all parts of the world.

However, initially this did not bring any changes in the system of transmitting television signals received from satellite. Such signals continued to be broadcast by transmitters at television centers. Only after the assimilation of the centimeter waveband and the geostationary orbit was it possible to simplify and scale down receiver equipment and to accomplish the idea of Direct Television Broadcasting (DTB), namely reception directly from satellite rather than via a ground relay. The serial production of individual receiver equipment for DTB will make it possible to receive several television programs, including foreign programs, at remote villages, farmlands, and expeditions.

Part Two

In our last issue we discussed the scientific and technical conference held recently in Suzdal, at which Professor

M.I. Krivosheyev, Doctor of Technical Sciences, presented a report on the directions of television development. He gave an interview to our special correspondent Boris Fomin, the next part of which we now present to you.

[Correspondent] Mark Iosifovich, what are the prospects of cable television, in your view?

[Krivosheyev] In the structure of cable television an increasing role will be played by a central complex which will receive signals from various sources of programs. Here they will be processed, converted, and amplified. This central complex will have satellite receiver equipment and transcoders to convert the signals of foreign color television systems such as NTSC (used in the United States, Canada, and Japan) and PAL (used in West Europe, the PRC, Australia, and other states) into signals used in the Soviet color television system, and so on. Video recorder equipment will make it possible to record programs at any time and to transmit them on the cable television system in time frames appropriate for a given region.

The development of an extensive wideband network in population centers, enabling the signals of television programs to be received directly in every apartment or in any enterprise or institution, will create the conditions for a fundamental change and a substantial expansion of the functions of the cable television network. Direct access to subscribers with the aid of wideband cable will make it possible to increase not only the number of television programs, but also the volume of other kinds of services. Thus, the concept of a comprehensive multifunctional wideband system on the base of the television distribution network is developing increasingly. Such a system will be the best means of satisfying requirements for communication facilities and of enabling the fullest utilization of achievements in electronic communications in respect of ever expanding spheres and forms of service. In the future it will be possible to develop comprehensive systems of mass services for the population in all essential types of communications: television and radio programs, telephone communications, telex, video link, transfer of video recordings, fax, telemetry, data transmission, and so on. The new cable television systems will differ increasingly from the original and current ones, whose function merely amounts to a one-way service to television viewers—the dissemination to a greater number of subscribers of program signals, including recorded films, by a local television transmitter station.

The greater prospects of a multi-purpose wideband system of communications, and also the desire to make full use of its possibilities, indicate the need for a systematic approach toward the network as a whole and also toward its individual services and elements. Here it is necessary to take account of development trends, not only in respect of the television reception network but also for other types of communications and services, both in the interests of individual subscribers and to

meet the requirements of cities or settlements. For example, education by television and new forms of television programs and services for subscribers will create the need for a significant direct exchange of information between viewers and the television station, namely two-way links with subscribers.

[Correspondent] A number of Western countries are increasingly introducing information services that the subscriber receives via fiber-optic lines. Could you tell us about that in more detail ...

[Krivosheyev] Cable will be the basis for developing two-way communications with a greater number of channels. Insofar as it is unrealistic to accomplish all types of services simultaneously and in a short time, it is important to assess which types of two-way communications should be developed first. Two-way communications first and foremost are necessary in the organization of educational programs, competitions, games, and other events.

Incomplete Democratization of TV Regretted

91UN1128A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Mikhail Nenashev, chairman of the State Committee for the Press, by S. Tikhiy, under the rubric "Hallway Interviews"; place and date not given: "Back to Central Television?—No Way!"]

[Text] M. Nenashev is chairman of Goskompechat [State Committee for the Press]. Recently he was chairman of Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting], and some time prior to that worked as...chairman of Goskompechat. He did not state these words verbatim, but when you delve into what he says—is this not precisely it?

[Tikhiy] Mikhail Fedorovich, how do you find working at your new post, one you used to occupy?

[Nenashev] Just as it is today for everybody—tough, difficult. Because any department is part of the country as a whole, and all the ailments and misfortunes of the country are reflected in it. But as far as the personal aspect is concerned, the press—newspapers, magazines, books—has simply always been close to my heart.

[Tikhiy] So it turns out you have returned to your basic element. All the same, do you presently regret the fact that you had to leave your post as Gosteleradio chairman?

[Nenashev] I would not say that, although I regret not managing to accomplish what I wanted to do.

[Tikhiy] And what exactly is that?

[Nenashev] I wanted to pursue a course of still greater democratization and specialization in programs and

channels. This is the only way out of our present confrontation. Each channel should have its own orientation. Why are things so difficult and complicated in television today? Because whereas, for example, we have a tremendous quantity of newspapers—oriented right, left, and centrist—we have just one television, which is compelled to combine all orientations and cannot devote equal attention to them all. This is where all the problems lie. Again I would say that the only way out is to have specialized channels. Only then can we have the differences of opinion and reach the permissible level of glasnost, given our limited technical capabilities.

[Tikhiy] So, in this regard, how do you evaluate the changes that have taken place in Central Television over the past two months?

[Nenashev] They are natural. Just take the most "important" conflict with the "Vzglyad" program. It was inevitable, after all, because if one proceeds from the Law on the Press, every editorial office (and "Vzglyad" is an independent editorial office) must be protected by some kind of contract. Today we have registered almost 2,000 publications. And in registering them, we draw up a contract that determines what kind of publication it will be, what kind of program it will have. But there is nothing similar for television. I do think it will be necessary, for example, to conclude a contract between Central Television and "Vzglyad." But a political confrontation need not be made out of this.

[Tikhiy] How do you assess the fruits of your successor's activity, and can you imagine yourself in his position?

[Nenashev] I would not like to speak about this. I think it would be unethical... I believe he is doing everything possible under the circumstances. I sympathize with him and understand his difficulties.

[Tikhiy] Why do you believe no proposal calling for suspension of the Law on the Press went through at the end of the previous session?

[Nenashev] I would not pose the question in that fashion. Because this was simply a discussion—what to do under such adverse circumstances. I cannot say that the question of suspending the Law on the Press was discussed seriously in the Supreme Soviet. On the other hand, a week ago we generalized the results of implementation of this law in the Committee on Glasnost. And we reached a united point of view that the law is functional, that it is exerting a positive influence on development of the press. I do not think that today someone could raise the question of its suspension or repeal. This is not a serious or realistic prospect.

[Tikhiy] If today you were offered another lateral transfer (this has always been in fashion with us), an offer to again head television and radio broadcasting...

[Nenashev] I would not agree to it. I do not think returning under these conditions is the thing to do. I see no sense in it.

'Fifth Wheel' Director Explains Program's Success

91UN1149A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 12, Mar 91 p 6

[Interview with B. Kurkova, director of Leningrad "Fifth Wheel" TV program and RSFSR people's deputy, by unidentified ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondents; date and place not given: "'Fifth Wheel'—No Problems?..."]

[Text] "Fifth Wheel" has become one of the most popular Leningrad TV programs. Our correspondents met with B. Kurkova, the director of the program and RSFSR people's deputy. Like many of our readers, we were interested to know: Is this "Wheel" really the fifth on the cart of Leningrad television. How are you able to put on the air material with "objectionable" politicians: the speech by B. Yeltsin in the House of Cinema, the discourses of Yu. Afanasyev, and the conversation with A. Tarasov?...

[Correspondent] Being here in Moscow and observing your television creativity, we believe that Leningraders have greatly surpassed Muscovites from the standpoint of glasnost and the ability to show the pluses and minuses of our life in a visual way. But on the other hand, echoes reach us that life in our country is not as easy as you would sometimes think, looking at the screen.

[Kurkova] On the whole, we are more obliged for our fame to "written" journalism than to "electronic" journalism. If newsmen and journalists did not write about us, the country would not even suspect the existence of "Fifth Wheel." The Leningrad channel has 70 million viewers. But our "Wheel" comes on late. For example, it starts in Sverdlovsk (taking the time difference into account) at 0100. It is hardly likely that everyone who would like to watch could allow themselves to do so, when they have to go to work in the morning.

[Correspondent] Why do you come on so late?

[Kurkova] When we were planning this program we decided that it would be elitist, exclusively for the intelligentsia. You see, before this there were never programs specifically intended for the intelligentsia. We thought that actors will finish their plays in the theaters, musicians will return from concerts, etc. But we were gradually being squeezed out of this time also. They even began to read the program of telecasts before "Wheel." But our audience has expanded today: We are viewed by all social groups.

[Correspondent] Your primary principle?

[Kurkova] Revival of cultural principles. Very likely, because Peter, in this sense, suffered much more than other cities.

[Correspondent] And, overall, how are your telecasts on Leningrad television received?

[Kurkova] There is no goodwill at all. Vladimir Molchanov said at a meeting at MOSCOW NEWS that what is most frightening is when your own colleagues try to "drown" you. The feeling in the editorial office, of which I am the editor in chief, is as if we are surrounded by small red flags... Remember how Vysotskiy sang: "The hunt for the wolves is on..."

Fifty-five creative employees work in the office. Uncommon people have assembled here—those who did not want to leave us even considering the precariousness of our position. Our people are "old hands" in many departments, with very obstinate characters. Indeed, my own nature is not sugar sweet...

[Correspondent] Everyone is familiar with your democratic views. But they say that you never invite people from the other "camp" on your program.

[Kurkova] We never invite them. Never! This is also an initially considered principle of our program. We think that the program will give them publicity. These people have an opportunity to get on the air in other programs. We do not want to "undress" them. Let them "undress themselves," not on our program.

[Correspondent] Let's talk about the Leningrad television company... Everyone wants to have his own company. But would you also like to have your own, which would include "Fifth Wheel" and "Monitor"?...

[Kurkova] The situation now is very complex. At one time they did not affect us. I am, after all, a people's deputy of Russia and of the Leningrad Soviet of People's Deputies. This gave me a kind of immunity for the entire editorial office. In addition, we are have friends among people who are very brave and whom we respect, many of whom carry political weight. We pride ourselves on our friendship with A. Sobchak and Yu. Afanasyev, who in general did not have an opportunity to get on the air other than with us, etc.

But there is no Leningrad television phenomenon. There really are many good journalists and directors who work there, but unfortunately I cannot say that there are whole collectives and editorial staffs where the views of creative workers are the same. They frequently have diametrically opposite views. But the viewer does not see all the telecasts. And the impression is created that all Leningrad television is permeated with a democratic spirit. This is not so. Therefore, I fear that if the "era of Kravchenko" now ensues, virtually all editorial staffs will work in his spirit, and will do what Kravchenko says. But we and a small handful of people on different editorial staffs will resist. Therefore, you begin to think about your own chances here...

[Correspondent] There are rumors that when some of your subjects are put on the air, almost detective stories take place...

[Kurkova] We have our own methods. I can disclose one of these methods, inasmuch as it will be impossible to

use it a second time. It concerns the telecast with Artem Tarasov. If, as is stated in instructions, I submitted the script beforehand and wrote that Tarasov is taking part in the program and indicated what he was talking about, then, without any guessing, the telecast would never have seen the light of day. Just a short time before this, subjects with cinematographers who expressed their protest against Central Television were taken off the air. There was nothing left for me to do but to give the leadership a "fake." And because this broadcast was a segment in the middle of a video program, it was easier for me to "mask" it. We assembled it on days off, when there was no television leadership.

On the evening that I planned the "Tarasov" telecast I persuaded A. Sobchak to go live on the air. Usually he leaves immediately after the program. But here, at my request, he lingered on in the office of our TV director, Petrov. At that time other subjects were in progress. Sobchak, intentionally or unintentionally, distracted Petrov with conversation. Tarasov "started to speak" in accordance with my calculations while Petrov was driving his car home. But with the program already started, even he would not dare to stop it. There would be a tremendous scandal!

I was overcautious, for I cannot accuse Petrov of the fact that he absolutely would have "cut" it. But I could not take the risk.

Almost the same thing happened with "Vzglyad." The appearance of Lyubimov on our TV cannot be concealed. We at first put out a small piece from "Vzglyad," about five minutes. But the "Vzglyad" crew gave us the whole recorded program. We again submitted a fake script... I understood that the director of the committee could not give approval for "Vzglyad" if the program was taken off the air by the chairman of the state committee. The director of programs asked me where the program was recorded—in Leningrad or Moscow? I lied for the first time in my life. I said Leningrad; otherwise, they would begin to review it. Before the beginning of "Wheel" V. Pravdyuk, who deals with questions of philosophy and literature, went on the air live. His appearance did not raise the fear that pure politics was to follow. After this, we put on the "Vzglyad" lead-in and showed the whole program. Everyone was faced with an accomplished fact. This was our victory, albeit rather local.

Lithuanian Editors Unite Against Publishing Monopoly

91P50136A Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian
8 Jan 91 p 1

Unattributed report: "Editors Against Diktat"]

[Text] Yesterday at the Press Building in Vilnius there was a meeting of the editors and publishers of the largest republic newspapers, RESPUBLIKA, LIETUVOS RYTAS [Lithuania's Morning], VALSTIECIU LAIKRASTIS [Rural Newspaper], TIESA [Truth],

VAKARINES NAUJIENOS [Evening News], as well as SVYTYRYS [Beacon], POLITIKA and MOKSLAS IR GYVENIMAS [Science and Life]. They discussed the complicated present situation of the press: the large increase in the price of paper and other printing materials and the monopolistic organizations such as the Spauda [Press] Publishing Enterprise and the Lietuvos Spauda [Lithuania's Press] Association, which force the readers to pay very high prices for the services extended to them. This leaves publishers with only one alternative, to increase the prices of their publications several times over.

Attempting to defend the interests of readers and of a democratic press, those at the meeting agreed to establish the Lithuanian Periodical Press Publishers' Association and an initiative group was elected which includes the publishers of RESPUBLIKA, LIETUVOS RYTAS and SVYTYRYS.

At the meeting, immediate measures were proposed for defending against the Spauda and Lietuvos Spauda monopolistic organizations, and it was agreed to support the efforts of the newspaper RESPUBLIKA to construct a new printing facility, also a consensus was reached that it is inappropriate to print Lithuanian government television program listings in the republic newspapers, if these listings have to be paid for.

Leningrad TV Chief Comments on Conflicts with City Soviet

91UN01143 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Mar 91 p 2

[Report on interview with B.M. Petrov, acting chairman of the Leningrad Television and Radio Committee, by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent I. Potekhina in Leningrad; date not given: "Nevzorov, Kurkova, and Petrov Want to Stay Together: Our Interview with the Leningrad TV Chief"]

[Text] People are talking more and more about a slow but incessant assault on glasnost. After the change of management, conflicts have been flaring up at Central Television one after another.

But here is a piece of news! The most free in the whole country, Leningrad television is voluntarily renouncing its freedom. Moreover, the television workers voted unanimously for being managed by an apparatchik, a person who had never had anything to do with journalism but who spent all his life carrying out Komsomol and party work.

The Leningrad Soviet commissions on glasnost tried to defend the unreasonable journalists from their own actions, but all their attempts failed. Leningrad TV categorically rejected the session decision on transforming the Leningrad Television and Radio Broadcasting Committee into the Leningrad Television and

Radio Broadcasting Company, after which, without a moment's hesitation, they put themselves "under the heel of the center."

What has happened? Which devil made them do it, a group of 3,000 employees known for their willfulness, obstinacy, and difference of opinions—this more than anything else? How come they became unanimous? (Only one voice was against, that of the host of the "Alternativa" program, a Leningrad Soviet deputy.)

I decided to present all these questions to Boris Mikhaylovich Petrov, whose name you hear all the time in Leningrad. And that is not surprising! He is the person who for over a year now has had the doubtful honor of being acting chairman of the Television and Radio Committee. His nomination was not approved by a Leningrad Soviet session because of his party nomenclature past; the same session fired him for his refusal to allow USSR Deputy N. Ivanov go on the air live (remember the scandal last year?). Now, all of a sudden, he is under the protection of the employees whom nobody could ever please.

[Correspondent] Explain this to me, Boris Mikhaylovich! Can it really be that Leningrad journalists are eager to follow the way of "Vzglyad" and Television News Service? Why did the Leningrad TV and Radio Committee develop such a desire to blend in with the all-Union Television and Radio Broadcasting Company instead of organizing their own, independent one in Leningrad as suggested by the Leningrad Soviet?

[Petrov] Well, first of all nobody is blending in with anything yet. The Leningrad Soviet was too rash in its conclusions in this respect. Secondly, a "Leningrad company" on which the Leningrad Soviet is insisting does not necessarily mean "an independent company." Thirdly, Leningrad TV is not facing this limited choice anyway—either it becomes local but free, or remains central but bound hand and foot.

It is not without reason that the status of Leningrad TV has not been determined yet, though emotions around this problem have been astir for a whole year. It is not that we do not have the time for it or that nobody is thinking about it (as you can see, the Leningrad Soviet was). It is just that the Leningrad TV situation is a unique one. In all of our country there are no TV centers similar to ours which also have a potential audience of about 70 million viewers. For that reason, a standard approach cannot be used when deciding the destiny of Leningrad TV. As we have learned from the situation with the Leningrad Soviet decision, any traditional measure would entail a categorical protest.

[Correspondent] A "tradition" may be not the only problem. I cannot recollect any other situation when the employees of the Leningrad Television and Radio Committee were so unanimous as this time when they rejected the decision. Recently the journalists and the deputies seemed to have found a common language. No

traces remained of the conflict that started a year ago with the "capture" of the television.

[Petrov] It was not so idyllic in reality. Our relations have remained strained through this entire period. The desire of Leningrad TV to go on some abstract free voyage, to become fully independent, is very far from being the reason for this. The real reasons are much more prosaic.

What would you think, for instance, if, at the very moment when your newspaper is all finished and has been approved for printing, some "representative of the authorities" shows up and demands to remove the prepared material from the issue and replace it with his own? Moreover, he presents something that needs thorough editing. I think that in such a situation you would not be able to publish your newspaper for too long.

But for us it has become almost a norm to have a deputy barge into the sanctum sanctorum of the TV center—the senior producer's office—and start foaming at the mouth demanding to be put live on the air immediately.

I find it hard to even try to explain what starts happening at the TV studio after 1700 every day. Each deputy considers it his duty to share his ideas with our viewers. This is a correct and quite sincere intention. The city soviet has to keep all Leningraders informed. They should be told everything that is happening in the bodies of power. But some elementary technology requirements also exist; there exists, finally, simple working discipline which prevents us from airing inferior programs. Any journalist knows that to air a 10-minute item he has to prepare well for it for half a day! But when the clock reached 2100 and neither the anchors nor the deputies themselves know who is going to speak—this is too much!

[Correspondent] Was that the reason for the conflict around the daily deputies' program which you canceled?

[Petrov] I categorically object to our relations with the Leningrad Soviet being labelled a conflict or even war, as happens sometimes. You have to try really hard to see political confrontation behind purely professional and technological problems. So, when some of the deputies present the problem in this particular manner, in my view there is nothing more behind it than the desire to make a name for oneself on a hot story.

As for the deputies' program, it has not been canceled. The Leningrad Soviet may, of course, see the time yet when the viewers themselves will demand it be canceled (we are constantly hearing complaints about the quality of the program). We raised this question long ago, saying that the program needs to be seriously revised; we offered our help. The problem could have been solved without any conflict at all. We understand perfectly well that it is not only the city that needs the program. Viewers from other regions are not at all indifferent to what is happening in the Leningrad City Soviet. But that does not mean, however, that internal squabbling should

be spilled over onto the 70 million people watching television. Not even if the leading characters are Leningrad Soviet deputies.

We keep hearing that the deputies are responsible for their program themselves. No, they are not! Leningrad TV is mainly responsible for the programs of Leningrad TV.

[Correspondent] One of the Leningrad Soviet deputies said at a news conference that the journalists of the government television network have to uphold government policy; they can pronounce their personal opinions on the channels of private companies...

[Petrov] The Leningrad Soviet is hardly the entire government. It is only one of its power structures. Of course, it has the right to be reflected in the mass media. But it should be reflected in a direct proportion to its importance. If we are talking about all-Union TV, this means one volume and one angle, republic TV—another volume and angle, and local TV—still another. As I have already mentioned, Leningrad TV spread beyond certain limits a long time ago.

[Correspondent] Here we are back to the issue of Leningrad TV's status. What kind of television is it? And whose is it?

[Petrov] That is the spark that set the forest on fire. Whose is it?

On the one hand, Leningrad TV belongs to the Union. It has been financed from the Union budget and it used to get a much larger share than any other oblast television. It was decided a long time ago to develop it into a central channel. On the other hand, we belong to Russia because we are on its territory. But we also belong to the municipal authorities, not only because we are situated in Leningrad but because Leningrad gives all its money to the central budget from which Leningrad TV is being financed.

How would you split us now?

We can give everyone his share, but Leningrad TV would then cease to exist as a phenomenon. We may get everything with tanks.

But I stand for the third choice. I want all the concerned sides to sit down and agree on what right each of them has on this property, and what are the terms for exploiting it. It must be possible to agree, without either being totally dominated by the Leningrad Soviet or becoming completely enslaved by that same Kravchenko...

[Correspondent] Boris Mikhaylovich, I do not think any other individual in the city was the subject of so much voting in the Leningrad Soviet as you. One may get the impression that no one else but you is the supreme judge at Leningrad TV and you are at the root of all the problems.

[Petrov] Yes, in Leningrad I must be the most famous "oppressor of glasnost" of the perestroika era. I keep being told all the time that my every step is a threat to the freedom of speech...

[Correspondent] Why then did your employees stand so solidly behind you this time when a year ago they received you more than apprehensively? No matter who I talked to at the Leningrad TV center, everybody was quite satisfied with the way you channel Leningrad TV across the sea of our current problems. What tricks do you use to find a common language with such different people as Nevzorov, Kurkova, and Degtyarev at the same time?

[Petrov] I do not use any tricks, and that might be the whole point. Just like any other person who is working here, I want Leningrad TV preserve its independent and, at the same time, diverse expression. I am trying to do my best to achieve that. Being a realist, however, I do not exclude the possibility that my staff just chose the least of all evils. I know just one thing for sure. If I feel that my staff is not with me and I am not with my staff, I will quit this job myself, in spite of all my current involvement in it.

Journalists Blamed at Moldovan Referendum

91UN1167A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 12, 23 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent Vadim Letov: "Guilty Without Blame"]

[Text] Kishinev—The referendum in Moldova, extended to four days by its organizers "for tactical reasons," lasted no longer than 24 hours. For the remainder of the time, people either obstructed or ranted and raved at the canvassing centers which had found refuge on the territory of Union-subordinate enterprises or military units. Who? The Moldovan People's Front disavows this.

At the canvassing center at the Kishinev plant Schetmash, USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy from Moldova Marshal Akhromeyev, military adviser to the president, was showered with abusive language from the "guards of Moldovan democracy," but nonetheless managed to make his way through. But the next morning neither I nor PRAVDA correspondent Arkadiy Pasechnik was able to repeat the marshal's feat. And police officials refused to assist me in this matter, standing on the sidelines both figuratively and literally—"Gentlemen of the press, we have been ordered not to interfere..."

It was absolutely the devil's delight at the canvassing center at the military unit near the Officers Club—one could not reach the unit entryway. They screamed in our faces, journalists "recognized and exposed": "Communists, go hang yourselves!"

Then, at somebody's command, a portion of the crowd dashed out to Kishinev's main thoroughfare with whoops reminiscent of the Indians in Western movies—

to reinforce, as it later became clear, those who were ranting and raving around the canvassing center at the vibration instruments plant. That same evening, the Moldovan television program "Mesedzher" quite triumphantly showed how the raiders tore up their ballots, threw the fragments into puddles of water, and danced around in victory.

It is a curious thing that during an interview with General Kostash, republic minister of internal affairs, we heard that no violations of law and order were noted during the referendum in the republic.

It was indeed a rampage of a referendum in Moldova. The names of those deciding to raise their voice in defense of the Union are defamed and published in the press. Written in Russian on the fencing in the former Pushkin Park, in the center of Kishinev, a poster invites all who took part in the referendum to leave Moldova immediately. The Communist Party of Moldova has gone underground in the direct sense. Its press is silent.

On Tuesday the informational program "Vremya" showed a short interview with USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy G. Tarazevich, tasked with heading the parliamentary commission on conducting the referendum in Moldova. No one saw him in Kishinev, but he drew an unexpected—and strange, we must say—conclusion: The referendum in Moldova would have gone more successfully had central press correspondents taken a more resolute position. Alas, the chairman is looking for guilty parties in the wrong place. Journalists "from Moscow" in Moldova have taken up a precise, uncompromising position, and it is awkward for us to elaborate on the bruises we received during the referendum in justification. The commission itself was unable to handle the tasking of the USSR president and in clarifying the course of the referendum in the country's political hot spot used—alas—unverified information. Unfortunately, Central Television assisted it in this effort.

Allow me to report that I personally voted the first day of the referendum. I said "yes" because I am an incurable optimist and believe that democracy will emerge victorious. But in the meantime, I and my family have been offered a choice—either hang ourselves or leave. A splendid choice, worthy of reflection...

Director Describes New Armenian Press Information Center

91UN1027A Yerevan AVANGARD in Armenian
24 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Abo Poghikeyan, Armenian Diaspora journalist and director of the newly-established Press and Information Center for the Armenian Revolutionary Dashnaktsutyun, by Ruzan Arakelyan: "The Purpose Is to Proceed In Accordance With the Requirements of the Times"]

[Text] [Arakelyan] As a result of the rebirth of the Armenian Revolutionary Dashnaktsutyun in the homeland as well as the organization's substantial and serious activities, this party will of course have its own official publication. As a consequence of the requirements of the day and the demands of the time, however, the party has also established a Press and Information Center in Yerevan. This development genuinely proceeds from national demand and is truly a national service. First of all it strengthens communications between the Diaspora and the homeland. News reaches the homeland from the outside world and is disseminated from the homeland more rapidly, directly, and in a prompt and timely manner. This is an important factor in view of the present situation and atmosphere in Armenia.

[Poghikeyan] Since this center was established, Armenian newspapers in the Diaspora have had no difficulty in obtaining news from the homeland, an undertaking which had been very difficult prior to that time.

[Arakelyan] The Center envisages establishing branches in other administrative rayons in the republic, in the external and internal Diaspora, and it also plans to establish contact with international news agencies. I am sure that the Center, with which I have the good fortune to be associated, will accomplish its programs because, in spite of difficulties, dedicated young men and women are working there, who approach the task with sensitivity and objectivity.

Since it is already officially documented as the second information center in the republic, after Armenpress, it is logical that it receive some kind of support or assistance by the government. In other words, are there any incentives or encouragements for your activities?

[Poghikeyan] I would disagree with a statement to the effect that our press center should be supported or subsidized by the government. The Center was established at the initiative of the Armenian Revolutionary Dashnaktsutyun Bureau, and therefore enjoys the complete support of that Bureau. We expect of the government only that it show us equal treatment. In other words, we expect the government to provide us with all those conveniences and opportunities which are given to other non-governmental agencies. We shall have no objection if the state provides generous financing and capabilities to news agencies which are directly subordinate to the government. For example, if Armenpress is a governmental news agency, it should receive total state financial support. We are not entitled to demand like treatment.

The only thing we expect of the government is official registration of our office. There seems to be some confusion here, however. The people at the Council of Ministers sent us over to Armenpress, for that agency to perform the registration procedure. And that is what was done. The officials at Armenpress most graciously registered us, giving us assurances that we shall henceforth be considered a legal entity. When we attempted to open an

account at the Myasnikyan Rayon Zhilsotsbank, we were told that we are not registered with the Council of Ministers, and for that reason we are not considered to be a legal entity. Because of this confusing situation, our Center's employees are denied a number of basic social entitlements which can be guaranteed through the act of official registration. We have requested that the Council of Ministers bring an end to this confusing situation. We do not believe that this delay is deliberate. It is simply that the government is new at addressing such matters.

We need no other encouragement. It is merely desirable that no artificial obstacles be placed in our path.

[Arakelyan] I would imagine that one of your difficulties involves staffing the Center with specialist personnel. Are you successfully accomplishing this?

[Poghikyan] Yes, we face serious difficulties in the task of providing the Center with young, able journalists, who are free of a mindset forged by the past. We are constantly looking, and it would seem that our search is going to continue for quite some time. We are looking for people who have a spirit of initiative, who are bold, intelligent and well-informed on national and international events, who possess elementary journalistic knowledge, who have a searching mind, who will be able to serve as society's watchdog over our newly-organized edifice of popular government. The unfortunate fact is that in Armenia journalism has always been weak, and has always been under constraints. Nor does the Diaspora have a strong tradition in this area, a tradition in which it can take pride or from which Armenia can benefit. It is true that there are well-known journalists of Armenian nationality working in the foreign press, but this kind of journalism is lacking in Armenian newspapers, the kind of journalism we are striving for today. We are therefore compelled to look to the experience of the Western press. It will be difficult to find trained journalists who are familiar with that experience. It is therefore important to create working conditions in which journalists will be able to attain the needed experience and knowledge, alongside their daily work activities. It is our responsibility to create those conditions.

[Arakelyan] Is party membership a mandatory prerequisite?

[Poghikyan] No, being a Dashnaksakan is not a condition for employment at the Press and Information Center for the Armenian Revolutionary Dashnaksutyun. We are looking for journalism professionals who will endeavor to gather accurate information about events and realities in Armenia. As for how this information will be used by Dashnaksakan or non-Dashnaksakan newspapers, that is the business of the publishers of those newspapers. The fact that the Center is Dashnaksakan will be evident only in the selection of subject matter. That is, their connection with the Dashnaksakan Information Center will be obvious when deciding what issues the Center's journalists will

address, and in what areas they will concentrate newsgathering efforts. To the extent that this is possible, we shall publish the news without taking an editorial position.

[Arakelyan] How do you envisage the Center's future activities and, of course, your personal future since, as I understand it, you plan to remain permanently in Armenia?

[Poghikyan] In the last three years the Armenian people have experienced the lack of and the harm from limited availability of means of ensuring accurate newsgathering and reporting. It would serve no purpose to belabor this point. It is a complicated and difficult task to gather accurate, complete information about events in Armenia and to deliver that information to the Armenian public and the public abroad. The Armenian Revolutionary Dashnaksutyun Press and Information Center will take part in this task, endeavoring to contribute to an integral newsgathering and reporting effort alongside state and other independent news centers and agencies.

During the initial period of its establishment, the Information Center focused chiefly on getting news concerning events in Armenia out to Dashnaksakan daily and weekly newspapers published in foreign countries. The activities of the Center then became gradually broadened: steps were taken to gather more extensive information from within Armenia, as well as to keep the Armenian press informed about daily activities in the Armenian communities abroad. The difficulties experienced in accomplishing this task in a satisfactory manner and with adequate promptness and timeliness have not yet been overcome, but they will be.

Our immediate future will involve efforts to provide international news. We can provide an indispensable service to our people in this area. We must establish the capability to provide newspapers in Armenia and our people with international news in a prompt and timely manner. We are presently working on accomplishing this goal, on resolving difficulties connected with the newsgathering and reporting process.

On a personal note, at least for a certain period of time I shall be totally involved with the operations of the Press Center. In the meantime I am impatiently awaiting ratification of the Law on Citizenship, so that I can obtain Armenian citizenship. I must also settle the problem of obtaining housing, so that I can bring my wife and eight-month-old child to Yerevan on a permanent-residence basis.

Georgian Media Instructions on Elections

91US0378A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
11 Mar 91 p 1

[SAKINFORM report: "In the Central Election Commission: Operation of Mass Media During the Period of Preparation and Conduct of Elections"]

[Text] Until the end of the pre-election campaign on 31 March 1991, and in accordance with Articles 11 and 51 of the Republic of Georgia Law "On Elections of Local Authority Organs—the Republic of Georgia Assemblies," the state mass media (television, radio, print media) will operate as follows:

1. Television:

From 25 February to 25 March, the main channel of Georgian television will devote at least 15 minutes daily to the election campaign: two segments. The time slot from 20:40 to 20:50 (after the "Moambe" program) will be reserved for 10-minute long presentations by each party (by mutual agreement this time may be divided between two parties, each of which will have a five minute presentation). The five minute time slot between 21:40 and 21:45 will be reserved for statements. The length of each statement will be one minute. The text will be read by the announcer.

The order in which the parties will have air time will be determined by drawing lots. Taping for television is done on the day of the broadcast or the day before. In other instances, time may be coordinated with the press group in advance. In case a party refuses to do the taping or to air a piece, it loses its place in the line-up.

The text of the statement to be broadcast must be delivered to the press group before noon of the same day. If by that time five requests have been submitted, the press group will determine which is accepted. Statements will be read in the order in which they were submitted.

Each party has a right to make seven statements.

The period between 26 and 29 March is reserved.

The Central Election Commission may decide to make these days available for presentations by parties. The length of the presentations will be the same for all parties.

From 26 February to 26 March Georgian Radio will reserve the following time for the election campaign:

- a) ten minutes daily in its information programs;
- b) one hour a week in its sociopolitical programs.

Parties wishing to make radio addresses should apply to the press group:

- a) to participate in the information program—no later than the day before;
- b) to participate in other programs—no later than a week in advance.

3. Central republic press (newspaper SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA, AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI, ERI, LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO, TAVISUPALI SAKARTVELO, VESTNIK GRUZII):

Between 26 February and 26 March each party participating in the election has a right to publish once a week in these newspapers any propaganda material or other information not to exceed the following size:

—in SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA: up to one-eighth of a page;

—in AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI or TAVISUPALI SAKARTVELO: up to one-quarter of a page;

—in VESTNIK GRUZII: up to one-eighth of a page;

—in ERI: up to one-eighth of a page;

—in LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO: up to one-eighth of a page.

Newspaper VECHERNIY TBILISI has a right, until 31 March, to publish one interview from each party participating in the elections.

In order to do that, statements and materials for publication must be submitted to the Central Election Commission press group before Saturday of the previous week. Materials will be published in the order in which they are received.

The volume of material published at any one time may be, if the party so desires, increased within its summary limit:

—in SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA: up to half a page;

—in AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI or TAVISUPALI SAKARTVELO: up to one page;

—in VESTNIK GRUZII: up to half a page;

—in ERI: up to half a page;

—in LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO: up to half a page.

Between 27 and 29 March each party may publish in SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA or in VESTNIK GRUZII a final appeal to the voters. The text of this statement must be submitted by the parties to the press group no later than 25 March.

Local press: in Tbilisi (newspapers TBILISI and VECHERNIY TBILISI); in rayons rayon newspapers.

The entity responsible for publishing information and maintaining the order of the line up in each rayon is the appropriate territorial or city (with territorial rights) election commission. Parity should be observed in accordance with specific distribution of political forces in specific rayons (by blocks).

The telephone number of the Central Election Commission press group is 93-73-70.

The Central Election Commission reminds all political organizations participating in the elections to the assemblies, that a party (a voting block) will lose its right to participate in the elections to one or the other assembly, unless it submits an appropriate request to the local election commission before 2 March.

The deadline for submitting lists of supporters of independent candidates for deputies to the local commissions is 4 March.

The Central Election Commission also reminds the initiative groups of independent candidates for deputies that, depending on the number of voters, an independent must collect the following number of signatures:

- for electoral districts of less than 200 voters—5 signatures;
- for electoral districts of more than 201 but no more 1,000 voters—20 signatures;
- for electoral districts of more than 1,001 but not more than 4,000 voters—40 signatures;
- for electoral districts of more than 4,000 voters—100 signatures.

'180-Degree Turn' Observed in Georgian Press

91UN1085A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by Special Correspondent G. Ivanov-Smolenskiy: "Total Democracy: Whither the New Monopoly on Truth in the Press"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The non-Baltic variant: I suppose that is how one could describe what has taken place in the Georgian press since the October elections.

The TASS report in Moscow sounded dramatic enough: "The Party (the Communist Party, naturally—G.I.S.) was left without a newspaper." It happened after the republic Council of Ministers adopted a resolution to make the newspapers ZARYA VOSTOKA and KOMUNISTI organs of the Supreme Soviet alone, removing "CP Central Committee" and "Council of Ministers," from the masthead, and at the same time renaming the publications VESTNIK GRUZII [Herald of Georgia] and SAKARTVELO'S RESPUBLIKA (The Georgian Republic), respectively. But in actual fact, the major republic newspapers were transferred from the Communist Party, which is no longer the ruling party, "without a single shot," and without the drama of the Baltics.

The Communists in fact handed over the press themselves, and I do not suppose it could have been otherwise. The reasons for the "velvet" revolution in the Georgian mass information media are several. The principal reason lies in the fact that after the tragedy of April, when people perished at the Government Building, the

Georgian Communist Party lost its last shreds of faith among the people. Everything thereafter became merely a matter of time. Even the extremely radical pre-election program with its passionate devotion to national ideals could not spare the Communists from becoming a hopeless minority in the parliament. Things got even worse. One of the inglorious pages of the history of the Georgian Communist Party was turned right before my eyes. At midday on Monday we had made arrangements to meet with the Central Committee Secretary for Ideology at the same time on Tuesday. The next morning we learned that the party ideologue, along with the first and second secretaries, had been given the sack. The motive was the very same: loss of confidence in the party. Thus, what were the ideas here, and what were the disputes about property like?

PRAVDA, the major publisher in Georgia and the only publishing house of the Georgian CP Central Committee in Tbilisi, having merely changed its name to SAMSHOBLO (Motherland), thus far still belongs to the Communist Party, and is counting up its ever-diminishing profits. But I do not think there will be a lawsuit on property here either, if the new authorities, the new political majority, wish to and are able to assume the burden of the exacting business of operating a publishing house. The traditional dispute—with whose money it was built—is still up in the air. The fixed capital of the publishing house is valued at 23 million rubles. More than half of that sum, according to calculations of the CPSU Central Committee, was contributed from the party budget. "If they are serious," says SAMSHOBLO Director V.P. Yesvandzhiya, "then the publishing house would have taken in 7-10 million rubles in profits for many years, and the contributions from the party coffers would have been repaid many times over. Although," clarifies Vakhtang Partebnovich, "the printing presses which came to us from Moscow were worth a half million dollars. But the cost to us was 320,000 rubles."

The latter is the very reason for which the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet are in no hurry to enter into a dispute on the new status of the publishing house. "We do not have a cent's worth of currency," lamented V.P. Yesvandzhiya, "and the tympani for the printing presses, for example, which we used to buy in England, will be exhausted in two months. Nor does the Council of Ministers yet have serious ties with the publishers of the world, in order to organize supplies. Finally, if the cost of paper continues to rise, we will last until mid-year at best. The republic budget is already in the red without us, and it is hard to envision subsidies. In short, we are not ready for the market."

I think, that if a dispute arose over the publishing house, we would fully resolve it. For now the well-known formula: "your idea—your money" on all accounts, in its own way suits both sides. The first part—the "Round Table" and the party bloc which determines the face of the parliament; and the second, the Communist Party, which in essence is left with no contributors.

As far as the political side is concerned... Some, I can see now, are simply dividing the air with their hands: "The Communists have capitulated!" Others, who are more calm, counter: "They acted wisely!" Some say, "They have betrayed their ideals!" But others declare, "They have taken a step in accordance with the people's will and in their interest. And so the party, which for 70 years affirmed that it was one with the people, will benefit as well." I see no reason not to agree with the Tengiz Dikhamindzhia, deputy chief of the Supreme Soviet press center: "The people elected this Supreme Soviet in free elections, and the people have a right to hear its voice. The moreso, that the newspapers which were transferred from the CPSU Central Committee are the organs of the entire parliament, and not that of a single 'Round Table.' There is space in it for the opposition too. If it turns out that our bloc finds itself in the minority, then we will turn the newspaper over to the new parliamentary majority."

Incidentally, I ask that you treat the news of the death of the party newspapers as somewhat premature. The Communist Party still has its own newspaper, but now it is called TSKHOVREBA (Life). (A recent Central Committee plenum stressed that a Russian-language communist newspaper was needed also). It is true that the circulation is somewhat more modest than before, and its influence less. And it is another thing that party journalists do not always make the most skillful use of this circulation.

Here is just one example. Several times in a row (and I heard it myself at one meeting), Parliament Chairman Z.K. Gamsakhurdia declared that former Georgian CP Central Committee First Secretary G.G. Gumbardze had allegedly moved into the Oktyabrskaya Hotel in Moscow along with several former leaders, and are preparing something along the lines of a "national salvation committee." What can one say, such an accusation is a serious one. I must acknowledge that I have never been a member of the Communist Party; therefore I am hardly a suitable advocate for the Georgian Communists. Nevertheless, upon arrival in Moscow I phoned both Oktyabrskaya Hotels. Neither one had the people whose names had been noted at the meeting. I did not carry the "investigation" further; it is not my affair. But, I am certain, it is the affair of Georgian communist-journalists. No matter how popular its leader is in the republic, irresponsible statements must be called irresponsible, and groundless accusations—groundless. There is a proper way to wage a political struggle.

It is possible that this would exhaust my topic, the traditional watershed (the old and the new authorities). As if the transfer of the most important newspapers in the republic from one hand to another were the obstacle. The question is more complicated than that. Today about 100 newspapers are published in Georgia. Dozens of parties took part in the first free elections. Even though they did not reach the parliament, many of them have not ceased to exist in nature, and have their adherents to this day. Finally, the national movement,

with all its power, was far from homogeneous. And so the question is, accordingly, a much broader one—about public opinion in Georgia, about the social atmosphere in it, and about the political climate of the difficult and quite often dramatic period of transition.

In something like three months, the press in Georgia has made a "180-degree turn." Since the October elections, without waiting for new publishers, the leaders, even the leaders of newspapers which had for decades hewed to the pro-communist line, began to noticeably and sometimes radically change their position: I would note in passing, practically with the very same, unchanged collective. By the way, in every editorial office they told me that the views and aspirations of the journalists coincided with the position of the new authorities, that finally they could write what they think, and that they had changed their status (if that happened) at the government's behest, however, at their own desire as well.

I was truly happy for my colleague: Not to have to act against one's conscience. For a journalist it is great good fortune when the opinions of the publisher, the editor, and his own coincide. Sholokhov's words came to mind as well, about the fact that the hearts of Soviet writers belong to the party, and it is the heart in turn and not the party at all that guides their hands and controls their creativity. In a word, the meetings with my colleagues, such as are found among journalists, were good, and the conversations—from the heart, and sincere.

After the meetings I set about reading the newspaper files, sometimes alone and sometimes with the help of my Georgian comrades. Three basic trends, it seems to me, set the tone and the direction of the Georgian press today. The first is the national idea, the state sovereignty and political independence of Georgia; the second is opposition to the center, to the Union, in nearly everything; and the third is—anticommunism (I hope that the reader would accept this word, used so tritely in our press, calmly, without ideological hysteria, as a given of the frame of mind and the correlation of political forces).

Each of the three trends, even if not of direct concern to me as a Russian, are at least clear and understandable. Incidentally, if we add such a "minor point" as one's basically irrational national feelings, we can understand that for the Georgians, all three trends are all the more understandable and of direct concern indeed. At the center they often ignore these things. However it also explains the ease with which the appeals and the slogans which are on the printing presses in the evening, are instantly accepted by the masses in the morning.

But I read on. And, it was strange: the more I went into the newspaper files, the more the vividly the feeling became. Yes, the sense of each individual article was, as a rule, directly opposite to what had been written just six months ago. But... Without exception, they were the opposite. We are painfully aware of the "forest of hands" raised in the pages of the new press. And it is not at all a matter of the "forest" voting unanimously (You

remember? You have not forgotten?) against the communist past. The fact of the matter is that today Georgia, I repeat, is not at all homogeneous—both politically and socially, and even moreso economically. There is the National Congress; there is the “Svoboda” [Freedom] bloc; there is “Democratic Georgia”... Each with its own views and platforms.

Incidentally, these old friends of ours—unanimity and unity of thought—showed through from issue to issue. I do not want to say that there is no place for critical correspondence in the Georgian newspapers, that discussion is forgotten. After occupying the “chief’s” chair for all of three days at VESTNIK GRUZII and not yet used to the telephone buzzer, Iya Mukhraneli told me: “We strive to present the opinion of every nation and all the political forces in the republic.” Well, it is entirely possible that pluralism will truly come to pass in the near future.

But today... Today, with rare exceptions, I have not encountered in the newspapers any dissidence on key problems, I saw no opposition to the basic purposes or slogans of “Round Table” day, or to the Supreme Soviet or its Chairman. I cannot get out of my head the words of Giya Patsuriya, former chief editor of what is in my view the best Russian language newspaper in the republic, MOLODEZH GRUZII: “The new authorities have inherited from the former their worst ‘bolshevik’ manners.” (More on why Giya Patsuriya is the—former—editor, a little later on.)

I do not want to be understood as saying that it is my intention to lecture the Georgians on how they should live, and what they should read and print. The people have elected their own parliament, and as they say, may God give them happiness and enlightenment with this parliament. My mission is more modest and more delicate—to share a few doubts.

There is no such thing as a perfect government; nor are there politicians who never err. The economic and political instability with which Georgia is living at present require careful movements and precise steps. The state of balance of all the powers—legislative, executive, judicial, and not the least of them, the “fourth estate”—the press, are the chief guarantees that the boat of changes will not capsize, and that it will reach the long-awaited shore.

Alas... Here are just a few spheres in which the Georgian press, in my view, does not shine, neither in terms of common sense, nor in terms of independence; where the “fourth estate” in essence blends with all the others as one.

For the Georgians—from the minister to the housewife—the most critical and painful question today is without a doubt the “Osetian” question. Tskhinvali is on everyone’s lips. One hears complaints against the central press from all sides: the confrontation is depicted as

one-sided. Publish our position (or at least no interviews): the land has been Georgian from time immemorial; the Osetian people are immigrants; the conflict is essentially not a national but a political conflict—provoked from the center at the hands of the Tskhinvali Party-Soviet hierarchy, in order to distract the Georgians from the national-liberation struggle and punish them for not wanting to sign the Union Treaty. This point of view is in every republic newspaper. Now I have presented it in the central press. And I hope I will be allowed to ask a question.

Let us suppose that the first, incorrect, move of the dramatic “Tskhinvali Party” had in fact brought them to power in Southern Osetia, declaring it a union republic. But the people, the ordinary Osetian people, why did they so easily and quickly accept the idea of separatism? Was it not because, like other ethnic minorities, they were simply frightened by the pre-election speeches of Round Table leader Z.K. Gamsakhurdia? Today, of course, one can disown the slogan, “Georgia for the Georgians.” But for those who do not remember, I will remind you: “Here the Tatar nation is raising its head and is threatening Kakhetiya; there the Lek nation; there the Armenian nation; and there the Osetian nation too... And you see it has already come to a halt: neither the Tatars nor the Leks are leaving Georgia... But strength is on our side, the Georgian nation is with us, and we shall deal with all traitors, we shall summon everyone to give a proper account, and we shall drive all the wicked enemies and the non-Georgians who have been given refuge here out of Georgia.” All this on the eve of coming to power and in the campaign, and is far from episodic.

Or let us take the complete abolishment of South-Osetian autonomy—did the response not lead to a national conflict (if perhaps, I repeat, in response to a mistake)? Would it not have been wiser, more statesman-like, to simply return the status-quo?

Let me make the proviso once again: the “Osetian” conflict is extremely complex and tragic, and demands careful examination. Everything that I set out above is merely certain versions gleaned from conversations—from conversations, but not from the pages of the newspapers. There one finds complete unanimity of thought—lean, well-known, and a guarantee against mistakes.

The transition period in Georgia today has spread to the authorities as well. Henceforth, the Supreme Soviet Presidium is sending prefects, possessing exclusive power, to the rayons. This was motivated by the need for rapid and decisive actions, and by the desire not to be inundated in debates. This is reasonable. But it was not only once or twice that I had occasion to hear serious fears, that the prefects would in time be turned into newly-fledged raykom secretaries, with all the “accompanying” circumstances. I had occasion to hear these things, but was unable to read them.

Nor is there a hint of controversy in the press on the legislative activities of the new parliament. In the Supreme Soviet itself, they cited the most important laws as the law on the National Guard, and on the prefects; that is, once again strengthening the executive power. No doubt about it, that is important. But the economy is in complete disarray. Would not the top priority be—laws on entrepreneurship, property, land? The forthcoming land legislation will be, incidentally, far from non-controversial, it seems to me. The land remains the property of the state, and cannot be sold by the farmers, but only inherited. Does it not seem that such “half-hearted measures” came out of the blue, in a republic that has, I am assured, been liberated? The reasons, alas, are not economic—but political: they say, that if the ethnic minorities, who live in compact groups, come into possession of the land, they might declare a sovereign republic. I do not know; is that better than our own ideological incantations, “We shall not give up our principles!” or not? At least it is also proper to consider other opinions. But the press is silent.

I met with many journalists in Georgia, and heard quite a few ideas from them, including some which fall into the seditious category and consequently do not appear in the newspapers. “Our national movements have come to blows because of personal ambitions.” “Why repeat ad infinitum that Georgia is the country of the Georgians; for that is clearly the case.” “It was not his program that pushed Gamsakhurdia to the pinnacle of power, but the Georgians’ demands for effective rule.” “The greatest tragedy today is the fact that the national idea has suppressed all the rest in Georgia—the rights of man, economic freedom, and similar self-evident values.”

Unfortunately, I cannot give the names of these journalists, who spoke, I believe, altogether harmlessly, in terms of the national standards of today. Because, even in connection with a brief notice on soccer which was considered “unpatriotic,” today they can set up real obstructions here for a journalist, and for the members of his family. Even Radio Liberty, which can hardly be accused of pro-soviet passions, immediately reported on the bulletin of the republic Supreme Soviet press center, criticizing the non-democratic step of the new authorities. Moreover, in the very same tone with which the press of the stagnation period used to “put” the dissidents “in their place.”

Finally, in their “discussions” among themselves the heads of the leading parties and the leaders of the national movements are delving even deeper into the history of their native land in their lexicon: “enemy of the Georgian people,” “KGB agent,” “mercenary traitors,” “congress of traitors,” and so on.

Such is the trend today: one of the basic peculiarities of social life in Georgia (along with the unusually high wave of nationalism, striving for state sovereignty and the breakdown of the economy), political impatience is becoming more and more persistent.

No, it is not a question of everyday patience. I was touched by a story on how not long ago Givi Taktakishvili, presently chairman of the Supreme Soviet Economic Commission, who for many years had lived with his family in a damp basement, gave up his turn for an apartment to an Osetian neighbor, who had been renting little corners all his life. I know many such cases. The kind-heartedness and humanity of the Georgians, which they have had for centuries, remains the same, and will always be so. In everyday life everything is as before. But in the awakening political life, there is, I repeat—impatience. This is felt especially in the press.

My Georgian colleagues lamented to me that a new “internal censor” had already appeared among many; that this prevents them from looking at life in all its vagaries and contradictions; and that in the final analysis all of this does not serve the cause of the republic itself, and the changes in it. Nothing can be said against that.

The trend has a tendency to come to a logical conclusion. I have already spoken about the trends in the Georgian press. And now—about its logical conclusion. I fear it is not the last.

The decree of the republic Council of Ministers on the fact that MOLODEZH GRUZII [Young People of Georgia] would be combined with two other newspapers, ZARYA VOSTOKA and VECHERNIY TBILISI, came without any warning at all in mid-December. The motive was lack of paper. The journalists at “MOLODEZHKA” declared that they would get the paper themselves. For about a month, VECHERNIY TBILISI remained the city newspaper. But MOLODEZH GRUZII continued to dangle between heaven and the printing plant. And then they were officially told that Georgian youth did not think like they did. And the Council of Ministers granted permission to open a new newspaper, and that is the name under which it was registered—NOVAYA GAZETA. They found paper, sponsors, and computers. But that was the end of the matter. The publishing monopolist refused them printing facilities (“The machinery is worn out.”), and one after another they began to “liberate” the rooms of the now former “MOLODEZHKA.”

“Besides,” SAMSHOBLO Director V.L. Yesvandzhiya told me, “what with their small circulation and the new prices for paper, the newspaper would have lost 200,000 rubles a year.”

I asked the question about the former republic youth newspaper last. And I already knew that “at the new prices,” 80 percent of Georgian newspapers can promise only losses; that about 50 new newspapers are being printed on the “worn-out machinery,” most of them with small circulations; newspapers which, finally, in fact would have had no losses, neither from MOLODEZH GRUZII, nor from NOVAYA GAZETA—the journalists had found themselves sponsors.

I knew, while asking the question about the newspaper, that the main one was—its contents. I would remind you

that MOLODEZH GRUZII was the only Georgian, and not just Georgian—the only Soviet newspaper that had enough courage to come out immediately after 9 April with the truth about the crime and the tragedy. At that time the editorial office was ransacked by soldiers, who confiscated practically the entire edition. That issue, I am convinced has become the pride of Georgian journalism, but at the same time is a bibliographic rarity as well. But I advise you to search through the newspaper files, and read other issues of MOLODEZH GRUZII, for the past year, let us say—you will not be disappointed: the newspaper is sharp, and is as courageous as before. In it you will truly find the greatest variety of opinions. There were critical articles aimed at the Round Table bloc, the future authorities, as well. (It is true, that Round Table's responses were even more critical.) The personal opponents of Zviad Gamsakhurdia fought impersonally on the pages of the newspaper (and he, incidentally, responded in the same way). And only through very careful reading could one find a certain attraction of the former MOLODEZH GRUZII to the positions of the National Congress, a movement that is also exclusively national, but which stands in opposition to the Round Table bloc, and consequently, to the new Supreme Soviet as well. For this reason, the statement from the Supreme Soviet press center called the newspaper a "submarine of the KGB and the Komsomol," asserted that it had hindered the national-liberation movement of the Georgian people, and promoted the inflammation of inter-ethnic enmity. And they closed it down for reason of unsuitability—and it is not only the journalists of MOLODEZHKA who are convinced of this.

In actual fact the position of MOLODEZH GRUZII is not without controversy, and is not without its flaws: nevertheless, they were closer than others to positions of common sense, to common human values that transcend party and national values. I would say that the manifesto of the newspaper was the article, "I Believe in Common Sense," by a prominent Georgian, a philosopher known to the world as Merab Mamardashvili, published not long before his death. Here are a number of its program ideas, to which I am prepared to subscribe.

"I am personally convinced that the path from slavery to freedom goes by way of interpretation of the formula: 'What does every Georgian want for his children?' Sobriety is called for. After all, the struggle must not be made on the basis of a nation, but for the freedom of the people."

"The only language in which one may shift the ruling structure, without changing its essence, is the language of pure national statehood, the language of leadership and a pure race."

"The monopolizing of the right of some people to truth is at hand. The only way out is a mass movement against such anomalies... If the Georgians do not want to protest, it means that they have degenerated."

"If they promise me that Georgia will once again be adorned with toasts, like, 'Long Live Georgia!'—well, I have heard that from the lips of the butchers 40 years ago, and that was not Georgia for me, just as it was not for anyone with sensitivity and a conscience."

"We must learn to sense the violation of our own human dignity. Unfortunately, many of my fellow-citizens are more sensitive to insults on their national honor, than to abasement of their human dignity, which brings slavery and injustice, lies and meanness."

"Defending the dignity of the Abkhazian, the Armenian, and the Ossetian means defending one's own dignity; otherwise I do not have a very deep understanding of a Georgian."

"Georgians must wake up and understand, that destabilization of everyday life will serve the purposes of the ruling structures... I do not accept those slogans of the national movement which promise me a new life of slavery."

It is a pity, that common sense has not yet triumphed.

In conclusion, I will cite yet another thought of the prominent Georgian Merab Mamardashvili: "I do not want faith...I want freedom of religion."

1991 Georgian Publications Listed

91UN1085B Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
1 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Georgiy Gamsakhurdia: "Coupons for Disinformation"]

[Text] The impression is created that coupons have been established for journalism...for "hot information." True, it is not always that easy to redeem them; but, once demand exists, there must be supply. And evidently, certain workers of the pen believe that in this matter all means are good ones.

On 27 January the Central Television program "Namedni" [The Other Day] reported on the closing of the last Russian-language newspaper in the Republic of Georgia. For those of us who live in this land, the absurdity of this report was not in doubt... Nevertheless, let us turn to the facts.

Below we present the reply of the Soyuzpechat RPO [unknown], which we received in response to an editorial inquiry:

Information

As of 1 February 1991, the following publications are being published in Georgia:

Russian Language**Newspapers:**

1. **Republic:** VESTNIK GRUZII, NOVAYA GAZETA, REZONANS;
2. **Oblast:** SOVETSKAYA ABKHAZIYA, ADZHARIYA, SOVETSKAYA OSETIYA;
3. **City:** VECHERNYY TBILISI, KUTAISSKAYA PRAVDA, RUSTAVI, TKVARCHELSKIY GORN-YAK, AVANGARD (city of Gagra);
4. **Rayon:** ZARYA (Bogdanovka), BZYB (Gudauta), LENINSKIY PUT (Tsalka);
5. **Departmental and Advertising Newspapers:** OGNI INGURI, ZHELEZNODOROZHNIK ZAKAVKAZYA, NOVINKI EKRAHA, GOVORIT I POKAZYVAET TBILISI, VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA GRUZII, MORYAK GRUZII, SOBRANIE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITELSTVA GRUZII, NA RUBEZHAKH RODINY, LENINSKOE ZNAMYA, NOVYE FLAGI.

In Other Languages:

GURDZHUSTAN (Azeri language), VRASTAN (Armenian), APSNY KAPSH (Abkhazian), SOVETON IRYSTON (Osetian), ARSHALUIS (Armenian and Russian), KVEMO KARTLI (Georgian and Azeri), BZYB (Abkhazian and Russian), BOLNISI (Georgian and Azeri), TRIALETI (Georgian and Azeri), ERTSAKHU (Georgian and Abkhazian), LENINELI (Georgian and Osetian), KOLKHOZON TSARD (Georgian and Osetian), SAMGORI (Georgian and Azeri), SHUKURI (Georgian and Armenian), and SAMTSKHE (Georgian and Armenian).

Magazines:

LITERATURNAYA GRUZIYA, SUBTROPICHESKIE KULTURY, MATSNE (Georgian and Russian); IZVESTIYA AN GRUZII, SERIYA KHMICHESKAYA, SERIYA BIOLOGICHESKAYA; KOMMUNIST GRUZII, VZGLYAD, RUSSKOYE SLOVO.

In Other Languages:

ALASHARA (Abkhazian), AMZAPTS (Abkhazian), APSAN AKAZARA (Abkhazian), ASHKOLA ALSTAZAREN (Abkhazian), and FUDIUAG (Osetian).

**V. NARKOSHVILI, deputy chief,
Soyuzpechat RPO.**

We knew that a lot of newspapers were being published in the languages of non-indigenous nationalities in Georgia (It is not a question of Abkhazian periodicals)—but in such numbers?! I admit that it was a surprise. So, are they all alike or what? Does each one have its own readership? If it does, then may God grant them long and fruitful work. But if not—does it make sense for the state, under

the new economic conditions, to maintain these publications (I have in mind the state publications)? Well, the appropriate organs will probably have to answer this question very soon.

Georgian Trade Unions Accuse TRUD of 'Malicious' Slander

AU2803143691 Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
19 March 91 p 3

[Open letter written by the ruling body of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Georgia to the editorial board of TRUD—date not given]

[Text] Recently, when purposeful and planned anti-Georgian hysteria, lies, and slander have occupied a significant and, at times, principal place on the pages of the central press and on television and radio, it is difficult to award first place to any information organ in this frenzied rivalry. The TRUD collective is not lagging behind but is up among the front runners. With its help, the multimillion reading public of the USSR is regularly receiving malicious disinformation that, for the sake of plausibility, is being diluted with a falsely lachrymose feeling of worker solidarity. What we have in mind, in the first instance, is the coverage of events in historical Samachablo or, as this region of the indivisible Republic of Georgia is being referred to, as usual, by the center, "South Ossetia" (TRUD, 12 March, and so forth).

What doesn't one encounter on the pages of this newspaper: from crudely fabricated and quickly put together shocking propaganda ploys to cunning lies about atrocities committed by Georgians. There is everything but the truth. However, this is understandable. After all, the truth does not further the set aim of the center—to deliberately disinform the toiling masses. It is feared, first and foremost, both by the executors (the journalists of TRUD) and the instigators (those in the Kremlin who are responsible for this current policy of imperial evil) who are aiming to artificially prepare public opinion so that they can justify the implementation of regular imperial measures and claim that these are unavoidable in the given situation.

Cynical lies are being spread throughout the country by a newspaper circulation of many millions, sowing seeds of doubt in the country's labor collectives and in the hearts of ordinary people and, at times, fostering enmity toward the Georgian people.

TRUD sympathizes with the Ossetian refugees, modestly keeping silent about the unfortunate Georgian and Ossetian working people who are streaming out of Samachablo to the republic's center. Journalists solemnly describe the Ossetian houses that have been burned down yet practically do not allude to the fate of Georgian houses, schools, and entire villages. They are horrified by the cruelty of criminal bands who have arrived here from the distant corners of the vast Union, even from Kemerovo itself. However, they do not trouble themselves to answer the question: What "benevolent" force

has encouraged them to come to this long-suffering land of Georgia from places where they were held under specially strict prison conditions? Correspondents list the types of weapons that are being used in the conflict; these include homemade weapons and the latest standard weapons in the arsenal of the Army that has been summoned to stabilize the situation in the region. However, they stubbornly refuse to name the factories in Tskhinvali where weapons are being manufactured by Ossetian extremists and the military units who are constantly supplying these extremists with unguided missiles.

Perhaps, the most important thing is that TRUD is trying as hard as it can to present the events in Samachablo as simply an ethnic conflict following in the sad line of tragedies: Nagorno-Karabakh, Fergana, Baku, and Novyy Uzen. However, it does not inform its readers that outside Samachablo, on the territory of the same

Republic of Georgia, twice as many Ossetians are living peacefully who angrily condemn their compatriots' actions that are being instigated by a cunning and cruel enemy.

The Confederation of the Independent Trade Unions of Georgia expresses its outrage at the false and provocative insinuations of the trade union organ TRUD that is disinforming the broad reading public and demands that it stops publishing materials which are helping to foment interethnic discord, hatred, and malice. Peace can be restored only through truth, mutual understanding, and a genuine desire for peace. This should be understood by a paper that claims to represent a multimillion army of trade union members.

The ruling body of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Georgia.

Kuropaty Investigation Defended Against New Charge of Falsification

91UN1107A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by BELTA correspondent Yevgeniy Gorelik, under rubric "With Regard to a Certain Published Item": "Who, Then, Shot People in the Back of the Head?, or What the Pursuit for Sensationalism Is Leading To"]

[Text] Late in December the MY I VREMYA newspaper, and on 30 January VO SLAVU RODINU, published extensive items in which, on the basis of the "results of an independent investigation" of former partisan commander I. Zagorodnyuk, there is a decisive refutation of the results of the almost year-long investigation of the "Kuropaty case" by an investigation group of the Belorussian SSR Procuracy and the findings of a governmental commission. Ivan Kharitonovich also expressed his categorical disagreement with their conclusions in a large number of letters that were sent by him to various administrative levels.

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet's Commission for Rendering Assistance in Guaranteeing the Rights and Interests of Rehabilitated Individuals and Their Families and in Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of Repressions reviewed those published items and statements and came to the conclusion that they do not have any documentary foundation and were constructed on abstract conjectural ideas and subjective hypotheses that cannot serve as proof.

In accordance with the commission's recommendation, we are publishing today material that has been prepared by a BELTA correspondent.

The published items could not fail to attract the reader's attention, since each one of them had the headline "Sensation!" And it was explained why: "A former commander of a partisan detachment demands the reconsideration of governmental findings concerning the investigation of the circumstances of death in a wooded area near Minsk."

The author of the sensationalistic item, I. Kh. Zagorodnyuk, and the editorial offices that gave him a rostrum in the press assert unambiguously: there are no NKVD victims in Kuropaty. "...Not a single one of the arguments, not a single highflown statements made by experts, provides any foundation for the governmental commission to conclude that the people who are buried at Kuropaty are NKVD victims," I. Zagorodnyuk asserts authoritatively. And then, as often happens, he immediately protests loudly, "Therefore I protest decisively and categorically against that conclusion, against the decision to erect a monument to the victims of fascism as being NKVD victims."

Ivan Kharitonovich does not have any doubts, and, in response to questions with which the investigation and

the governmental commission struggled for almost a year, he answers without any vacillation: "victims of fascism." For the sake of justice we shall say that, in order to reach such a serious conclusion, at first he had to "arm (himself) with a compass, pencil, and paper, and carry out (his) own investigation..." The result of that painstaking labor was to be a map of Kuropaty executed on a scale of "one centimeter equals 35 paces."

Well, he can have that map and those "paces," because, as MY I VREMYA states in an appendix, "...in his arguments (I. Zagorodnyuk) relies not only on a topographic and logical analysis, but also upon a tremendous amount of his own experience and upon information that he accumulated during the terrible wartime years." Who knows whether it is sufficient to have even "a tremendous amount of experience" in order, in an offhand and playful manner, to refute the investigation's arguments that were based on the depositions given by almost a hundred witnesses, including eye witnesses, and on the conclusions of dozens of the most complicated expert evaluations.

Incidentally, about eye witnesses. For some reason I. Zagorodnyuk stubbornly refuses to acknowledge their existence and states just one time: "As for the forest that was allegedly cut down during the fascist occupation and that 55 eye witnesses testified about, it did not even exist there!"

We understand that it would have been simply absurd to dispute seriously the assertions and ideas that rely, as we have already said, on "a tremendous amount of his own experience" and on information from the "terrible wartime years." Answers to them have been given in the documentary book "Kuropaty: sledstviye prodolzhayetsya" [Kuropaty: The Investigation Continues], which was published early last year and which contains rich factual material that had been obtained by the investigation group. Also, in the very first item published by Z. Poznyak and Ye. Shmygalev, "Kuropaty—The Road of Death," from which, properly speaking, everything began, in the reports on the course of the investigation, in a long interview with the republic's procurator that was published after the completion of the investigation, and in a large number of other articles and essays, those answers do exist.

Nevertheless, after apologizing to the reader for any possible repetitions of previously published items, we would like to quote several brief excerpts from depositions given by people whose memory has preserved the events of that terrible and bitter time. We do this especially for those for whom I. Zagorodnyuk's "sensational revelations" involuntarily caused alarming doubts in their soul.

Here, then, is an excerpt from a statement made by retiree Yekaterina Nikolayevna Bogoychuk:

"I have been living in the village of Tsna-Yodkovo since I was born. The forest that is situated between the beltway and the Zaslavl road used to be called Brod... We

lived on a farm near the forest. In the evening, when you went out into the street, at about 2300 or 2400 hours, you could hear: pow! pow! They were constantly shooting. Once we were gathering berries near a fence. I looked through a hole in the fence and saw a large bush of berries. There was a hole under the fence, and I crawled through it. Immediately a man ran up to me and shouted, 'What are you doing here? Get out of here right now!' and he fired a shot at me... I was terrified and ran away. That was in 1937."

Nikolay Vasilyevich Karpovich, born 1919, retired, states:

"Sometime in 1937, in the forest that was next to our village, they began to put up a fence about three meters high. The boards were attached solidly next to one another, but we kids would cut holes in them and see what was going on there. The territory was guarded by NKVD workers. I myself saw these guard troops many times.

"Usually they would bring in people in vehicles in the evening, around 1700 or 1800 hours. They would shoot them immediately. About twice I saw people being shot. They would line up the people in front of trenches and then shoot them..."

It would be possible to quote dozens of similar pages of depositions by village inhabitants who saw with their own eyes, over a period of several years, these terrible acts of drumhead justice being perpetrated. But, all things considered, these people do not count for I. Zagorodnyuk as an authority if they could not remember whether there had been a forest on the outskirts of the village. Or could it be that Ivan Kharitonovich puts more trust in the statements made by those who were located there, on the other side of the fence, alongside of the victims, people who during those years wore the NKVD uniform?

Sergey Maksimovich Zakharov, 75, served as a janitor in the NKVD komendatura. Here is a brief excerpt from his interrogation.

"On orders issued by the komendant, I and other members of the convoy group, whose names I no longer remember, at about 2200 or 2300 hours, drove up in a closed truck to the 'American'—the internal NKVD prison. The guard loaded into the truck, if my memory does not betray me, about 20 prisoners. We were given the responsibility of guarding them en route to the place where the sentence would be executed, and to prevent them from escaping."

"Where would you take them to be killed by firing squad?"

"We would drive along Logoykoye Shosse for about four kilometers, and then turn to the left. After a few minutes, we would drive into a forest... I never got out of the truck or went to the place where they were shooting people. I would sit in the back of the truck and guard

those who had been sentenced... I do not remember exactly who it was—a person doing the firing or a guard—but he would come to the truck, take a person out, and lead him away. A shot would ring out. Then someone would come for another prisoner, he would be led away, and once again we would hear a shot ring out. They were all shot to death in this manner."

"At that time did not you hear the name of what village was located near that forest?"

"I do not remember the name. I only know that Bochkov's wife came from that village. During the war I heard that the Germans had executed her because her husband was working in the NKVD."

We should explain that Tatyana Yermolovich, wife of Ivan Bochkov, deputy chief of the Belorussian SSR NKVD komendatura, actually had been born in and, prior to her marriage, had lived in the village of Tsna-Yodkovo.

Sergey Nikolayevich Kharitonovich, retiree, former guard at the NKVD internal prison, states:

"I never personally drove any prisoners out to be shot. My job was to take them out of their cells to the truck, which was called the 'black raven.' We would put 15-20 persons at a time into the truck and they would be taken away immediately... I drove out to the execution site only once, in order to dig a fresh grave. We also had to ride in the 'black raven,' and we drove out along the Logyskoye road. Then we turned to the left... We arrived at a forest, and we saw the burial mound there. The bodies in it had already been covered with sand. Our job was to fill in the hole completely and make it level with the ground."

One wonders what would be the feelings in that situation of those persons who had investigated the Kuropaty case and who painstakingly collected those 13 volumes of testimony and physical evidence.

B. Sobolev, chief of the investigation unit of the Blorussian SSR Procuracy, states:

"We feel calm. And we even become gradually accustomed to the refutations of those who do not particularly like the truth about Kuropaty. I had the occasion to meet several times with I. Zagorodnyuk, and to have conversations with him. Here is a record of one of those conversations, which I was forced to make in order subsequently to quote from it when giving official answers to his letters to various administrative levels."

"Could you tell me, Ivan Kharitonovich, why you feel that the bullet casings that were found in Kuropaty, and that were manufactured at Soviet plants between 1928 and 1939, were used by fascists who were killing people by firing squad? Do you have any facts or is this your own hypothesis?"

"I saw the Germans seizing our warehouses. I cannot assert that that ammunition was used during the executions by firing squad at Kuropaty, since I was not an eye witness to those executions. However, judging from my own reasoning, I came to the conclusion that that ammunition could have been seized by the Germans during the occupation of Belorussia."

"Many witnesses reject your assertion, and they state outright that the executions were carried out by NKVD workers..."

"I do not believe those witnesses, since there was no forest at the place where they saw the executions, and they say that there had been one..."

"On what do you base your denial of the results of the ballistic tests that were made by the investigation?"

"I have recently become acquainted with the instructional manual concerning the procedure for carrying out various tests, including forensic ballistic tests, and I can see that actually I do not know all the fine points of those types of tests, and therefore I erred."

(One might note that this conversation took place long before the items were published in the press.)

"You assert that the bend in the laying of the gas pipeline pursued 'political goals,' and made it possible to provide a convenient place for the construction of a future monument. What substantiation do you have for these conclusions?"

"I feel that the pipeline should have been laid without any extra bends. That contradicts common sense and my own experience, as well as the specifications."

Ya. Brolishs, Belorussian SSR Procuracy investigator for especially important cases, and the leader of the investigation group, states:

"To put it honestly, we did not even assume that in the gas pipeline that had been laid much earlier than the time when we began the investigation one could discern any 'machinations' by the investigation. We asked specialists to give their explanations for the bends in the pipeline. And these were the answers we got: 'In the sector that you are interested in... it was planned to lay the gas pipeline through an existing well-traveled cutting 6-7.5 meters in width, to avoid cutting down any trees... Since the gas pipeline ran through the cutting, it repeated all its bends and turns. Filippov, chief project engineer.' And a second document: 'The Mingaz [Gas Ministry] enterprise reports that the high-pressure gas pipeline... was installed in accordance with the construction plan through an existing cutting in order to decrease the amount of trees cut down. Popov, enterprise director.'"

We shall not cite any new arguments, or multiply the testimony that refutes the "conjectures" made by the authors of the published items. For Ivan Kharitonovich they are nothing but "the shame and falsification of the century... outright deception of the public." But there is nothing that can be done: one cannot keep shouting until no one wants to hear anything.

There is one more thing that I would like to remind my fellow journalists about in a friendly way. Special caution and delicacy are needed by those who decide to deal with the topic of a nation's sufferings, the bitter symbol of which is now the incoherent word "Kuropaty." I would like to remind them that they are dealing not simply with a problem, but with thousands of human souls and a memory that is sacred to them.

Sociology Institute Head on Public Opinion Survey Faults

91US0333A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by V. Yadov, director of the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences and president of the Soviet Sociological Association: "Be Careful: A Survey of Public Opinion"]

[Text] Three Simple Rules of Sociology.

Society's perception has long equated sociology with surveys of public opinion. And although this perception is completely incorrect, because sociology is a well ramified area of scientific knowledge, we are reconciled with this image of it. One can prove the opposite by only one method: you make a convincing and deep analysis of the changes that are occurring in society, which requires both deep knowledge and high professionalism. And, what is more, scientific honesty and civic responsibility. Soviet sociology is still just acquiring these qualities. For too many years it has been isolated from world processes for developing science, it has depended too much upon ideological dogmas, and only recently has it acquired an independent status within the system of academic scientific knowledge and the right to train its own people in the universities.

And time does not wait. Social passions are being inflamed to the limit. Antagonistic social forces are using all available means to prove their correctness and the "indubitable" incorrectness and maybe even the evil intentions of their political opponents.

Injections of passion into orbit actively involve that very area of sociology whose concept is understandable to everyone—the public opinion survey. "Well, good, you do not believe me," says a deputy or a political activist. "But perhaps you have some objection to an 'objective sociological survey?'"

Yes, we can.

Everyone knows the bitter joke that there are various types of lies, and among them is the lie of statistics. The data of public-opinion surveys can turn out to be plausible disinformation, considering the way the data are presented today to the public readership and the way that the surveys themselves are at times conducted.

I shall not name the newspapers from which I shall cite examples. First, because of the fact that the reader is inclined to reproach them for political bias, he will begin to suspect nonobjectivity. Second, simply because the examples are typical of a multitude of such examples.

The first example. A survey of readers of an All-Union newspaper, basically a popular medium of the intelligentsia. Questions about attitudes towards private ownership of land. A headline that asserts that people approve of private ownership of land. And it is true that more than 80 percent of the readers answered affirmatively to

the general question of whether such ownership is acceptable. . Were they urban or rural residents? Do they at all represent the population structure of a vast nation? To the question about the purposes for which people would want to acquire land, about 12 percent answered: for commodity production, that is, for sale of farm products at the market. The rest, for a garden plot, for a cottage, and so on. To the question about the size of a private parcel, again about 10 percent aspired to a fair-sized plot (more than 10 hectares), the others to a considerably smaller one.

Who conducted the survey? Prominent specialists in the area of mathematics and computer technology. There was no commentary, no stipulations about the tentative nature of the authenticity of these data and no interpretation of any kind except for the desire to prove the correctness of the policy espoused by the newspaper. And so it is. But is this relevant here to a public-opinion survey?

The second example is no better. A newspaper reports that a scientifically based sampling of the Moscow populace by the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences was used. Unlike the example of unrepresentative surveys in the streets (or in newspapers), the survey was conducted at the place of work and covered all vocational groups. How those surveyed were chosen was not reported. How the questions were put was not clear. It was clear only that here was "authentic science" (this was repeatedly emphasized) and that the people decisively favored the idea of preserving the USSR and they approved the Law of the Presidency about joint patrolling. In this case the workers were the overwhelming majority, while representatives of the creative intelligentsia were all as one—they were against it. Literally, that is how it was said. Perhaps these "creative intelligent ones" numbered three or ten people? At this very same time a survey was conducted by other researchers in Leningrad, but on the street and also—with a representative sample. According to the results of this survey, 48 percent of the unskilled workers, 65 percent of the skilled workers, and 40 percent of the humanitarian intelligentsia said they were for the formula of referendum and preservation of the Union.

As a specialist and, moreover, as one who is informed about the professional level of the centers known to me, I can trust some papers and have doubts about others. For example, I know that in Leningrad the survey was conducted by professionals who are respected in our sociological society, and who are, moreover, radically aligned. It was not in their interests to emphasize that 40 percent of the creative intelligentsia came out as opponents of the "unitary state" (as was said in the commentary and the publication). But, without revealing their political sympathies, they told us factually the information received, and they indicated the formulation of the questions, the makeup of the sample, and the deviation of the sample from the statistics of the distribution of the urban population by group of those surveyed.

But what is the reader, and, all the more so, officials who makes important political decisions, to do? Ideas have already been floated about creating our own centers for conducting surveys, for no one can be trusted, everyone is in one way or another biased in his intentions and his presentation of the data. Science and politics have been mixed together into one. Moreover, politicians capitalize on the scientific data, and they manipulate social opinion in their interests, supposedly relying on...sociology.

Two scientific reports by American specialists recently fell into my hands. With meticulous thoroughness, the authors assessed the authenticity of the data of public-opinion surveys that were conducted in our country during the period up to the end of 1989, they compared the competency of various centers and organizations, and they even extended the evaluations: USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] and its social-survey service—was the only one awarded the highest rating—a “5.” VTsIOM [All-Union Center for Study of Survey Information], which at the time was just developing its activity, received a “4” evaluation. My institute, alas, was awarded a “3” (instead of the “2” of previous years, thanks even for that). The overwhelming majority of the surveys, especially newspaper surveys, were evaluated, completely correctly, even lower. And not because they were all unreliable. Only because they did not give the reader information about the sample, about the magnitude of error in distribution of the answers (they are always inevitable), or even about the complete formulation of the question itself.

To take the matter further, sociologists are in for the same fate as that of all other social institutes and organizations whose authority has been dropping steadily. People are losing faith and getting accustomed to the fact that they are simply being deceived.

In calling deputies, political leaders, and the press to account, we are obligated to do at least the simplest thing that is within our powers: to give society reliable knowledge about the state of mind and the opinions, moods, and assessments of its citizens. If we do not know which decisions are the most reasonable, then at least we should know how people relate to them, whether they understand or do not understand their proximate and remote consequences. Public opinion is a subject where one need not speak about absolute competency, but one can make judgments about the positions of various population groups. It is the business of society itself and of its empowered representatives, leaders of public movements, and each person individually to understand various decisions. But, in this connection, he should know what others are thinking. He longs for this knowledge and searches for allies and opponents. In the event of a general social crisis, errors in such evaluations can be tragic and irrevocable.

And it must be said that this is not so complicated—to ascertain the soundness of given public-opinion methods. There is an art in getting objective data. Here,

just like in the market for commodities. To make something of good quality is the task of the skilled craftsman, and everyone who knows the criteria for making evaluations can evaluate the merits of what has been done.

Let us remember three comparatively simple rules.

Rule One. If something published about a public-opinion survey lacks information about the makeup of those surveyed (the sample), do not believe what is said there. Do not be hypnotized by the numerical value of the sample (thousands of respondents). This is not of the essence. The main thing is the quality of choosing the respondents, how much their composition by basic indicator (sex, age, and social and professional groups) deviates from the actual distribution in a given region and whether the rule of equal probability of one's being among those surveyed was observed. Conscientious and knowledgeable specialists will do a so-called “repair” of the sample and will eliminate displacements in favor of some population group and in the composition of the newspaper readers, for example; but let this displacement exist. We are obligated to report this. Absolutely authentic data does not generally exist. The main thing is to know the margin of error and the limitations of the conclusions. A brief phrase is needed: a survey of the population of some region that is representative by sex, age and education has an error of plus-or minus some certain percent, with a displacement in favor, let us say, of greater representation by the population of some nationality. Now we ourselves can judge how true are the discussions about the “majority” or “minority” in definite items of the survey. If the majority is 54 percent, and the errors is within the range of 5, then actually this can be 49, or 59. It must be compared with other distributions.

A competent presentation of survey data in general forces the reader to think and to penetrate into the essence of the problem and to refrain from swallowing blindly the definitions and interpretations offered. If information about the sample of those surveyed is not reported to us, this means either the survey was conducted unprofessionally, or negligently, or—what is worse!—they want to lead us into a misconception.

Rule Two. You should know the complete formulation of the question and the distribution of all the answers. Pleas that the newspaper or other report does not have enough space cannot be justified here. When I read, for example, that such and such a percent of those surveyed “decisively” support the President, and so many are “decisively” against, I suspect the publication's author of negligence or guile. In cases of this kind, most people with sound judgment state their opinions carefully, preferring the formula, “basically,” or “perhaps,” or something close to that. Either such a variant was not even foreseen, or we have not been given the complete data. When they give you commentary and, in parentheses, percents in favor of some judgment or another, you know that they are imposing their policy on you. You should know the whole truth, what the context is, and

what other judgments and percentage distributions have been obtained. Let the ensuing commentary interpret the data cited. It is possible to concur with it, but one can also formulate one's own opinion.

The press has written much about a trickily formulated question proposed for an All-Union referendum. We know, however, that the answer to it can be defined differently: either for a united, or a renovated, or a socialist federative state, or for the observance of the rights of man, regardless of nationality, or for everything together in question. The recently held Congress of the Soviet Sociological Association expressed its perplexity over the reason for the formulation of the referendum's question. It was intended knowingly to avoid an unambiguous interpretation of the results, but, in so doing, to provide primarily for the voices of the "fors."

Rule Three. Any publication of the results of a public-opinion survey should make reference to the organization or person who conducted the survey. A lack of conscientiousness in public-opinion surveys should be punished no less severely than disinformation in the reports of journalists or television commentators.

The situation that prevails today with public-opinion surveys is more than worrisome. It calls for vigilance. And there is still time to put a stop to the development of an already known, habitual trend: that of committing irrevocable errors and then recanting them. Is it not better to avoid confessions, not to commit the sin?

Moscow Health Care System Facing Financial Difficulties

91US0333B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 9, Mar 91 p 3

[Article by I. Repin, deputy chief of the Main Medical Administration of the Moscow City Ispolkom, and people's deputy of the Moscow Soviet: "Everything Is Collapsing According to Plan"]

[Text] On the threshold of 1991 the Moscow health-care system and with it the health of several million people has come to the verge of a catastrophe. According to calculations of the Main Medical Administration of the Moscow City Ispolkom, in order to provide the city's population with all types of free medical assistance at the former level, the city's health-care budget should grow 2.5-fold in comparison with 1990's.

| Moscow's Health-Care Budget (millions of rubles) | | | |
|--|-------|-----------|-------------|
| | 1990 | 1991 | |
| | | Allocated | Requirement |
| Pay | 442.0 | 482 | 937.2 |
| Budget contributions | 31.0 | 125 | 346.8 |
| Food | 58.9 | 59 | 181.5 |
| Medicines | 121.0 | 154 | 210.6 |

| | | | |
|---|-------|-------|---------|
| Other expenditures | 171.8 | 261 | 385.3 |
| Acquisition of equipment and implements | 53.5 | 60 | 154.3 |
| Acquisition of minor furnishings | 18.8 | 22 | 30.1 |
| Overhaul | 49.8 | 68 | 189.0 |
| Total: | 946.8 | 1,231 | 2,434.8 |

However, the current budget was formulated according to the "residual principle," with a deficit of R1,203.8 million. An analysis of it indicates that increases in appropriations by R182.8 million was enough only for paying for social-insurance deductions (this year they are not seven percent but 26 percent) and for "old debts"—additions to the pay of workers of medical institutions which were promised several years ago. No money has been allocated for raising the pay of medical personnel. The appropriations for household expenses for the hospitals do not consider the rise in wholesale prices and rates for municipal services (electricity 29 percent, heat 60 percent, laundry as much as 400 percent, transport 50 percent, servicing for cooling installations 200 percent), and for the increased expensiveness of produce.

Compare the prices: (rubles and kopecks per kilogram)

| | 1990 | 1991 |
|------------------------|------|-----------|
| Potatoes | 0.10 | 0.50 |
| Tomato paste | 0.70 | 3.27 |
| Poultry | 1.75 | 3.25-3.35 |
| Green peas | 0.69 | 1.53 |
| Bulb onions | 0.50 | 0.80 |
| Meat (2d category) | 1.05 | 2.00 |
| Fruit juice (3 liters) | 1.75 | 5.26 |

The health-care budget for 1991 was reviewed by the Moscow Soviet. Here is the result: there are no funds in Moscow and it is impossible to find 1.3 billion additional rubles for protecting Muscovites' health. There are options for cutting expenditures, but they can yield a saving of only about R70 million, and one cannot cover the "holes" in the budget this way. It is possible to convert to a payment basis for certain types of medical help (cosmetic surgery and health centers), but the complete destruction of the free-medicine system with a reduction of the standard of living is impermissible.

When there is talk about who will be the "owner" in Moscow, the Union and republic leaderships constantly emphasize their "kind" attitude toward the capital's needs. But when the question arises about realistic help for Muscovites, who have the misfortune to live in a "double capital," then right away it is explained that all the city's problems should be solved by the Moscow City Ispolkom and the Moscow Soviet. Without specific additional financing for health care from Union and republic budgets in equal shares, it will be impossible to maintain Moscow's medicine at even the former level.

If Moscow's 250,000 medical personnel, who have been driven to the bitter end, declare a strike, the question of which is already on the agenda, then the consequences for the city and the whole country will be unforeseeable.

Belorussian Doctors Against Abuses in Psychiatric Care

91US0367A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 4

[Open letter to Belorussian officials and public from Belorussian psychiatrists: "The Mental Health of the Population Must Be Protected"]

[Text] A group of scientists and psychiatrists sent an open letter to Chairman N.I. Dementey of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and the heads of news media, law enforcement agencies, and public health agencies. They made several principled statements about the protection of the mental health of the population. At the authors' request, we are printing a slightly abridged version of the letter.

We were motivated to write this letter to the republic parliamentary leadership and the general public by the unobjective, incompetent, and tendentious discussions of topics in psychiatry and psychotherapy that have become so common in the republic news media.

We will cite just a few examples to illustrate this.

An article in one republic newspaper said that a school-girl who watched the television programs of A.M. Kashpirovskiy fell into an abnormal state in which she began to "see" various "images and incidents and to communicate with extraterrestrials." Journalists were delighted with the story, but we were disturbed by it, because we have often seen the appearance or aggravation of mental disorders in people, especially children, following television programs dealing with psychotherapy. According to the author, the girl felt she had the "power" to hypnotize other people, and her teacher permitted her to hypnotize her classmates. Hypnotherapy, however, is far from safe, and this is why the law prohibits the practice of hypnosis by persons without a medical education and outside the walls of medical treatment facilities and prohibits the hypnosis of children of a certain age.

The "Krok" television program on: "Psychiatric Repression in Belorussia," which was first shown on 7 March 1990, was a model of incompetent and biased reporting. All of the statements by the former patients who were invited to appear on the program were taken on faith, without any preliminary investigation. A study of available medical records proved, however, that they were not telling the truth.

A question the host asked one of the patients sounded blasphemous: Is it possible that you were given a special injection to make you appear mentally ill? This kind of question is completely out of line. An investigation revealed that the woman had been given an injection of relanium and dimedrol, which are commonly prescribed

for people in her condition and are used in almost all hospitals, not to mention the fact that many people have these medicines in their own medicine cabinets at home.

We are witnessing the effective creation of a shadow public health sector in the republic, where "would-be doctors" without a medical education (health technicians, electricians, engineers, athletes, etc.), illusionists, absolutely unscrupulous individuals, and even the mentally ill are unimpeded in offering various types of "therapy" for selfish gain. Some have "certificates," "degrees," and "permits" of unknown origin. This kind of activity, however, is prohibited by law in our country and abroad. The conclusions of the Moscow "International Independent Psychiatric Research Center," the president of which is M.G. Tsaregorodtsev (who appeared on the "Krok" program, incidentally, as an expert), are given a great deal of credence in many courts, the editorial offices of newspapers, on television, and among some people's deputies. We feel the need to express our opinion of this organization and warn that its conclusions must be weighed carefully. We have encountered cases in which the center has reported the absence of mental illness in the past or present, after a single examination and without any analysis of earlier medical records, in individuals who are suffering from psychoses or are in a psychotic state. Some have even been issued driver's permits. Recently, one of the center's official forms bore the name of a Belorussian man who not only has no medical training, but does not even have a higher education and was once a patient in a mental hospital himself.

We are certain that some of the people's deputies and journalists discussing psychiatric topics have no knowledge of the elementary legal provisions in this field, ignore the common rules of deontology (medical ethics), and make categorical statements on matters requiring professional knowledge and experience.

Some people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, for example, allowed former patients of mental institutions to read or remove psychiatric medical records. By law, however, only judicial investigative bodies and the highest public health body have the right to do this.

One of the prerequisites for the successful treatment of any illness, especially an emotional disorder, is the patient's trust in the physician. When television makes every effort to portray the physician as a butcher and jailer, can this promote trust? Of course not! It can only arouse fear, suspicion, and belligerence in people, including patients. This view of psychiatrists does not encourage people to seek medical assistance early and to begin treatment at the right time and leads to premature discharges from institutions. This could cause acute illnesses to become chronic, increase the percentage of disabled individuals, and increase the number of suicides and murders of innocent people. These tendencies have already been observed.

This certainly does not mean that there are no shortcomings or problems in the organization of psychiatric care, and these can and must be discussed. There are as many of these in psychiatry as in all health care and in the society as a whole. Because of the low level of general knowledge, part of the population regards mental illness and psychiatric consultations and treatment as something shameful. Many of our patients encounter unjustified difficulties in employment, especially at enterprises which have made the transition to leasing and economic accountability. Psychotherapeutic and social aid to the ill has not been developed adequately. Some hospitals and clinics are located in buildings that do not meet sanitary and hygienic standards. Regulations in mental institutions require further liberalization and humanization.

There are unconscientious and unqualified personnel who make mistaken diagnoses, keep inaccurate records, etc.

We are disturbed that some news media are giving people an irrational view of the world and are promoting mysticism and quackery. There has been a tendency to use the mentally ill for political purposes. Some were treated by psychiatrists for disorders stemming from conflicts in the home or on the job, but now these individuals are saying that they were victims of "political terror" and fighters for the truth and against the totalitarian regime.

We were also motivated to write this letter by the meeting psychiatrists had at the end of 1990 with deputies and journalists from several publications. We were amazed by the biased views of people's deputies S. Naumchik from the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and A. Talkovskiy from the Minsk city soviet, their incompetence, and their efforts to politicize purely medical problems. The brief report on Belorussian television was humiliating in content and purpose. Have people really forgotten the days when scientific issues in genetics, cybernetics, psychology, and so forth were resolved by means of a vote at rallies or the publication of scathing newspaper articles?

We urge the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet to pass the laws: "On the Rights of the Mentally Ill, the Procedure of Rendering Psychiatric Assistance, and the Social Protection of the Personnel of Psychiatric Institutions" and "On the Protection of the Mental Health of the Population."

We urge law enforcement agencies and the courts to enlist the services of legal-psychiatric expert commissions for the investigation of cases connected with diagnosis and treatment.

We urge law enforcement agencies and public health officials on all levels to stop the illegal "therapy" conducted by individuals without the legal right or necessary professional training to offer these services.

We must have an atmosphere in which the psychiatrist will be able to perform his professional duties only in accordance with the law, his conscience, and his professional knowledge.

Republic and Minsk city board members of Scientific Society of Psychiatrists of the Belorussian SSR:

P.P. Volkov, doctor of medical sciences, professor, head of the Psychiatry Department at the Belorussian State Institute for the Advanced Training of Physicians, and chairman of the republic Scientific Society of Psychiatrists; A.F. Skugarevskiy, doctor of medical sciences, professor, and chairman of the Minsk city Scientific Society of Psychiatrists; T.T. Sorokina, doctor of medical sciences and professor in the Psychiatry Department of the Minsk Medical Institute; T.N. Karapina, division head in the republic psychiatric hospital; A.T. Zorko, chief physician in the republic clinical psychiatric hospital; V.T. Kondrashenko, doctor of medical sciences, professor, and head of the Psychotherapy Course at the republic institute for the advanced training of physicians; Yu.P. Sushchenya, chief physician in the Minsk city psychiatric clinic; M.I. Lappo-Osharina, chief physician in the Minsk drug treatment clinic and chief psychiatrist of the city of Minsk; V.D. Korolev, candidate of medical sciences and chief psychiatrist of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health; F.M. Gayduk, doctor of medical sciences, professor, and head of the Psychiatry Department at the Minsk Medical Institute; L.I. Tsvirko, chief physician in the Minsk Oblast psychiatric clinic and chief psychiatrist of Minsk Oblast.

Armenian Official on Social Security Reforms in Republic

91US0380A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
23 Feb 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with A. K. Yesayan, Armenian Republic minister of labor and social security, conducted by GOLOS ARMENII correspondent A. Arakelyan: "Social Protection: Guarantees and Possibilities"]

[Text] A. K. Yesayan is Armenian Republic minister of labor and social security. By training he is a jurist and a graduate of the law department of Yerevan State University. He has worked for 13 years in the republic Ministry of Social Security. For the past four years he has been in the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium apparatus. He was appointed minister at the end of 1990.

What are the ministry's primary means of action? Its tasks and the difficulties connected with performance of them—this and much more was the topic of an interview with A. K. Yesayan conducted by GOLOS ARMENII correspondent A. Arakelyan.

[Arakelyan] Recently a new word, labor, appeared in the ministry's name, and it is listed first. What is your opinion of this change, and what differences are there between the functions of the old and new ministries?

[Yesayan] The ministry's new name is not just a formal change in the old name; it has a logical explanation. People's practical working life begins at age 18 and by law can extend to age 60 for men and age 55 for women. The result of each person's labor is social security provided by the state: a pension. In this sense including the functions of the former Ministry of Labor under our ministry is of great significance, because there are special pensions for people who have worked a certain amount of time, if not their whole lives, under hazardous conditions. Since prior to the unification of the two agencies it was mainly people with a humanities background who worked in the social security system it was difficult for them to determine who had a right to a special pension and who did not. For instance, miners or chemical industry workers have a right to retire at a younger age. Sometimes when pensions were determined everyone was lumped together in the same category regardless of the conditions under which they had worked, whether in hazardous production, underground or in a clean office. Now we take a differentiated approach to each specific case.

Furthermore, now we are dealing directly with the cases of persons being repatriated with regard to employment, aid to children and social security. That is, our ministry handles all the problems encountered by repatriated individuals, and under the conditions existing in our small, compact republic that is the best option, one which precludes all possibility of excessive bureaucracy.

[Arakelyan] Today everywhere one goes one of the main topics of discussion is market relationships. They have scarcely begun, yet already many people have been left without jobs. At the present stage those people are mainly intellectuals: staff from scientific research institutes and creative organizations and engineering and technical personnel from production enterprises. We are witnessing sharp staff cutbacks and sometimes the elimination of entire organizations. Yet the majority of these people who have, to put it bluntly, been tossed out in the street have no entrepreneurial bent for setting up their own businesses. Will there be any sort of special guarantees for them?

[Yesayan] According to the preliminary figures there are presently 270,000 unemployed people in our republic, and in the future this number will continue to grow. I will attempt to explain this figure. The 270,000 include students, and a large number of homemakers, and people who engage in agriculture on their private farm plots and have no desire to work in the state sector of the economy or on kolkhozes. But of course the number of people who truly do not have a job remains strikingly high for our republic; at the present time that number is over 60,000.

Personnel cutbacks are nothing new. Over the past three years there have been two series of cutbacks, primarily among the intelligentsia. The number of cuts has risen in our republic in recent months due to the elimination of or structural changes in many ministries and agencies.

The future does not look encouraging. Market relationships will intensify each person's struggle to keep his or her job. Now the most important criterion will be each person's professionalism, i.e. the amount of that person's actual output.

The republic Council of Ministers has decided to permit special pension conditions for individuals who have been let go as a result of cutbacks: men may retire at 58, and women at 53. Soon the Armenian Supreme Soviet will discuss an employment law which will set forth the status of an employed person; unemployment payments will be made using that law as a guideline. But there is one significant factor: during the period in which unemployment payments are received the unemployed person must undergo retraining, i.e. acquire a skill which is in demand. In view of this we must move more quickly to analyze the supply of and demand for specialists. Fairly intensive efforts in that direction are already being made both by us and by the committee on economics. There are plans to conduct the retraining at special training centers. We are being assisted in establishing these by the International Labor Organization, which deals specifically with such matters; we have already concluded an agreement with them regarding the establishment of such a center in Yerevan. It will be set up using the facilities of one of the capital's vocational and technical schools. This is essential, and it should be begun at once. And we should begin by publishing research findings concerning the fields in which we are producing too many specialists, and those where there are personnel shortages. Another aspect of social protection is a labor exchange which will serve as an intermediary between employers and job seekers and will encompass and categorize all segments of our republic's working population.

I would like to comment on another problem as well: the exodus of highly skilled specialists out of the state sector into cooperatives. What is happening is that due to low pay in the state sector a portion of professionals are moving to the trade and consumer services sectors. It is clear that pay scales in the state sector must change and change quickly.

To sum up what I have said, it is essential to note that our main task today is to ensure social protection for the people against the initial shocks of a market economy. In order to do this we must define a minimum standard of living. Unfortunately, that minimum is changing so rapidly that defining it precisely is a very difficult thing. According to our preliminary figures it is presently over R200 [rubles, monthly]. Yet there remains one "small detail": to find sources of funding and provide this minimum living standard. Whereas previously we were part of a union-wide provision system, now our ministry must seek out its own financial resources. We have already established a special pension fund in which sums are being paid by enterprises, state budgetary organizations and institutions, along with a portion of the money received through privatization. Plus wage deductions for

social security. Furthermore, the republic government will, I believe, find other kinds of "financial injections" for our ministry.

We are also looking for other sources of funding. Among other things, we recently held a charitable concert and auction, all the receipts from which—and they were substantial, R1.8 million—went to raise maintenance standards for nursing homes and homes for mentally retarded children. We will continue this practice.

[Arakelyan] The next thing is privatization, and perhaps more cutbacks—this time among those who perform physical labor.

[Yesayan] Privatization will begin with small enterprises, trade facilities and the service sector. In these areas we see broad opportunities to create new jobs, particularly in the service sector, which to me seems like virgin territory. These opportunities are so great that it is possible that this sector could absorb everyone who becomes unemployed.

I believe that we will pass a law ensuring the employees of privatized enterprises their jobs and salaries for a specified period of time. For instance, if a private individual purchases an enterprise and can get along with eight employees instead of 10, nonetheless that individual will be required to continue paying a guaranteed average salary to the workers let go.

I would like to note that even the term "unemployed" is a relative one. In some regions there will be an overabundance of workers, while in other areas there will be a great labor shortage. For example, presently there is a need for between 40,000 and 60,000 construction workers at construction sites in the disaster area alone. Yet right now thousands of construction workers are moving to other regions of the country to make a living. The same situation exists at a number of industrial enterprises as well.

[Arakelyan] Due to the sharp price increases an unprotected segment of society is taking shape: pensioners, invalids and the poor. Are measures to protect these people envisioned?

[Yesayan] Indeed, the hardest blow is being felt by precisely those groups. And it is only natural that we should ensure them a minimum standard of living. There are plans not to levy taxes on income under R160 per month (the present cutoff amount is R100). Pensioners will receive an additional subsidy of R65 per month, and the stipends of VUZ [higher educational institution] students will increase to R120 per month, while those of students at tekhnikums will go to R100 and those at vocational and technical schools to R60.

Orphaned children will receive R200 per month, while invalid children will receive R135.

There are plans to make an annual payment of R200 for each child under the age of six, R240 for each child between six and 13, and R280 for each child between 13 and 18. We are also going to raise provision allocations for all specialized institutions: hospitals, boarding schools, etc.

There will be wage indexing as well. True, it is my opinion that this should not be done, and I will tell you why. If a worker receives, say, R240 and then gets another R60 in category II, then in effect the worker did not earn that R60. Regardless of his work output he will receive the money. Personally I favor a program which increases wages themselves—this would serve as an incentive to increase labor productivity. True, I do not know which option our parliament will choose.

[Arakelyan] The disaster area and the refugees are a separate topic. Over half a million of our republic's citizens are living under highly uncertain circumstances, whether for lack of a roof over their heads or as a result of supply problems.

[Yesayan] In my opinion, right now the most important task is to provide them with jobs. We should have done this very quickly in the disaster area, say within three or four months, because labor therapy could have been used to bring people out of their state of shock. There are enterprises which should have been put back into operation within a few months. For example, if we had restarted the Stroy mashina Plant in Kumayri, which produces stonecutting equipment, we could have supplied the people with building stone and they could have begun building themselves houses and also deadened their pain at the same time as they provided themselves with a place to live. This was not done, and now in Armenia, the land of stone, the black market price for a single building stone has risen from 40 kopecks to R3.00! The number of construction cooperatives there in the disaster area should have been sharply increased, and they should have been supplied with materials.

Employment of the handicapped is another important problem which persists. We are presently completing a study on classification of these individuals and a specific program to provide them with acceptable jobs. Many handicapped people are presently working at home, but I think that in their situation the right thing for them would be to work in a collective. There is a law which states that every enterprise should create jobs for the handicapped; we need a law which will impose certain monetary penalties if that is not done. We would use the funds thus collected to establish specialized enterprises.

Our ministry wants to approach the government with a proposal that we develop a comprehensive republic program to provide for the handicapped. This program should cover everything, from housing and jobs to recreation and transportation. In my opinion the refugee problem is also primarily a problem of how to employ them in such a way as to provide them with housing as well. We must not forcefully propose to people that they settle in some specific region. In this case market forces are the definitive mechanism for finding them employment. People will want to go to places where there are jobs and will tie their future to those regions. Plus there will be incentives to work under difficult conditions. There is a plan to pay bonuses for working in the high mountains: a 10-percent bonus between 1,500 and 1,800 meters, 20 percent up to 2,000 meters, 25 percent over 2,000

meters, and 25 percent in the disaster area. There is a need to lower retirement age depending on an individual's place of residence. For instance, in Amasiyskiy and Gukasyachskiy rayons men should have a right to retire at age 55 and women at age 50.

[Arakelyan] One last thing. As a rule, every new administrator chooses his own team. Do you have one?

[Yesayan] I have worked in the ministry apparatus for 13 years, and I am very familiar with the professional and personal qualities of virtually everyone here. I am satisfied with the work of an overwhelming majority of my colleagues.

Census Figures on Nationality Composition of Families, Marriages

91UN1138A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 91
Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Article by L. Semenchuk: "At a Reader's Request: Truly One Family"]

[Text] *"I have a request for you: prior to the referendum publish data from our country's 1989 census of population regarding the number of persons of native and other nationalities living in each of the union republics. Because when they make their decision whether to say 'yes' or 'no' to the referendum, people often have little idea to what extent the people of our country are interconnected."* (From a letter by N. Suchkov, war and labor veteran, Ussuriysk, Maritime Kray)

In compliance with Nikolay Ivanovich Suchkov's request we went to Lyudmila Mikhaylovna Yeroshina, deputy head of the Population Statistics Administration under the USSR State Committee for Statistics.

L. Yeroshina acquainted us with data from the 1989 census regarding the number of people of native nationality in union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs. Space does not permit us to publish all the data—we will have to wait for the long-awaited final census figures. But these figures certainly do give one food for thought. For instance, in the Ukraine, Ukrainians comprise 37.419 million out of the total population of 51.452 million. In Belorussia people of the native nationality comprise 7.905 million of a total population of 10.152 million. In Kazakhstan these figures are 6.535 million and 16.464 million, respectively, in Lithuania 2.924 million and 3.675 million, in Latvia 1.388 million and 2.667 million, and in Estonia 963,000 and 1.565 million.

Census data convincingly demonstrate that the long years of living side by side, a common economy and life without barriers or artificial separation along ethnic lines have helped people realize what they have in common as human beings and the unity of their interests and life goals. That is why they react with such pain to interethnic conflicts; that is why they want peace and harmony regardless of the nation to which they belong. Take Russia for example. Here there is a total population of 147.022 million of which, according to census data, 119.868 million are Russians. Within autonomous regions as well as outside of them there are 5.522 million Tatars, 1.774 million Chuvash, 1.345 million Bashkir, 1.073 million Mordvin, 899,000 Chechen, 715,000 Udmurts...

Here are the figures on families of mixed ethnicity:

Breakdown of Families by Nationality of Family Members by Union Republic (Based on 1989 Census of Population)

| | Number of Families (in thousands) | As a Percentage of All Families | |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| | | Families in Which All Family Members Are of a Single Nationality | Families in Which Family Members Belong to Various Nationalities |
| USSR | 73,078 | 82.5 | 17.5 |
| RSFSR | 40,246 | 85.3 | 14.7 |
| Ukrainian SSR | 14,057 | 74.7 | 25.3 |
| Belorussian SSR | 2,796 | 75.4 | 24.6 |
| Uzbek SSR | 3,415 | 87.3 | 12.7 |
| Kazakh SSR | 3,824 | 76.1 | 23.9 |
| Georgian SSR | 1,244 | 87.8 | 12.2 |
| Azerbaijan SSR | 1,381 | 92.1 | 7.9 |
| Lithuanian SSR | 1,000 | 87.2 | 12.8 |
| Moldavian SSR | 1,144 | 75.4 | 24.6 |
| Latvian SSR | 732 | 72.5 | 27.5 |
| Kirghiz SSR | 856 | 83.5 | 16.5 |
| Tajik SSR | 799 | 85.2 | 14.8 |
| Armenian SSR | 559 | 96.2 | 3.8 |
| Turkmen SSR | 596 | 86.7 | 13.3 |
| Estonian SSR | 427 | 82.7 | 17.3 |

Interethnic Marriages in 1988 (As Percentage of the Total Number of Persons of a Given Nationality Marrying)

| Nationality of Person Marrying | Percentage of Men Marrying Women of a Different Nationality | Percentage of Women Marrying Men of a Different Nationality |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Russian | 16.0 | 17.2 |
| Ukrainian | 33.4 | 33.5 |
| Belorussian | 38.6 | 38.1 |
| Uzbek | 6.6 | 5.0 |
| Kazakh | 7.5 | 7.2 |
| Georgian | 17.9 | 9.5 |
| Azerbaijani | 11.5 | 4.4 |
| Lithuanian | 12.4 | 12.3 |
| Moldavian | 28.2 | 28.8 |
| Latvian | 25.3 | 24.0 |
| Kirghiz | 6.9 | 6.1 |
| Tajik | 12.9 | 11.5 |
| Armenian | 20.2 | 11.8 |
| Turkmen | 9.0 | 3.9 |
| Estonian | 15.8 | 15.2 |
| Jewish | 58.3 | 47.6 |
| German | 67.6 | 64.6 |
| Tatar | 40.9 | 42.2 |

According to figures from postwar censuses the number of ethnically mixed families has risen steadily. For example, whereas in 1970 such families comprised only 13.5 percent of all families, in 1989 they accounted for almost 18 percent.

The percentage of families of mixed ethnicity varies considerably from one union republic or settlement type to another. In urban areas it is higher by a factor of almost two than in rural areas. This is due to the great ethnic diversity of the urban population. Ethnically mixed families comprise approximately one-third of urban families in Moldavia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Latvia. In rural areas the greatest numbers of mixed families are found in Kazakhstan and Latvia.

Lithuania's Immigration, Outmigration Problems Examined

91UN0708A Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in Lithuanian No 50, 13-19 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by Ceslovas Grencevicius: "Wipe Your Tears, Native Land: Repatriation: How much from Lithuania and how much into it?"]

[Text] First, Vadimas Juodka (in official papers still written as Juodko) switched an apartment in the Perm region of Berezniki for one in Gardinas then later for one in Vilnius. Through double-switching he returned to the land of his forefathers. V. Juodka, a candidate in technical studies, is opening a private business in Vilnius.

On the other hand, 59-year old Anele Malakiene, a Lithuanian, expressed her desire to leave Lithuania

because of nationality discord. She wrote in her application, "I cannot stand the lies and injustices which now reign in Lithuania. And the ones who are suffering are the simple people and the retired. All that remains for them are empty shelves and prices."

Meanwhile, A. Aladyshevas is asking to be let into Lithuania because he wants "to live in a free and independent country and to serve in the troops defending that land." There are many like him.

Some in Moscow want very much to convince the world that the "nationalism intrusion" in Lithuania is breeding refugees and equate us with hotheads in other regions of the empire. The separation of countries is always significant in its migration process as well. In times of doom people want to be as close as possible to their motherland.

This year fewer people moved into Lithuania from the USSR. This is the first time this has happened in decades (since the time of deportations) according to Vladimiras Grazulis, director of the Office of Migration at the Ministry of Social Welfare.

During nine months of this year, 14,950 people moved from our Republic to live in the USSR, while the movement from there to Lithuania was 9,157. The arrivals include 3,950 Russians, 680 Belorussians, 2,358 Lithuanians, and 2,169 of other nationalities. In comparison, in 1987 the number of arrivals exceeded those leaving by 7,930; last year by 1,316. These are important migrational changes which, according to V. Grazulis, represent a wave of repatriation.

There are hundreds and thousands of fateful problems for people. The Lithuanian migration service anticipates several years of intensive work in preparing immigration and emigration laws. A proposal for an agreement between the governments of the Lithuanian Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic has been prepared (during nine months of this year in and out-migration totalled 13,600). V. Grazulis states that, along with the RSFSR, such an agreement should be reached with Belorussia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, as well as with (of a more general nature) the USSR. Of course, it is most important to provide living space. It is not always possible to come up with suitable exchanges. For example, there are quite a few wanting to return to Lithuania from Kazakhstan, but the number wanting to move there can be counted on one hand. Or here in Jonava, in building No. 16 on Zemaite Street, those who came from Murmansk to work in the Azota plant have now decided to resettle, usually in the largest cities in the USSR, and are demanding that the Lithuanian government build them apartments or take care of them in other ways? But who will build apartments for our people working and living in the barracks and train cars along the BAM [Baykal-Amur Main Rail Line] route?

Beginning in August of this year, questionnaires were begun to be circulated and systematized for citizens of the USSR desiring to leave Lithuania and those wanting to come here to live with us. They accumulate in the Office of Migration at the Ministry of Social Welfare (the municipal economic statistical center) through various channels where they are processed while a search is made for possible apartment exchanges. At the center I read letters expressing thanks for the help they received in finding apartments to exchange. This is the way that the majority seek to take care of their settlement needs. There are other possibilities: an apartment can be abandoned and the USSR government takes care of the individual in his chosen place of residence; compensation by local government institutions; buying an apartment from the government and selling it at auction. The data are sent to local governmental institutions while awaiting a reply.

At the present time, the computer at the Data Center holds data from 3,500 questionnaires, 2,300 of which are for leaving and about 1,250 which are for entering (for a total of about 10,000 people). About 100 questionnaires arrive each week. Of course, quite a few of them are incomplete. A. Stankevicius, director of this center's division, and R. Gudelyte, the head programmer, analyzed the questionnaires on hand and commented on some of the data. The largest majority to leave are Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians (many of the respondents did not indicate their nationality). Among those wanting to leave are also eight Lithuanian families and individuals (for a total of 20 people). Chief among the reasons given for wanting to leave are the desire to return to one's homeland and be reunited with one's family. However, many do not mention these reasons. National discord is mentioned as a reason for leaving is

mentioned by only a few dozen respondents. By the way, about 600 wanting to resettle in Lithuania as individuals or with their families are really asking for political asylum. They are escaping poverty in the USSR, seeking freedom, a better system, etc. Of those intending to move to Lithuania, a little over half descend from Lithuania or have connections with it.

It is important to recall that there are quite a few who never returned from being deported and quite a few political prisoners.

In writing, I keep hearing the lines carved out on a graveside polecross in the Birstonas cemetery for those who never returned from exile: "Wipe away your tears, my native land, and raise to the battle your remaining children." The fateful year of decision has arrived not only for Lithuania but also for other nations of the USSR. Therefore, we have to help those awakened by the call of their nation in every way possible. Some we have to see off graciously; others we have to welcome with care in helping them exchange apartments and settle in.

Call for Ending All State Support for Atheism

91UN1041A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Mar 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by V. Kalinin, RSFSR Honored Jurist: "On Fanatical Atheists and the Freedom of Conscience"]

[Text] My contemporaries can recall a song with the following, briskly cheerful refrain: "We will level churches and prisons to the ground." With regard to prisons, the song did not come true, and the hopes were not borne out. What happened was just the opposite: Many camp-type barracks had to be built in the Far North, in Siberia, and in even remoter areas. And the only prison that was closed down was the Taganskaya in Moscow. But as to churches, thousands of cathedrals, churches, monasteries, and convents were razed, just as the song had called for. The following metamorphosis—rare in history—also occurred: some monasteries and cathedrals were converted into prisons. And it happened that clergymen, together with their parishioners, bore their heavy cross there during the years of arbitrary rule and repressions. Let us believe and hope that these past events will not be repeated. But neither should we neglect or forget them.

Our country has put into effect a law entitled "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations"; it is a law that was born in torment and travail. But, I am convinced, it made its appearance as fully satisfactory for our times and for the immediate future. Organizations of all religious faiths are interested and motivated in seeing to it that this law works. Such organizations include rural parishes, the Patriarchate and the Buddhist temple [datsan], the mosques and synagogues. With each passing day they are becoming more and more active; they are beginning to understand their own rights and opportunities, to realize their independence and to defend their own interests.

The former legal statutes and provisions with regard to the registration of all religious societies in Moscow have been drowned in Lethe—the river of oblivion. A halt has been put to the demeaning procedure of the state registration of clergymen; and the normal taxation of clergymen's incomes has been established. Religious organizations can now transfer their nonliquid assets and religious possessions to their own property. Without any dwindling or "paring down," they can now teach "God's law," i.e., theology, the Koran, or the Torah even in the schoolroom. The introduction of an alternative service in accordance with one's conscience is finding support.

The time is coming whereby the power of the law is taking effect in the sphere of freedom of conscience instead of the force of an irreconcilable materialistic ideology. Party-type atheism is lapsing into silence. Certain ispolkom staff members are becoming increasingly agitated and disturbed because religious organizations are beginning to appeal to them more and more about religious matters. The plenipotentiary members of the Council for Religious Affairs are feeling uncomfortable because their power is coming to an end, and their positions are being abolished. The difficulties of professional atheists are becoming more tangible inasmuch as the law does not allow the state to finance activity with regard to propagandizing atheism.

Perestroika has been going on for some time now. But the "combat veterans" among the social scientists concerned about the communist upbringing and education of the people have not "grown old." And here now a large group of scholar-atheists under the aegis of the Inter-Republican Branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, belonging to the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee in the city of Kiev, have published a book entitled "Atheist Education: Contents, Forms, and Methodology" (Kiev, 1989). This book is devoted to the purpose of converting a believer into an atheist. It leaves out of consideration the issue of whether such a person wants to become an atheist or would prefer to believe in some god or other.

It is appropriate to pose the following question here: Upon what legal or ideological grounds, with what forces, and on whose account would the complex of measures proposed by the authors be carried out?

It is impossible to find serious, clear, convincing grounds on which to base such a goal as the need to re-educate believers and convert them into atheists. Would they be better in this new capacity, i.e., more honest and honorable, kinder, and more concerned for the people around them, and finally, more sober? Throughout the centuries the Orthodox Church has attempted to firm up the people's sobriety or temperance. Atheism avoids this topic, but I have long wanted to share some information which I read on this score in "The Clergyman's Desk Reference Book" (Vol 4). And so when a priest is hearing a confession, and the person involved tells him about a family conflict arising from an immoderate use of wine, i.e., drunkenness, the book advises the priest as follows

in his talk with the person involved: a) not to scold the person until he become sober; b) to try to influence the person not by threats but by kindness and steadfast convictions, by pointing out the harmfulness of alcohol for one's health, the devastating example for the children, and the material ruination of the family. Added to this is a prayer for the correction of the drunkard. It must be said that not only the Orthodox Church but also other faiths have been and still are extremely active in advocating the people's sobriety. And this cannot help but be deemed useful for our times.

At the highest political and state levels the previous position regarding the atheistic education of the population has been done away with. Such a goal as atheistic education is not to be found in either the CPSU Program or its Charter; nor is it to be found in the new law mentioned above. This new law does not permit any sort of official atheism. And the law must be followed unwaveringly, recognizing the human right of freedom of religious belief.

Circumstances have radically changed and are still changing.

Nowadays scientific atheists have stopped preaching about the reactionary essence of religion and asserting that it is immoral to be a believer.

With a serious budget deficit, it is becoming unavoidable for the CPSU to cut back on the staffs of party institutions. And, in the first place, this must, of course, affect the ideological scholarly institutions. As to the Institute of Scientific Atheism, to my way of thinking, it should be closed down entirely and as soon as possible. In addition to a tangible savings in monetary terms, such a decision would also bring about another real benefit. It would mean the genuine abandonment by the CPSU of the atheistic education of the people—something which has become outdated at the present stage of the society's development—as well as the acknowledgement of the evolving multi-party system. It must be admitted that, over a quarter of a century, this institute has not evolved as a center for cultural atheism, professing a person's legitimate right to freedom of conscience and religion.

For many decades atheism asserted itself to be a science, and, naturally, it influenced hundreds of scientists who wrote candidate's and doctoral dissertations. Here are just a few examples drawn from the 1989 KNIZHNAYA LETOPIS. L.V. Kalin became a candidate of philosophical sciences for a work entitled "Atheistic Education of Young Persons in a Labor Collective." At the MGU [Moscow State University] P. Khamshik defended a dissertation on the following topic: "Engineering and Technical Intelligentsia as an Object of Atheist Education." Doctoral dissertations were defended, in particular, by M.F. Dzhalilov on the urgent and promising topic of "The Inter-Relationship Between the Scientific and Technical Revolution and the Atheist World View," by Ya. Khodzhaev on the topic of "The Activity of Turkmenistan's Communist Party with Regard to Young

People's Atheist Education During the 1970's and 1980's" (defended at the Ukraine's Institute of Party History). And M.N. Usenova enriched scientific scholarship with a work entitled "The Socialist Family as a Factor in Forming an Individual's Atheist World View." All this took place quite recently—at the high point of perestroika and under the supervision of the VAK [Higher Certification Commission]. And it is continuing to this very day. And there is no one to call a halt to this stream of state-sponsored ideology, no one to impose obligations or constraints on the money flowing out of the state treasury. The Ministry of Finance should place rigid limits on works devoted to atheism. For, of course, atheism is really nothing but a disbelief in God, or, to use K. Marx's words, a "negative recognition of the Divine Being."

A great deal has changed in our life. During the past few years certain decrees once passed by the CPSU Central Committee have been abrogated. However, some party documents which have essentially outlived their usefulness still maintain a kind of pro forma existence. Among the latter are, undoubtedly, the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, dated 7 July 1954 and entitled "On Major Shortcomings in Scientific-Atheistic Propaganda and Measures To Improve It." This document prescribed the following point for schools, specialized secondary educational institutions, and VUZ's: "The teaching of subjects (history, literature, natural science, physics, chemistry, etc.) shall be saturated with atheistic contents." It is my profound conviction that this portion of the decree was unconstitutional in its nature from the very beginning. But to this day those teachers who are fanatically devoted to atheism base their stance of universal atheism on the above-mentioned document.

The Moscow City Committee for Public Education has not yet revoked the methodological recommendations according to which it is suggested that teachers interpret curricular material for "exposing" the religious world view. This begins in the first grade and pertains to all subjects, including mathematics, drawing, music, and even physical education (no fooling!). The main moving force in this matter is A.N. Alekseyev, the "patriarch" of pedagogical atheism and a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. He has written 23 textbooks and a good hundred articles on the atheist education of schoolchildren and students at pedagogical colleges.

Even at VUZ's it is suggested that the teaching of specialized disciplines be saturated, i.e., filled and soaked through, with atheism. A pamphlet by R.N. Danilchenko, a docent at the Moscow Steel and Alloys Institute ("Atheist Education—An Important Factor in Affirming Communist Morality," Moscow, 1987) reports that, according to the institute's plan, atheist education encompasses the entire process of teaching and educating students from the first through the fifth course of instruction. And it permeates the teaching of the sociopolitical and specialized disciplines. I would have no objection to this provided that the steel and

alloys made by the atheist "recipes" and technologies came up to high, world standards. But alas....

The USSR Supreme Soviet has assigned the task of revising the instructional program within the state system of education in accordance with the legal or legitimate right to freedom of conscience. It seems to me that the students should not have to take exams and checkups on the course of the former scientific atheism, which has now been termed the "history of religion and atheism." Because, after all, according to the new law, citizens shall have access to education regardless of their attitude toward religion.

Within the USSR State Committee for Public Education the adherents of scientific atheism do not want to lose this line of activity for "professional atheists," powerful people, as one scholarly lady-atheist expressed it, to lose "our daily bread." But the law has been passed, and the decision must be taken not from the viewpoint of atheist education, but rather by putting first a person's right, his conscience, and the freedom about which this law speaks.

Let me make a cautious suggestion. It may be that the adherence of the USSR State Committee for Public Education to scientific education is to be explained by the fact that V.N. Savelyev, the system's leading specialist, is one of the theorists of atheist education for young persons. Quite recently his printed work entitled "Atheist Education of Young Persons During the Period of Perestroika," Moscow, 1989) was published (co-authored with Z.A. Tuzhurizina). From beginning to end this work asserts the OBLIGATION to provide an atheist education for our young students. On p 17 the two candidates of sciences reproach "major writers and poets, artists and sculptors who did not help the cause of atheist education during the period of stagnation." "We know of hardly any works of art," the authors exclaim, "wherein the figure of a conscious materialist and atheist is embodied...."

Perhaps the democratization of public education under the conditions of restructuring the higher schools will provide the basis for the USSR State Committee for Public Education to seek out and find other approaches which would correspond to the meaning and the spirit of the new law. Such a decision would give hopes for the task assigned by the USSR government, in connection with the new law, for revising the teaching program in the state educational system, for bringing it into line with the right to freedom of conscience. From academic year 1992/93 on the programs and curricula of all educational institutions must be purged of atheist "saturation."

A significant place in the law is occupied by charitable activity and mercy, right up to creating for this purpose associations, societies, and brotherhoods, institutions for those persons in need of help and support. The law speaks directly about the right of religious organizations to organize shelters, boarding-schools, hospitals, and other institutions of a charitable nature. Contributions and deductions which are channeled into charitable and merciful types of causes shall be deductible from the total amounts subject to taxation.

This can be spoken about directly and frankly, inasmuch as for many long years there was a predominant conviction that, in the first place, charitable activity by religious organizations was prohibited by law (although not a single law said anything about this matter). And, in the second place, the amoral nature of charitable activity in our socialist society was pointed to, inasmuch as it was considered that Soviet man was provided with everything by means of state and public funds and, therefore, had no need of "handouts."

Our words of praise about the new USSR law does not signify that it is ideal. I have reservations about it. To my

way of thinking, this law should have banned the conduct of political meetings and other demonstrations of a political nature in areas or rooms set aside for religious organizations.

When working out this law, a model was made for the mechanism of its implementation. Its being "measured to fit life" was created theoretically. Now its real life is beginning—a life which will interweave the relationships among and attitudes of people, religious organizations, their clergymen, organs of state power and administration, their leading officials, and rank-and-file employees. And for everybody there is one guideline—the Law.

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